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1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
“The key, absolutely fundamental rights of workers are those rights that enable the working 
people to fight for and defend their rights. This group of rights consist of three rights namely, 
the right to establish and join trade unions, the right to collective bargaining and the right to 
strike”.1  
The freedom to exercise these rights has to be acknowledged as an undeniable characteristic of a 
liberated society.2 A society which lacks the right to strike cannot be regarded as a democratic 
one.3 The effort to obtain rights for workers in South Africa has always been and continues to be 
placed within an extensive framework of ideological and basic human rights battle for the people 
of the country.4 Over the centuries industrial action has been fundamental in contributing to the 
“cathartic progression” which has carved the edifice of employment law5 as we know it today. 
South Africa’s transition to democratic labour relations has been interwoven with socio-
economic developments.6  
The Wiehahn Commission’s (the Commision) Report of 1979 emerged as an oasis to a parched 
and weary nation and a turning point in South African labour relations. It is only upon the 
publication of the Commission’s Report could the majority of South Africa’s labour force benefit 
from labour rights, particularly the legalisation of strike action.7 The development of the right to 
strike, therefore, cannot be regarded in isolation but rather it is an essential mechanism utilised to 
                                                          
1 E Manamela & M Budheli, ‘Employees’ right to strike and violence in South Africa’ (2013) 46(3) CILSA 309.  
2 J Bowers & M Duggan The Modern Law of Strikes (1987) 1. 
3 L MacFarlane The Right to Strike (1981) 12. 
4 R Bernikow ‘Ten years of the CCMA- An assessment for labour’ DITSELA (Western Cape) Labour Law Seminar 
(2007) 13. 
5 W P Visser ‘“To fight the battle of the workers”: The emergence of pro-strike publications in the early twentieth 
century South Africa’ (2004) 49(3) International Review of Social History 3. 
6 D du Toit ‘Industrial democracy in South Africa’s transition’ (1997) 1 LDD 39. 
7 P Benjamin, R Jacobus & C Alberton Strikes, Lockouts and Arbitration in the South African Labour 
Law.Proceedings of the Labour Law Conference 1988 (1989) 27. 
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counteract the dictates of management8 as well as promote and defend the interests of trade 
union members.9 
 In South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and another,10 it was held that 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution) entrenches the right for trade unions to collectively bargain, as well as their 
members’ right to strike in order to advance collective bargaining.11 Thus, there exists an 
inextricable relationship between these components because, “[i]f workers [can]not, in the last 
resort, collectively refuse to work, they [can]not bargain collectively.”12 The constitutionalisation 
of employment rights has thus beneficially influenced labour law13 by enshrining the 
fundamental right to strike action within South African legislation.14 
South Africa’s development of strike action echoes a historically segregated workforce.15 
Government’s past enactment of discriminatory legislation created a divide between blacks and 
whites16 thus inciting labour unrest, which has had both domestic and international 
ramifications.17 Due to these racial policies, in 1964 the country was compelled to resign from 
the International Labour Organization (ILO).18 After being threatened with international 
exclusion and sanctions alongside a tremulous economy, Government was compelled to reform 
its policies.19 
                                                          
8 T Cohen & L Mattee ‘Public Servant’s right to strike in Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa - A comparative 
study’ (2014) 17(4) PER 1631. 
9 L J Matee Limitation on Freedom of Association The Case of Public Officers in Lesotho (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Kwazulu- Natal, 2013) 9. 
10 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC). 
11 South African National Defence Union supra note 10 at 20. 
12 J Brand Strike avoidance - How to develop an effective strike avoidance strategy? 23rd Annual Labour Law 
Conference (2010) 1.  
13 G M Ferreira ‘The development of South African labour law for the past ten years (1994-2004)’ (2005) 24(2) 
Politeia 17. 
14 S Vettori ‘The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the protection of trade unions’ (2005) 17 SA Merc LJ 297. 
15 W P Visser ‘A racially divided class: Strikes in South Africa, 1973- 2004’ available at 
http://www.sun.academia.edu/WesselVisser, accessed on 5 July 2015.  
16 V Mhungu Positive Discrimination in South African Employment Law: Has Affirmative Action Overstayed its 
Welcome? (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Kwazulu- Natal, 2013) 1. 
17 T Cohen ‘Limiting organizational rights of minority unions: POPCRU v LEDWABA [2013] 11 BLLR 1137 (LC)’ 
(2014) 17(5) PER 2209. 
18 B P S Van Eck ‘Regulated flexibility and the Labour Relations Bill of 2012’ 2013 De Jure 605. 
19 W P Visser ‘From MWU to solidarity – A trade union reinventing itself’ (2006) 30(2) SAJLR 4. 
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A defining event in the country’s history of labour was the mass strike action in Durban during 
1973,20 which served as a precursor to the renaissance of labour reformation that emerged 
through the Commission’s Reforms in 1979.21 This led to numerous amendments to labour 
legislation which for the first time endowed all employees with equal rights irrespective of 
race.22 Copious legislation have since then been enforced to ameliorate labour law.23 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
South Africa’s Labour Relations Act 66 of 1996 (hereafter referred to the LRA) has been 
declared as one of “the world’s most progressive labour legislation[s]”.24 However, in the light of 
the volatile strike action that has threatened to cripple the country over recent years,25 industrial 
action which is the uniting of workers as a fortified front has been replaced by generating fear 
and causing destruction.26 This necessitates a closer examination of South Africa’s labour 
legislation in order to critique how effective it is in regulating industrial action. If indeed South 
Africa’s labour legislation can be described as one of the most advanced, surely strike action 
which is constitutionally enforced for all South African workers27 should not be described as a 
“massacre”?28 
The progression of South Africa’s labour legislation has become a superstructure built upon 
legislature’s response to industrial action.29 This is evident in the gruesome 1922 Rand Rebellion 
which sowed the seed for the promulgation of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924 
(hereafter referred to as the Industrial Conciliation Act).30 Due to the Industrial Conciliation 
                                                          
20 ibid 4. 
21 J F Myburgh ‘100 years of strike law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 964. 
22 M Wiseman ‘Recent South African labour legislation: Assessing the new rights of black workers’ (1986) 179 
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 163. 
23 M Budeli ‘Workers’ right to freedom of association and trade unionism in South Africa’ (2009) 15(2) Fundamina: 
A Journal of Legal History 14. 
24 R Welch ‘Rights to strike in UK and SA law: A comparison’ (2000) 26 International Union Rights 26.  
25 D T Masiloane ‘Guaranteeing the safety of non-striking employees during strikes: The fallacy of policing’ (2010) 
23(2) Acta Criminologica 35. 
26 P Zulu ‘Reflections on mass action, ethics and rationality’ 2009 African Journal of Rhetoric: Moments of 
Engagement- Power, Rhetoric and Protests 207. 
27 R Venter Labour Relations in South Africa (2006) 44. 
28 C Chinguno ‘Marikana: fragmentation, precariousness, strike violence and solidarity’ (2013) 40(138) Review of 
African Political Economy 639. 
29 Muburgh (note 21 above; 962). 
30 Act 11 of 1924. 
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Act’s exclusion of blacks from its definition of an employee,31 blacks remained excluded from 
trade union membership and the use of industrial action for 55 years. Even though white trade 
unions were permitted registration,32 their right to engage in strike action was severely 
constrained by the dispute resolution system of the industrial councils.33 
The transition from oppression to democracy ultimately led to the enactment of numerous 
legislation intended to protect employees by extending various rights and implementing 
frameworks to address the consequences of century long inequalities.34 The Constitution 
entrenches labour rights and most significantly the right to strike,35 while the LRA provides an 
extensive framework to govern dispute resolution and affords organisational rights as well as the 
right to strike. The LRA’s implementation of bargaining councils have been effective, however, 
it has encountered a number of challenges, mainly due to the deficiency of additional 
programmes to enforce successful bargaining.36 Since these enactments, labour relations have 
undergone fundamental changes to employment.37  
It is therefore necessary to emphasise that trade unionism and its active involvement in strike 
action have been fundamental in shaping labour relations. Even years into democracy, strike 
action still demands the attention of the employer.38 It has to be conceded that strike action is 
predictable, as it is the ultimate weapon workers can utilise to protect their interests.’39 This in 
turn has resulted in a dramatic increase in strike action over the years, which has had drastic 
consequences for the country at large. This dissertation will not question the function or purpose 
of industrial action, but rather it will seek to analyse the reasons why violent strike action has 
escalated over the years in the light of legislation.  
                                                          
31 s 1. 
32 M Uys ‘Factors Influencing the Future Existence of Trade Unions in South Africa’ (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of the North-West, 2011) 4. 
33 D S Harrison Collective Bargaining Within the Labour Relationshipin a South African Context (unpublished LLM 
thesis, University of the North-West, 2004) 24. 
34 P Benjamin ‘Labour market regulation: International and South African Perspectives’ HSRC Employment and 
Economic Research Program (2005) 41. 
35 The Constitution; s 27. 
36 S Godfrey, J Theron & M Visser ‘The state of centralized bargaining in South Africa: An empirical and 
conceptual study of collective bargaining’ DPRU Working Paper 07/ 130 (2007) [4]. 
37 Cohen (note 17 above; 2210). 
38 G Murwirapaechena ‘Exploring the incidents of strikes in post-apartheid South Africa’ (2014) 13(3) International 
Business & Economics Research Journal 553. 
39 M A Chicktay ‘Placing the right to strike within an international framework’ 2006 27(2) Obiter 346. 
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The violence which accompanies strikes is increasingly disturbing. When procedures 
implemented for dispute resolution are ignored, court interdicts disregarded and strikers engage 
in intimidation and violence to assert their claims, it is quite blatant that South Africa needs to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the policies and procedures it has enforced to regulate dispute 
resolution.40 Even more alarming is that strike action used today to assert demands, are compared 
to those which occurred prior to the promulgation of the Constitution. This begs the question of 
whether South Africa’s progress is merely inscribed in policy rather than practice. 
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This research is intended to be an evaluation of the effectiveness of the LRA in managing and 
supervising the implementation of the right to strike. The dissertation acknowledges that there 
are many contributing factors  that cause violence and unwarranted illegal conduct of strikers 
such as inequality between races which have been inherited from apartheid, poverty and social 
deficiencies, union rivalry and unemployment to name a few.41 However, this dissertation will 
not engage in any discussion pertaining to the above mentioned contributing factors. The main 
objectives of the study are as follows:  
 The dissertation will analyze the effectiveness of the provisions of the LRA and how 
successful it has been in managing and preventing illegal and violent strike action.  
 The dissertation will also consider the possible pitfalls of the provisions of the LRA as 
well as the interpretation of such provisions by the Judiciary which could be probable 
contributors to the increase in violent strike action.  
 The dissertation will also provide recommendations on how the LRA could help decrease 
strike violence. 
  
                                                          
40 C Bosch … et al The Tokiso Report on the State of Labour Dispute Resolution in South Africa (2013) 17. 
41 G Murwirapechena & K Sibanda ‘Exploring the incidents of strikes in post-apartheid South Africa’ (2014) 13(3) 
International Business & Economics Research Journal 554. 
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1.4. RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
Firstly, cognisance must be given to the fact that the Constitution provides all workers with the 
right to strike among other labour rights.42 The constitutionalisation of the right to strike is the 
recompense for the militant stance organisations adopted, which has culminated in the right to 
engage in strike action as well as to promote democracy.43 Additionally, the Constitution also 
enforces basic human rights enshrined in chapter 10. However, recent strikes have seen essential 
services come to a devastating halt with chronic patients not attended to and urgent surgeries 
completely disregarded in hospitals.44 Furthermore, due to the fact that intimidation and violence 
are so frequent during strike action it has “been established as a tradition”.45 
For instance, the strike in 2010 caused essential services to come to an abrupt standstill and court 
interdicts to be defied. This was an unequivocal violation of s 71(10) of the LRA. In 2011, the 
engineering strike resulted in workers using intimidation and violence to canvass through 
factories to prevent non-striking workers from carrying on employment.46 During the Marikana 
strike, 34 striking platinum miners were mercilessly shot to death leaving homes without 
incomes and robbing families of their fathers and husbands. This repulsed the country and sent 
shock waves through the international world while taking on the title of a massacre, likened to 
the Soweto uprisings.47 This is indeed a calamitous problem. It is unacceptable that legislation, 
which endorses basic human rights, should also contain a right which infringes upon such human 
rights. This is evidently not the intention of legislature and should not be deemed acceptable, as 
the right to strike is essential to the implementation of freedom and democracy48 and should not 
contravene the very purpose it seeks to uphold. 
Secondly, the LRA provides a regulatory framework which outlines the procedures for collective 
bargaining and effective dispute resolution. Additionally, it provides a list of workers who may 
                                                          
42 The Constitution; s 27. 
43 B Hepple‘The right to strike in an international context’ available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/.../- 
StrikeSymposium09-Hepple.pdf, accessed on 2 June 2015. 
44 TR Mle ‘A critical analysis of the 2010 Public Service strike in South Africa: A service delivery approach’, 
available at http://www.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic/.../jpad-v47-ni-si1-a7.pdf, accessed on 13 April 2015. 
45 P Benjamin ‘Assessing South Africa’s commission for conciliation, mediation and arbitration (CCMA)’ Working 
Paper No. 47 (2013) 35. 
46 Bosch (note 40 above; 17). 
47 P Alexander ‘Marikana, turning point in South African history’ (2013) 40(138) Review of African Political 
Economy 611. 
48 Matee (note 9 above; 1). 
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not engage in strike action, and if such workers do engage in strikes then such action will be 
unprotected. However, the mere fact that numerous strikes have been characterised by brutality 
and are unprotected, illustrates that there is a discrepancy between what policy strives to achieve 
and the veracity of industrial action. 
This is indeed concerning, as our legislation cannot be deemed to be advanced on the one hand 
while on the other hand reality negates the core moral values legislation intends to implement. It 
is therefore essential that this dissertation not only evaluate current legislation in its regulation of 
strike action, but also posit amendments where defects exist, as well as suggestions on how 
policies and procedures should be implemented to ensure compliance. 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 How has industrial action contributed to the development of South African labour 
legislation before and after the promulgation of the 1996 Constitution? 
 What are the policies which regulate the employment relationship between employer and 
employee?  
 More pertinently, are they adequate in preventing conflict from escalating into strike 
action?  
 Is the recent epidemic of strike action indicative of the flaws in legislation’s competence 
in regulating strike action? 
 If indeed there are such flaws in our legislation, what can be done to amend these laws in 
order to prevent a recurrence of past events? 
1.6. METHODOLOGY 
This is a desktop study and the compilation of this dissertation will include visits to various 
libraries to consult information resources as well as the extensive uses of the interlibrary loan 
facility are envisaged. Numerous sources will be utilised in writing this dissertation, which 
include both South African and international sources such as books, journal articles, conference 




1.7. TIME FRAME FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The work on this dissertation began in 2015 and it is envisaged that it will be completed in 1 
year. 
1.8. OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS 
In chapter 2 the dissertation will begin with a discussion on the development of labour legislation 
which led to the endorsement of the right to strike. In chapter 3 the dissertation will then go on to 
elaborate on the international laws and international instruments that protect and regulate the 
right to strike. Chapter 4 will then go on to discuss the entrenchment of fundamental labour 
rights that are enshrined within the LRA. Chapter 5 will focus on the regulation of strike action 
and the various methods that the LRA endorses to eliminate and deter illegal strike action. 
Chapter 6 will illustrate the recent strike action that has plagued our country as well as suggest 
possible solutions which would decrease violent and unprotected strike action. In conclusion, the 
dissertation will summarize the significant aspects of the discussion and will provide concluding 




THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR LEGISLATION 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
“The freedom of employees to combine and to withdraw their labour is their fundamental 
safeguard against the inherent imbalance of power between the employer and the individual 
employee. This freedom has been accepted as a hallmark of a free society”.1 
 
In order to fully appreciate the right to strike within our free society, one has to take cognisance 
of its progression over the centuries. It is trite that the right to strike has been postulated as 
necessary to enforce fairness within the collective bargaining system.2 However, the role of 
industrial action far exceeds its mere purpose within labour relations.3 
Firstly, it is imperative to state that historically South African labour relations were established 
upon a system of gross inequality.4 Therefore, it is within this system that the pertinence of 
industrial action is highlighted, as the effort to obtain rights for workers has always been and 
continues to be placed within an extensive framework of ideological and basic human rights 
battle.5 It has become quite common for workers to make certain demands within their 
employment circumstances that they now see manifest within the political sphere.6 Significant 
amendments to South Africa’s policies have fueled Government’s attempts to address the socio-
political deficiencies of the country.7 
                                                          
1 J Bowers & M Duggan The Modern Law of Strikes (1987) 1. 
2 A Bogg The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition (2009) 256. 
3 M A Chicktay ‘Placing the right to strike within a human rights framework’ (2006) 27(2) Obiter 348. 
4 V Mbungu ‘Positive discrimination in South African employment law: Has affirmative action overstayed its 
welcome’ (unpublished LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu- Natal, 2013) 1. 
5 R Bernikow ‘Ten years of the CCMA- An assessment for labour’ DITSELA (Western Cape) Labour Law Seminar 
(2007) 13. 
6 T Novitz International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (2003) 57. 




The trade union movement has been fundamental in structuring the political and socio-economic 
policies of South Africa.8 It is therefore fundamental to emphasise the role of South African trade 
unions9 and their alignment with political organisations that have largely contributed to the 
egalitarian society we live and work within.10 It is even more crucial to accentuate the role of 
labour legislation and its progression despite the oppressive laws enacted to repress race groups 
in the past. However, legislation has not been enforced simply upon the request of workers, but 
rather it is the significance of strike action and its crippling effect on the economy, which has 
largely contributed to attracting Government’s rapid response to changing legislation over time. 
It is for this reason that the evolution of strike action cannot be mentioned without referring to 
the epoch of apartheid. 
This chapter deals exclusively with the evolution of labour law within the repressive regime of 
apartheid. It firstly explicates the inception of South Africa as a Union and the beginning of 
industrial labour in South Africa. It further discusses the birth of the first trade union as well as 
the earliest noted strike actions, which saw Government enforcing legislation to contain disputes.  
Secondly, the chapter goes on to discuss the establishment of the country as a Union and the 
initiation of oppressive legislation. This era sees the rise of white supremacy and the violent 
clashes by black workers against apartheid labour laws.  
Thirdly, the chapter elaborates on the rights of workers within the apartheid regime. It becomes 
apparent that the role of legislation was merely to facilitate the agendas of Government in 
maintaining white dominance. Finally the chapter discusses the radical changes which initiated a 
reformation within labour law as well as the country as a whole. 
In order to comprehend where our country is going, one firstly has to acknowledge where we 
have come from. 
  
                                                          
8 G Murwirapachena ‘Exploring the incidents of strikes in post apartheid South Africa’ (2014) 13(3) International 
Business & Economics Research Journal 553. 
9 C Twala & B Kompi ‘The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the tripartite alliance: A 
marriage of (In) Convenience? HASA Conference (University of the North- West) Reflecting on the 25 years of 
COSATU (1985-2010) (2010) 174. 
10 B Hepple ‘The Right to Strike in an international context’, available at http//:www.law.utoronto.ca/documents-
/conferences2/strikeSymposium09-Hepple.pdf, accessed 5 July 2015. 
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2.2 THE INCEPTION OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
2.2.1. The period between the years 1652 and 1910 
In 1652 the Dutch East Indian Company11 was established by the European settlers when they 
descended upon the shores of South Africa along with a small number of unskilled slaves.12 In 
1658 there was a great need for labourers, which necessitated shipments of slaves from areas 
such as Angola, Guinea Coast and in subsequent years as the need arose, from southern India, 
Ceylon, Indonesia and Madagascar.13 Slavery was the backbone of the labour industry of South 
Africa. 
In 1809 the slave trade was legally abolished.14 However, the concept of slavery still existed,15 
and only in 1934 did South Africa formally abolish slavery. As a result thereof, Government 
passed non-racial legislation to regulate the rights and functions between master and servant.16 
Legislation was however merely to prescribe the duties of the employer and worker as no 
struggle for power existed between the parties. The trade union movement was insignificant 
during this time; as such a need did not present itself.17 This was to change through the industrial 
revolution. 
The nineteenth century marked the inception of the country’s industrial development as a result 
of the gold and diamond discoveries,18 which consequently led to the establishment of the 
mining industry19 as well as other industries necessary to sustain the mining industry. The 
                                                          
11 G W Mukundi South Africa: Constitutional, Legislative and Administrative Provisions Concerning Indigenous 
Peoples (2009) 10. 
12 D Nupen ‘Constitutionalism and Political Stability in South Africa’ (2004) 4(2) African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution 120. 
13 G H  Le May Black and White in South Africa: The politics of Survival (1971) 5, F Wilson Labour in the South 
African Gold Mines 1911-1969 (1972) 1.  
14 N J Rhoodie Apartheid and Racial Partnership in Southern Africa (1969) 13. 
15 H Corder, N Hayson & P Malherb Focus on the History of Labour Legislation (1979) 29. 
16 M Budheli ‘Workers’ right to freedom of association and trade unionism in South Africa’ (2009) 15(2) 
Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History 2. 
17 M Kittner, M Korner- Dammann & A Schunk  Labour Uunder the Apartheid Regime- Practical Problems and the 
Legal Framework of Labour Relations in South Africa  (1989) 3 
18 J S Saul & S Gelb The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution (1981) 10, W H Thomas The 
Socio-Political Structure of the South African Economy-its Dynamic Perspective in South Africa: Industrial 
Relations and Industrial Sociology (1979) 6. 
19 F A van Jaarsveld From van Riebeeck to Vorster 1652-1974 (1975) 159. 
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development of gold mining necessitated the procurement of labour.20 South Africa possessed a 
majority of Asian and Black unskilled labourers.21 This was insufficient for the demand required 
by these emergent industries22 therefore skilled European, American as well as Australian 
labourers were brought in to fill the gap.23 Trade unionism is essentially a British concept,24 and 
it is with these immigrants that the first trade unions of South Africa were initiated.25 It is 
significant to draw attention to the fact that Asians and blacks constituted the vast majority of 
unskilled labourers, who were unrepresented by trade unions.26 
As a result of the displacement of black labourers during the Anglo-Boer War, which took place 
between 1899 and 1902,27 many black labourers did not return to the mines after the war. 
Therefore an urgent need for labourers arose. This precipitated the immigration of Chinese 
workers. However, due to a number of conflicting issues that presented itself, the repatriation of 
these immigrants was compelled by Government.28  The beginning of the 1900’s experienced an 
endemic of impetuous strike action as a result of dissatisfaction in working conditions.29 These 
strikes are pertinent to the development of labour legislation as they resulted in Government’s 
hasty efforts to contain the aggressive stance that these workers had taken by implementing 
various laws.30 Although legislation was futile in curtailing the torrent of strikes that threatened 
to wreak havoc during the early 1900’s,31 these enactments ultimately restrained workers from 
trade unionism and strike activity for over a decade. These early strikes included the 1907 and 
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1913 miners’ strikes, the railway and printer’s strike in 1911, as well as a general strike which 
took place in 1914.32 
The general strike of 1914 was an extension of the 1913 strike, which led to the enactment of 
further legislation that sought to stifle strike action.  On 14 January 1914, Government declared 
martial law and ordered the arrest of many labour leaders, as well as the deportation of nine 
strike leaders. These actions were supported by Parliament, and made possible by the 
promulgation of the Indemnity and Undesirables Special Importation Act.33 Government 
presented the Peace Preservation Bill to Parliament in 1914, which effectively abolished workers 
rights to engage in strikes, picketing and abdicated all forms of freedom of speech and assembly. 
This was strongly opposed and resulted in the enactment of the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal 
law Act34 which banned the forced enrollment to unions, violent forms of strike action and 
picketing, along with an absolute ban on strikes within public service functionaries, as well as 
increasing the level of control of law enforcement.35 
Government made further efforts to address the turmoil within industrial labour law by enacting 
the Workman’s Compensation Act36 along side the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law 
Amendment Act,37 which sought to increase the states’ control on the disorder initiated by public 
persons and trade unions.38 These enactments were a direct result of the early strike action during 
the 1900’s which sought to prevent future anarchy caused by industrial action. A significant 
progression in legislation was the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act39 which pioneered South 
Africa’s first system of conciliation. It applied only to mining, engineering and metal sectors, 
essential municipal services and the building industry. The Industrial Disputes Prevention Act 
excluded black and Asian workers and employers who employed less than ten white workers.40 
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The Industrial Disputes Prevention Act stipulated that if employers intended to make any 
amendments to the terms and conditions of the employment relationship, a month’s notice of 
such changes was required.41 Where an employee disagreed with such changes, and only if the 
proposed changes affected ten or more of the employees of the enterprise, a conciliation and 
investigation board would be assigned in terms of the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act.42 It is 
imperative to note that the dispute resolution framework created under the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the LRA) is very similar to that created under the Industrial 
Disputes Prevention Act, as both of these enactments provide for parties to engage in 
conciliation regarding disputes of interest, such as terms and conditions of employment. 
Where disputes arose regarding terms and conditions of employment, the board would be 
charged with the responsibility of investigating the conflict and providing a report on their 
findings. These findings were not regarded as obligatory, but rather consultative.43 Under the 
Industrial Disputes Prevention Act, strike action was permissible. However, this right of recourse 
was only available once the investigative board had given its report on the conflict and when 
independent action to resolve the dispute by the parties had come to an end.44 The Industrial 
Disputes Prevention Act was pivotal to the progression of labour rights as it afforded workers the 
lawful means of countering the dictates of employers. Instead of merely accepting conditions of 
employment, the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act provided for a legal means of negotiating 
disagreements through the establishment of the conciliation and investigation board. In addition, 
strike action as early as 1909 was recognised by legislature as a social power that could be used 
to induce employers into submission when conciliation was unsuccessful. 
It is essential to note that as early as 1909 conciliatory bodies similar to those created under the 
LRA were formed to settle disputes. Even though these councils differed in that their findings 
were not obligatory in contrast to the binding nature of collective agreements reached through 
the bargaining councils,45 they are comparable in terms of the purpose their existence seeks to 
fulfill which is to resolve disputes and issues relating to terms and conditions of employment.46 It 
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is also worth mentioning that strike action from the early 1900’s was used as a mechanism to 
assert demands on employers. When one seeks to understand the essence of strike action, one 
becomes aware that regardless of the era in which strike action originated, the purpose for which 
it exists pervades through generations. 
2.3. THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS UNDER THE APARTHEID REGIME AND THE 
PROGRESSION INTO DEMOCRATISED SOCIETY (1910-1948) 
2.3.1. The period between the years of 1910-1948 
In 1910, due to the convergence of the various railway systems,47 the previous Boer Republics in 
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State as well as the Cape and Natal British colonies emerged48 
to form the Union of South Africa.49 A constitution was adopted by the country which placed all 
inhabitants under British rule. Those who did not comply with the normative standards of 
European rule were deemed to be subjects of administration.50 The constitutionalisation of white 
supremacy was an indication to blacks that white aristocracy was not willing to enforce 
equality.51 
The concept of white dominance and black oppression was well established by 1910, and until 
the latter part of the twentieth century altered very little in its intents and purposes.52 The Union 
was able to implement the edifice of the 'colour bar' through the enactment of various racial laws 
structured for the specific oppression and exploitation and subjugation of the black race.53 The 
ideology of racial segregation and political control established the foundation of the 
superstructure of the labour framework.54 
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White labour leaders were some of the first political leaders to welcome segregation policies. 
These labour leaders were compelled to respond to the white labourer’s concerns that black 
workers would replace the unskilled white. Therefore, out of fear the white labourer demanded 
segregation55 and Government willingly complied with their demand through the promulgation 
of discriminatory legislation. In 1911, the Mines and Wage Act56 was passed which formed the 
cornerstone on which further discriminatory policies would be implemented.57 The Mines and 
Wage Act effectively sought to enforce the reservation of job categories specifically for white 
workers.58 It applied broadly to not only the mining industry but also to the tramways, 
infrastructure and construction sectors.59 The Mines and Wage Act effectively provided that 
workers possess competency certificates in order to occupy skilled positions within the mines.60 
In addition, such competency certificates were not to be issued to non-Europeans in the 
Transvaal and Free State provinces.61 
However, if such competency certificates were issued in any other province, these would 
consequently be denied acknowledgement in the Transvaal and Free State provinces.62 This 
legislation was implemented to stifle the progression of the black worker by ensuring that blacks 
only undertook menial labour. It is submitted that the effect of this legislation restrained black 
workers as unskilled labourers. It is imperative to reiterate that the South African economy was 
at its peak during the early 1900’s as a result of the gold and diamond discoveries. Consequently, 
employers required an abundance of labour at a cheap rate. This led to the enactment of further 
legislation in favour of the white employer. 
The Native Labour Regulations Act63 was promulgated to fortify the grip on black labour by 
ensuring that these workers were more economical to obtain and keep hold of, as black 
workers formed the perennial of cheap and unskilled workforce.64 The Native Labour 
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Regulations Act stipulated that a written contract had to be concluded as well as attestation to 
take place before a judicial officer such as a magistrate.65 Employers were explicitly 
prohibited from coercing employees for reasons such as higher salaries or benefits “to desert 
or to break any binding contract”.66 In addition, employees themselves were held criminally 
liable if they failed to carry out the terms of the employment contract without a lawful 
reason.67 
This is quite evident in the case of R v Smit,68 where the court dealt with the common law 
approach to strike action and held that a strike is essentially the refusal to continue work, which 
constitutes a breach on the part of the employee in his contract. The employer in such 
circumstances is entitled to cancel the employment contract and dismiss the employee without 
prior notice. Therefore, following from the Native Labour Regulations Act as well as case law, if 
black employees embarked upon strike action it would have been regarded as a breach in his 
employment contract and he would be dismissed without a right of recourse. Black workers thus 
lacked a crucial element in dispute resolution as they could not use strike action as a threat to 
employers. 
Even though black labourers approached racial policies with much resistance, this resistance was 
not successfully expressed through labour movements.69 A significant trade union that arose in 
the early 1900’s was the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) which was the 
forerunner of the African National Congress (ANC). The constitution that was adopted in 1910 
initiated the same militant stance the (SANNC)70 had taken against the reservation of thirty-two 
job specifications for white labour. Thus, the SANNC gained the support of black workers.71 
Even though the SANNC remonstrated against the exclusion of rights pertaining to voting, as 
well as many others laws, this, however, proved futile as segregation policies continued all the 
more.72 Consequently, there was a desperate cry among black workers for a voice that would 
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speak on their behalf against these injustices. This cry was thought to be heeded to in the 
formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU). 
The year 1918 was when the first black workers’ union took root under the leadership of General 
Secretary Clemens Kadalie.73 The ICU was the most prominent union to be established on the 
African continent74 and by the latter part of the 1920’s over 100 000 members constituted the 
ICU.75 However, regardless of its large membership by 1931 the union had become a vapor in 
the wind and could not survive as a result of ineffective leadership, poor administration and 
external stress placed upon it.76 In contrast to black unions during the 1920’s, white unions 
flourished. In 1920, the British Amalgamated Society of Engineers combined with smaller craft 
unions to become the Amalgamated Engineering Union. The exclusion of black workers branded 
them as ‘pseudo-craft’ unions. 
The term ‘pseudo’ essentially denotes something that is pretentious and false.77 It must be noted 
that the progression of initial craft unions was based on the skills of its members. Therefore, it 
has been argued that these unions represented themselves as skilled workers within labour 
sectors to intentionally exclude black workers who by tradition and as a result of the Mines and 
Wage Act were regarded as unskilled labourers.78 This effectually allowed white workers to 
advance over their black counterparts. Thus, white craft unions were an illusory pretense of 
skilled workers unions as they implemented a strategy to racially segregate black workers.79 
Although early trade unions had devised the strategy to exclude blacks on the basis of skills, 
unions formed after 1945 progressed with the assistance of employers and Government to secure 
their elite position by the promulgation of legislation.80 
The 1930’s experienced a surge in black unionism across various industries. This was strongly 
opposed by the Chamber of Mines who feared that the organisation of black unions within 
prominent industries would be extended to the mines. This stance continued well after the 
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Second World War and eventually led to the establishment of the African Mine Workers’ Union 
in 1941. However, the union was constantly restrained by the Chamber and the arrest of 
organisers.81 White workers within the mines were protected by the dependence capital had on 
their skills. This secured and justified their significantly high salaries. Therefore, when capital 
realised that black workers could undertake the same work for a relatively lower wage, white 
workers had lost their bargaining foothold.82 
The disposition around the mining industry during the 1920’s was highly volatile as mine owners 
began to submit white workers to harsh conditions of employment and a threat of a reduction in 
salaries.83 Suffice it to say that the sole reason white labourers enjoyed the benefits of high 
salaries was at the exploitation of their lowly remunerated black counterparts.84 However, 
beneath the security of white labour lay a deep under-current of a ‘big financial view’, which 
saw the Labour Party (LP) favouring the mass of economical black labour in comparison to the 
well paid white workforce.85 The LP’s financial strategy basically entailed that the expense of 
wages in mines would be substantially reduced if lowly paid black workers replaced highly paid 
white workers. This sought to benefit the country’s financial position as this would ensure that 
costs would be significantly cut back, because black workers would undertake the same job as 
white workers but only for a fraction of the cost of wages for a white worker. This was the white 
workers' most dreaded fear that would soon become reality. 
The walls of white labour began to crack and both skilled and unskilled white labourers were 
rendered vulnerable. Skilled white labourers feared their replacement by the black labourer, 
whereas semi-skilled white labourers were threatened by restrictions on job specifications.86 This 
in turn would culminate in defensive measures to protect their interests, such as the use of 
industrial action.87 In 1920, hostilities intensified when recommendations were made by the Low 
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Grade Mine Commission to eliminate job reservations for white workers.88 This decision would 
effectively open positions within the mines, thereby allowing black works the opportunity of 
placement of certain jobs specifically reserved for white workers only. The protection white 
workers received were a result on the dependency on their race. Therefore, the elimination of job 
reservations for white workers essentially eliminated the white worker’s protection. 
In 1922, there was a decision to retrench white miners who were semi-skilled in an attempt to 
save on wages.89 This ignited a bloodbath of violent insurrection in the Witwatersrand. This 
became branded as the Rand Rebellion and lasted approximately three months.90 The Rand 
Rebellion was known as South Africa’s largest strike, which involved over 22 000 participants 
and was the most gruesome to ever occur in labour history.91 The strike caused grievous harm, 
which included the death and injury of many workers.92 
However, it was the Rand Rebellion that drew cognisance to the lack of adequate attention being 
given to labour legislation. This was quite evident in the enactment of the Mines and Works 
Amendment Act,93 which sought to ensure greater regulation of the mines in an attempt to 
prevent strikes such as the Rand Rebellion.94 The country’s poor white problem, which was 
caused by the retrenchment of unskilled whites, required the exclusion of black workers and the 
inclusion of white unskilled workers at a wage given to semi-skilled workers. Thus the colour 
bar was entrenched through the Mines and Works Amendment Act.95 The Rand Rebellion was 
thus essential for future developments which would follow in its wake. 
The strike initiated a transformation in industrial labour relations and was instrumental in 
establishing the trajectory of South African labour law for two crucial reasons.96 Firstly, white 
labourers were able to bring about political change in the country that saw the fall of the Smuts 
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Government in the 1924 elections which was to their benefit.97 Secondly, it gave rise to a 
‘conciliation system’ established through the enactment of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 
1924.98 When the National Labour Party came into power in 1924,99 the Industrial Conciliation 
Act was promulgated. This was the country’s first all-inclusive piece of legislation to govern 
labour relations.100 
As a mechanism of preventing a recurrence of the Rand Rebellion, the Industrial Conciliation 
Act was aimed at placating the white worker and enforcing dispute resolution between 
employers and employees.101 The Industrial Conciliation Act sought to provide a solution to the 
increasingly poverty stricken white class by instilling a system of preferential treatment towards 
white workers.102 The Industrial Conciliation Act also recognised strike action within collective 
bargaining and necessitated a period of ‘cooling off’ until attempts were made to resolve an 
issues through negotiation.103 The Industrial Conciliation Act also made reforms regarding 
unions and organisations. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act necessitated trade unions and employer’s organisations to be 
registered.104 South African trade unions were thus attributed equivalent recognition to unions in 
Britain and became legal entities.105 The agreements reached through negotiations created 
binding obligations on all constituents within that given industry. In addition, industrial action 
could only be utilised once an extensive conciliatory process had been undertaken.106 The most 
far-reaching implication of the Industrial Conciliation Act was that for 55 years black workers 
were excluded from trade union membership. Even though white trade unions were permitted 
                                                          
97 Finnemore (note 72 above; 20). 
98 H G Ringrose The Law and Practice of Employment (1983) 7.  
99 Seekings (note 95 above; 3). 
100 M Finnemore & R van Rensburg Contemporary Labour Relations 2nd ed (2002) 9. 
101 H Bhorat, C van der Westhuizen & S Goga ‘Analysing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market: 
The role of Bargaining Council’s DPRU (2007) 3. 
102 D du Toit Capital and Labour in South Africa (2010) 94. 
103 P Randall  Power, Privilege and Poverty (1972) 34. 
104 Act 11 of 1924; s 12. 
105 Ringrose (note 98 above; 7). 
106 D S Harris ‘Collective Bargaining within the labour relationship: In a South African context.’ (unpublished LLM 
thesis, North-West University, 2004) 24. 
22 
 
registration their right to engage in strike action was severely constrained to the dispute 
resolution system of the industrial councils.107 
Regrettably, however progressive the Industrial Conciliation Act may have been, black workers 
were exclusively excluded from it108 as they did not constitute an ‘employee’ under the definition 
provided for in the Industrial Conciliation Act.109 The wiliness of legislation ensured that only 
registered trade unions participated in collective bargaining and considering black workers were 
not permitted to formulate or join registered union,110 Government effectively enforced a dual 
strategy to alleviate the “poor white problem” to suppress the black worker.111 Consequently, 
there was a need for legislation to regulate workers who did not fall under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. 
In 1925 the Wage Act112 was passed as a means of instituting further management and 
conciliation mechanisms in labour relations.113 Where industries fell outside the scope of the 
industrial council system and where there was an absence of consensus under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, the Wage Act provided for a unilateral decision regarding conditions of 
employment and salaries.114 The Wage Act in contrast to the Industrial Conciliation Act was 
applicable to black workers.115 
The Wage Act had no particular specifications of wage determinations based on race. However, 
the Wage Act did insist that the Wage Board take into consideration the daily expense of 
labourers as well as the given industry’s ability to afford the pay structure. Even though this was 
in place, the Board was able to maneuver through the provisions to benefit white workers.116 
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This was indeed contrary to the intention of legislature which “was to secure an employee a 
proper minimum wage, commensurate with his qualification and services”.117 
 In 1930, the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended. The provisions of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act 24 of 1930 (hereafter referred to as the Industrial Conciliation Act 1930) 
enabled the Minister of Labour to pass resolutions regarding black workers who were excluded 
from the Industrial Conciliation Act 1930. These amendments encompassed decisions regarding 
workers who were excluded from the definition of an employee enshrined in the Industrial 
Conciliation Act 1930.118 
In 1934, a commission of enquiry was instituted to examine the Industrial Conciliation Act 1930 
and the Wage Act. Based on their findings, the Industrial Conciliation Act 1930 and the Wage 
Act underwent further amendments, which resulted in the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937 
(hereafter referred to as the Industrial Conciliation Act 1937).119 The Industrial Conciliation Act 
1937 was promulgated to provide a more effective framework for dispute resolution and thus 
reduce strike action by workers. However, this in fact had an adverse effect which resulted in a 
surge of strike activity. In 1935 Natal experienced an upsurge of trade union movement. 
Sporadic strikes took place which involved the Natal Iron and Steel Workers’ Union as well as 
other strike action involving factory and coal workers lasting on average between 2 and 16 
days.120 
However, despite this sporadic strike activity, the most significant strike of this era was the Rand 
Rebellion. As a result of the belief that Government was the cause of the volatile censorship of 
the strike, by the time of the 1948 elections the country had lost its faith in the Smuts 
Government.121 Consequently, this elevated the National Party (NP) into power.122 
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2.3.2. The period between the years 1948-1990 
In 1948, the Nationalists (National Party) were elected into power on a platform used to enforce 
apartheid123 primarily due to the growing concern white conservatives had124 over the substantial 
progress of black workers and their continued propaganda for communist ideologies.125 The 
National Party sought to contrive an elaborate framework of legislation to implement the concept 
of apartheid. The separation of races was inculcated in all spheres of life.126 
In October 1948, the Industrial Relations Commission of Enquiry (the Commission) was 
instituted which was led by P. W. Botha. Thus the Commission became known as the ‘Botha 
Commission’.127 The Commission was of the view that black workers did not possess the 
necessary skills required for the participation in the elaborate labour relations structure. 
However, the Commission did suggest that black workers obtain some form of assignment 
within the labour system.128 
Upon the recommendations of the Commission, the Suppression of Communism Act129 was 
passed which sought to suppress trade union movement and further prohibited all forms of 
communist propaganda.130 This enactment was a response to the 1946 mine workers strike which 
was aimed at weakening black trade unionism. This subsequently led to the banning and arrest of 
numerous leaders of black trade unions. This resulted in effective leadership being ousted from 
their positions.131 Black unions therefore lacked any form of organisation and strength, thus 
reducing their bargaining power substantially.132 
Consequently, the obligation of employers to negotiate with such unions was also weakened.133 
The Commission also suggested that black trade unions should be permitted to negotiate with 
conciliation boards on a pre-condition that the board be chaired by an official of the state and 
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only if the state consented to the initiation of the board.134 This era was characterised by its 
heightened political militancy,135 strikes and stay aways and Government’s response through the 
enacting of various security legislation designed to quell any form of resistance towards 
apartheid.136 This may have solved the problem of black resistance, but negotiations between 
employers and black workers were seriously hampered. 
In 1953, the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act137 (hereafter referred to as the Native 
Labour Settlement Act) was passed to regulate employment conditions and for resolving disputes 
between black workers and employers.138 Where an enterprise consisted of twenty or more black 
workers the Native Labour Settlement Act provided for internal committees. However, the 
powers of these committees were limited, as they were consultative in nature, merely to discuss a 
conflicting matter that presented itself in the workplace.139 This is evident in P.E. Bosman 
Transport Works Committee &others v Piet Bosman Transport (Pty) Ltd,140 where it was held 
that the worker committee created under the Black Labour Relations Act had no locus standi, 
because it was merely a statutory body possessing limited functions. It could not take up issues 
beyond the employer or assume the role of a litigant. Nor could this body acquire any further 
powers merely because its constitution authorises such additional powers.141 
 Additionally, the Black Labour Relations Act142  was promulgated to assist black employees. 
The Black Labour Relations Act introduced a dual legal system that sought to work alongside the 
Industrial Conciliation Act by protecting the interests of black workers where the Industrial 
Conciliation Act 1930 excluded black workers.143 However, even though the Black Labour 
Relations Act provided black employees with more labour rights to improve the relationship 
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between employer and employee, it prevented the registration of black trade unions and 
prohibited black workers from the use of industrial council systems.144 
In 1956, the Industrial Conciliation Act145 (hereafter referred to as the Industrial Conciliation Act 
1956) was endorsed. The Industrial Conciliation Act 1956 further entrenched the separation of 
workers based on race, as well as proscribing new unions consisting of both white and coloureds 
from being registered.146 It also provided that specific types of work were reserved for people of 
particular races.147 The Industrial Conciliation Act 1956 allowed for the formulation of an 
industrial tribunal which was tasked with providing recommendations concerning the 
enforcement of job reservations for workers.148 However, this legislation also had a major 
shortcoming similar to its predecessors. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act 1956 specifically excluded black workers from its definition of 
an employee.149 Therefore, the Industrial Conciliation Act 1956 provided another mechanism for 
enhancing apartheid policies by enforcing stringent control on black trade union movements.150 
This was achieved by the banning of multi-racial unions from being registered and required 
existing multi-racial unions to divide into unions according to their race.151 It is imperative to 
reiterate that black labour formed between 70 to 80 % of South Africa’s workforce. Strike action 
by black workers would have had insurmountable consequences on economic activity. Thus, 
legislature prohibited industrial action by black workers and even though the formation of black 
trade unions was permissible, their registration was denied as a form of control on black 
labour.152 The Industrial Conciliation Act 1956 therefore, excluded black workers from the 
system of collective bargaining and in doing so effectively established white trade unionism. The 
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employers’ right to dismiss workers who engaged in strike action was enforceable irrespective of 
whether the strike was regarded as legal or illegal.153 
Even though this legislation was endorsed to advance the concept of apartheid, it was South 
Africa’s first statute which comprehensively embodied issues such as workers’ freedom of 
association and entrenched trade union rights. It prohibited an employer from preventing an 
employee to join a trade union according to their race or any other association of the 
employee.154 The Industrial Conciliation Acts sowed the seeds of settling disputes via 
negotiation.155 This was to be endorsed through the elaborate system of dispute resolution 
enshrined in further legislation. 
2.3.3. The initiation of a new labour relations framework between the years 1956 and 1973 
In 1956 Government also passed the LRA.156 The LRA provided for the establishment of 
industrial councils. These councils performed ‘quasi-judicial’ functions by attempting to prevent 
conflicts between parties to the labour relationship through negotiation processes aimed at 
concluding agreements.157 The LRA created a special court structure to address issues of unfair 
labour practices. These were the Industrial Court, the Labour Appeal Court as well as the 
Appellate Division.158 
The LRA prescribed a process for collective bargaining. However, it did not provide for a right 
to strike but rather for the ‘freedom’ to engage in strike action, on the precondition the dispute 
related to an issue of employment. The LRA did not explicitly mention that striking employees 
could not be dismissed. This in turn led to a number of unfair dismissal cases.159 Nor did it 
prescribe a set amount an aggrieved party could claim for unfair dismissal, which allowed the 
Industrial Court to have complete discretion regarding the matter.160 
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The Industrial Court was also entitled to reach a binding agreement enforceable on potential 
strikers. Once such an agreement was reached, any strike action taken after this step would have 
been unlawful as well. Where no industrial council had jurisdiction over the matter, then an 
application had to be brought for a conciliation board to be established. This conciliation board 
could either refuse or provide the Minister with a report.161 
The case of National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) v East Rand Gold & Uranium162 adequately 
elucidates the application of this mandatory requirement. In this case the court was presented 
with a situation where the parties were engaged in bargaining over wage increase as the previous 
recognition agreement had expired. At the end of the initial negotiations, the parties had not 
reached consensus. The union then applied for the establishment of a conciliation board. The 
board was appointed and the parties met to discuss the issue, but could not reach a resolution.163 
After a strike ballot had been taken and the majority of the members voted for a strike, the strike 
began. The court held that,  
“strike action was a legitimate corollary of collective bargaining,…discrimination against 
union members on the basis of their participation in strike action amounted to the imposition of 
a penalty for striking, an approach which was open to abuse and which had the potential to 
lead to industrial strife. Such discrimination was not consistent with basic principles of 
collective bargaining”.164 
The LRA also provided for a mediator where industrial council or conciliation boards have 
reached a deadlock regarding the dispute. The mediator’s role was to act as a chairman over the 
matter and has to use his own persuasive techniques to bring the parties to an agreement.165 The 
LRA also provided for voluntary and compulsory arbitration. This process took place when an 
industrial council or conciliation board could not reach an agreement and parties did not intend 
engaging in strike action or lock-out. The decision of an arbitrator was binding and final on the 
parties.166 According to the LRA, strike action initiated while parties were waiting an award by 
the voluntary arbitration hearing was deemed unlawful. Registered trade unions, their officials 
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and employers' organisations as well as their members could not initiate strike action if they were 
part of the industrial council, which adopted a constitution stating that matters which were not 
decided by the council had to be submitted for arbitration.167 
Even where there was no such clause in the council’s constitution, strike action was still not 
permissible unless there was a majority vote taken by secret ballot, which favoured the strike 
action.168 In terms of the LRA, the Industrial Court was established. The court’s jurisdiction was 
laid out in s 17(11) of the LRA. The court was enabled to grant status quo orders regarding 
unfair labour practices until a final determination had been made. The Industrial Court played a 
significant role within the dispute resolution system as its enforcement of status quo orders was 
intended to promote parties to engage in negotiations through conciliation in an attempt to 
resolve labour disputes through the process stipulated by the LRA first rather than engaging in 
court proceedings or industrial action.169 It was able to hear appeals taken from the industrial 
registrar, an employer or his association or even a trade union. The Industrial Court was 
therefore classified as a quasi-judicial body that undertook an advisory role.170 
The LRA had both a civil and criminal effect with regard to strikes and lock-outs. Firstly, in 
terms of civil law a strike’s legality was irrelevant. Therefore, if a worker participated in a strike 
he or she could be dismissed for breach of contract on the basis of prolonged absenteeism during 
the strike. Workers were not protected against dismissal. Consequently, the dismissal of a black 
worker gave way to potential criminal liability. According to the Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act,171 (hereinafter referred to as the Black Urban Areas Act) a black worker 
would lose his right to live in an urban area once dismissed by his employer and if he did not 
find alternate employment within a specific time he would return to his ‘homeland’. If he did not 
return to his homeland, he would be criminally liable. Such a worker would have then resorted to 
finding employment in his rural homeland where job opportunities were scarce.172 These 
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devastating consequences were hoped to have been reversed when South Africa became a 
republic, however, this was not the case. 
In 1961, South Africa became a republic which saw the adoption of The Republic of South 
Africa Constitution173 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution). The Constitution, together with 
the Electoral Laws Consolidation Act174 endorsed segregation more ruthlessly by promoting 
political and social rights for whites only. During this time Government sought to place a more 
stringent hold on blacks which resulted in the enactment of the Black Authorities Act 58 of 1951, 
the Black Labour Act 67 of 1964 and the Promotion of Black Self- Government Act 46 of 1959. 
These discriminatory acts were strongly opposed by the international community who attempted 
to admonish South Africa by passing resolutions against apartheid. 
The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 1761 of 1962 which criticised South 
Africa’s practices of apartheid. Therefore, member states of the United Nations were compelled 
to end all military and economic relations with the country. Consequently, South Africa was 
obliged to withdraw as a member from the International Labour Organisation in 1966. This 
resulted in South Africa becoming isolated from international affairs which had drastic effects on 
the country’s economy.175 This isolation, however, did not deter South Africa who further sought 
to stifle any form of progression by black workers through the promulgation of yet more 
legislation.  
In 1973, the Bantu Labour Regulation Act176  was established. The Bantu Labour Regulation Act 
sought to standardise working conditions for black employees. It implemented the process of 
negotiation of settling conflicts and disputes between employees and their employers as well as 
creating structures to initiate labour committees. However, the Bantu Labour Regulation Act 
challenged the formation of black trade union movement by limiting black workers to 
committees that were primarily employer-initiated and lacked any substantial power to bargain 
effectively. Even though blacks were permitted to establish black trade unions, such unions were 
not permitted to engage in negotiations regarding wages and employment conditions.177 It is 
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submitted that by prohibiting black workers in the decision-making process of wages and 
conditions of employment, legislature effectively restrained black workers to the dictates of their 
employers. 
The surge in the manufacturing sector culminated in the migration of black workers to urban 
areas resulting in the urban African population doubling in size. Black labour was severely 
controlled by the state. The capacity of black workers to formulate unions was very limited. 
Even though there were some unions in place, their success was inconsistent and undependable. 
The Trade Council of South Africa was based in Durban, which sought to operate primarily 
within the textile sector, but was highly ineffective. Black workers continued to be unrepresented 
at the beginning of the 1970’s, while Indian workers obtained partial representation.178 
Even though the atmosphere was dominated by racial oppression, this era was characterised by 
numerous strikes, which rose from 6 000 strikers in the 1960’s to 94 000 in the early 1970’s.This 
effectively led to the birth of the black consciousness movement among university students, and 
the South Africa Students’ Organisation (SASO), as well as the National Union of South African 
Students’ (NUSA). The working class as well as unions that had been immobilised in the 1950’s 
and 1960’s contributed largely to the formation of new trade unions. These progressions laid the 
foundation for the 1973 strike action.179 
The beginning of the 1970’s saw the National Party government make radical changes to the 
private sector of employment relations, as there was an urgent need for stability. There existed a 
grave need for skilled workers, coupled with the torrent of sporadic strike action and internal 
pressure, Government was forced to reform its policies.180 Government initially held that black 
workers should only upon the approval of white unions, receive promotions, but due to the 
critical state of the economy, cabinet had to alter its view.181 The labour constraints on black 
workers began to steadily loosen. Due to a scarcity of skilled workers, Government was 
compelled to improve training facilities for blacks. Job prospects for blacks thus became a 
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primary concern. Consequently, employment for whites was severely threatened and caused 
great anxiety within white trade unions.182 
2.4. THE WIEHAHN REFORMS 
A defining event in the country’s history of labour activity was the mass strike action in Durban 
during 1973 which served as a precursor to the renaissance of labour reformation.183 This strike 
action was a culmination of decades of forced acceptance of labour policies. These strikes were 
initiated as a result of factories following suit of the factories in neighbouring cities184 The wave 
of strike action which engulfed the industrial sector, saw approximately 60 000 to 100 000 black 
employees down tools over grievances regarding insufficient pay, and increasing unemployment 
and poverty rates.185 It is quite evident that “tragedy tends to catalyze change.”186 The 
institutionalisation of racial segregation accompanied by the torrent of strike action fertilised the 
ground for an unprecedented harvest of trade union movement which black South Africans had 
long anticipated.187 
The Durban strikes of 1973 concluded in a new system of labour relations, which was a result of 
the black trade union movement. The employment relationship between mine bosses and black 
workers was previously regulated by a contract that supported apartheid policies. However, that 
relationship saw significant transformation as negotiations between employers and unions took 
place within an extensive framework based on anti-apartheid ideologies. Therefore, previous 
labour contracts began to resemble standard forms of employment contracts.188 By the year 1976, 
Government took cognisance of the profound force black workers had become.189 Government 
was placed in a suffocating corner by having to deal with international pressure such as the threat 
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of sanctions being placed on the country by the United Nations, as well as the threat of 
disinvestment by multinationals.190 As a result, Government was compelled to respond.  
In 1977, the Wiehahn Commission was established being named after the president of the 
Commission, Professor N.E Wiehahn,191 a labour law specialist and the Minister of Manpower’s 
legal advisor.192 The Commission comprised of thirteen members consisting of white 
representatives of employers and unions. The Commission’s only member, who was black, was a 
businessman. The Commission adopted Dutch and German works councils as models for   South 
African labour relations.193 The Commission was charged with the responsibility of examining 
various prospective reforms regarding collective labour law. Its report which was released 
between the years 1979 and 1981 contained six parts.194 
In 1979, the Commission’s first report was submitted. The Commission's essential 
recommendations for labour reform were that all workers be entitled to the right to freedom of 
association irrespective of their race or sex.195 Membership of trade unions should be decided 
upon by the unions themselves. This would lift the ban on those unions which consisted of mixed 
races and institute a free and voluntary association to trade unions.196 It was also suggested that 
unions be able to freely decide on their own terms and conditions. Employers may not prohibit 
an employee from union activities or membership, as this would constitute unfair labour 
practice.197 
The Commission also proposed the eradication of job reservation according to race as well as 
including making apprenticeships accessible to all workers.198 All racial constraints were 
repealed as well as the Bantu Labour Regulations Act of 1973.199 The Commission was also of 
the view that there existed a deficiency of sufficiently qualified workers. Therefore, it 
                                                          
190 M Wiseman ‘Recent South African Labour Legislation: Assessing the New Rights of Black Workers’’ (1989) 
9(1) Boston College International and Comparative Labour Review 173. 
191 R E Bissol & C A Crocker South Africa into the 1980’s (1979) 63. 
192 A Lichtenstein ‘From Durban to Wiehahn: Black workers, employers and the state in South Africa during the 
1970’s’ Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER) (2013) 1. 
193 Kittner, Korner-Dammann & Schunk (note 17 above; 37). 
194 Ringrose (note 98 above; 10). 
195 M Budeli ‘Employment Equity and Affirmative Action in South Africa: A Review of the Jurisprudence of the 
Courts since 1994’ Conference on ‘Twenty years of South African Constitutionalism’ New York Law School 1998 4. 
196 Finnemore (note 72 above; 25). 
197 V V Razis Swords or Plough Shares? South Africa and Political Change: An Introduction (2001) 68. 
198 W G James The State of Apartheid (1987) 11. 
199 Budeli (note 25 above; 472). 
34 
 
recommended training of workers to be implemented through the enactment of legislation such 
as the Manpower Training Act of 1981.200 It recommended that a National Manpower 
Commission be instituted. This Commission would be endowed with the responsibility of 
making proposals on labour reformation and would be affiliated to the Ministry of Manpower, 
and lastly, there should be an independent Industrial Court to secure the consistent outcome of 
cases.201 The institution of the Industrial Court would effectively replace the industrial tribunal 
and be responsible for dispute resolution.202 
At first, white union leaders were in favour of the elimination of the colour bar, as most white 
workers were given promotions or pay hikes. However, this changed dramatically with the 1976 
recession and worsened after 1981. This led to the loss of jobs due to the reorganisation of the 
labour market. Consequently, white workers began to fiercely oppose the National Party.203 
Government accepted over 90% of the recommendations made by the Commission. This 
catalysed an entirely new dispensation from that which had been embedded in the country for 
over a century. This was met with various reactions.  
Even though white conservatives of white trade unions were not in favour of the 
recommendations, internationally it was enthusiastically welcomed.204 As a result of these 
recommendations, amendments were made to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 in the years 
1979 and 1980. This Act also underwent various amendments in subsequent years, which created 
the Labour Relations Amendment Act 51 of 1981, and thereafter the 1983, 1984, 1988 and 1991 
amendment acts.205 
In 1980, parts 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the Wiehahn Report was published. These reports were not 
fundamental in the development of trade union rights or the right of freedom of association. Nor 
did they include any regulations regarding industrial action.206 In 1981, part 5 of the Wiehahn 
Report was presented. These recommendations however, did consist of various proposals 
regarding trade union practice and the right to freedom of association. It further proposed that 
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South Africa’s labour policies and practices should correlate to the standards set by international 
instruments. The report also suggested that the prerequisites governing trade union registration 
should be revisited and amended where necessary.207 
The enforcement of the recommendation created significant progress for black workers. The year 
1977 saw the formation of 22 black unions, which represented 88 000 members. Subsequently, 
various bodies were created to render legal advice and provide training regarding collective 
bargaining and organisational skills. To curb this progression by some, parallel unions were 
initiated, which effectively meant that white unions would run alongside black unions in order to 
dominate an industry.208 The role of trade unions was taken very seriously and they were 
especially held accountable when they engaged in unlawful strike action. This was evident 
through the outcome of a number of important cases.  
In Murray & Roberts Buildings (Cape Town) Pty Ltd v SA Allied Workers’ Union,209 the 
respondent initiated a strike involving the applicant’s employees. The strike took place and the 
applicant gave the strikers notice that they were dismissed.210 The union denied that it 
encouraged the illegal strikes and if the union organiser had initiated it, then the organiser had 
done so without the union’s consent or knowledge.211 The court held that it is probable that the 
respondent did nothing to prevent the strike or discourage the effect the strike had on the 
employees or the employer’s business. The actions of the representatives of the respondent 
constituted unfair labour practice.212 The court was not willing to tolerate deviations from 
legislation from either employees or employers. 
The Industrial Court was also unyielding towards employers who did not engage in all possible 
procedures for dispute resolution or attempt negotiation with unions. In MAWU v Natal Die 
Castings Co. (Pty) LTD,213 the employees embarked on a strike over a wage dispute which 
resulted in the dismissal of strikers on the second day of the strike. The employer was only 
willing to reinstate some employees who it viewed were not guilty of misconduct. The union 
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insisted upon the reinstatement of all the strikers as well an inquiry into the allegations of 
misconduct of the strikers. The court held that the dismissal of the strikers was unfair and 
condemned the employer for not making an effort to reach an agreement with the union or to 
engage in arbitration.214 
Part 6 of the report was particularly important for employees within the mining industry. The 
reforms removed the racial specifications of the Mines and Works Act of 1965, by substituting 
the term ‘scheduled person’ with that of ‘competent person.’ Thus, black workers were permitted 
to receive blasting tickets, which would equate them with white miners.215 Another pivotal 
implication of the reforms was the formation of the Industrial Court. The term ‘court’ is rather 
misleading as it was not a court per se, but was in reality a ‘quasi-judicial tribunal,’ which was in 
other words a board that undertook seemingly judicial functions relating to labour law.216 
Therefore, the Industrial Court was essentially similar to the role and functions of its 
predecessor, the industrial tribunal, but with the additional power of extended jurisdiction. 
Cognisance must be given to the fact that according to the LRA, legal strikes did not fall within 
the ambit of unfair labour practices. The concept of unfair labour practice became pertinent when 
dealing with dismissals, which were a result of employees striking.217 ‘Unfair labour practice’ is 
a term which is wide enough to allow the court’s interpretation. If a matter could not be resolved 
by the industrial council or conciliation board within its sector, such a case would be referred to 
the Industrial Court to be decided upon.218 Even though the Industrial Court was not authorised 
to make judgments regarding questions of law, the court could make decisions regarding an 
unfairness of a labour practice, because an unfair labour practice does not require the element of 
lawfulness. This element will be discussed in detail further on in the chapter.219 
Even though the Wiehahn Commission sought to provide relief to the political, socio-economic, 
national and international crisis which was a result of the black labour movement, these 
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recommendations could have been seen as a means of restraining black labour.220 The 
Commission was adamant that black unions even though unregistered, enjoyed a far greater level 
of freedom in comparison to white unions that entitled them to engage in political propaganda at 
their will.221 Therefore, the recommendations presented by the Commission were a mechanism 
of control and suppression rather than emancipation of black trade unions. Registered unions 
would require adherence to a framework of “rule by proclamation.” This would be an intensified 
extension of Government’s power over trade unions.222 
The year 1983 saw the promulgation of The Republic of South African Constitution (hereinafter 
referred to as the Constitution 1983).223 This Constitution was very much the same as its 
predecessor in that it was responsible for functioning racial segregation amongst blacks and 
whites. Blacks were once again refused political rights. In 1984, a tri-cameral parliament was 
initiated, which included coloureds and Indians but omitted blacks. Trade union movements 
during this period were highly influential in combating the apartheid policies.224 The 1980’s were 
characterised by civil unrest directed against apartheid policies. Even though central Government 
was a fortified force, these rebellions resulted in the demise of local Government systems.225 
In the year 1988, the Labour Relations Act226 (hereafter referred to as the Labour Relations Act 
of 1988) underwent further amendments. In terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1988, black 
employees were given extended protection by the specification that any direct or indirect 
intervention regarding an employee’s right to associate or not to associate would constitute 
unfair labour practice.227 This effectively ensured that all employees were protected from 
discrimination as a result of their trade union membership. However, its ambit was limited in that 
it excluded employees within the public sector, employees in the farming sector and domestic 
servants. 
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In the year 1971, the Bantu Affairs Administration Act228  had been promulgated in light of the 
Riekert Commission’s report which dealt with the control of the entry of black workers into 
urban areas. It was implemented to ensure proficient administration over the metropolitan areas 
and to promote an increase in the mobility of black labour. The administration boards set up 
under the Bantu Affairs Administration Act were tasked to increase ‘necessary’ labour coming 
into the area and control ‘unnecessary’ labour that should be removed from the area.229 
Effectively, this meant that legislature was willing to allow black workers into urban areas as this 
would increase productivity substantially. Consequently, those workers who were deemed to be 
unbeneficial to production and the economy were taken out of the urban areas.   
Employees within the public sector were governed by the Public Services Act.230 In terms of the 
Public Services Act, employees were entitled to join associations. These associations however, 
were restricted in their rights to deliberate on conditions of employment with the state. A further 
amendment entitled the Industrial Court to issue urgent interdicts proscribing practices of unfair 
labour. The Public Services Act endorsed the element of liability on union members, their 
officials and even their office bearers for any injuries or damages to property as a result of 
unprotected strike action. The amendments also created the Labour Appeal Court.231 
After the height of apartheid in the 1980’s, the 1990’s ushered in a new democratic order. The 
first democratic elections led to the repeal of apartheid policies and finally brought an end to the 
institution of apartheid. An interim constitution was put in place, which enshrined equality of 
race and sex entitling every citizen the right to fundamental freedoms.232 During the 1990’s there 
were many reformations within the labour system. At this time the country experienced 
numerous political and social challenges, which had dire consequences for the economy. 
Consumer boycotts as well as an increase in industrial action largely contributed to South 
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Africa’s instability.233 In the year 1993 negotiations between parliamentary bodies and the ANC, 
which was led by Nelson Mandela, were held to legislate the concept of equality.234 
2.5 DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT IN DEVELOPING 
PERTINENT CASE LAW THAT HAVE ADEQUATELY ILLUSTRATED THE 
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN LEGISLATION AND THE LABOUR COURTS 
As was previously discussed, the Industrial Court was given a wide range of discretionary 
powers in terms of interpretation and application of principles.235 This was primarily due to the 
fact that the LRA and its amendments did not provide express definitions to terms. The 
successors of the Labour Relations Act of 1988, expressly included strike action from its 
definition of unfair labour practice. This inclusion of strike action under unfair labour practice by 
the Labour Relations Act of 1988 had devastating consequences for employees. Even if 
employees followed the process as stipulated by the Labour Relations Act of 1988, their actions 
could still be deemed unlawful according to the Industrial Court’s perception of fairness.236 
Consequently, the Industrial Court was left to its own discretion in determining concepts of 
fairness which were highly contradictory.237 Furthermore, it is submitted that the legislature did 
not provide a distinction between disputes of rights and disputes of interest. It is submitted that 
this lack of clarity resulted in inconsistency in the development of principles in labour law and 
ultimately preserved the black employee’s title of underdog. Firstly, it resulted in an 
overwhelming case load for the Industrial Court as it was now tasked with a dual responsibility 
to act as arbitrator and judicial officer. This point is clearly portrayed in BTR Dunlop Ltd v 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2).238 The case essentially dealt with the 
dismissal of a shop steward following a disciplinary enquiry. Employees of the respondent 
initiated a strike for the reinstatement of the shop steward. This strike was deemed to be illegal, 
as it did not comply with legislation. The employees were thus interdicted from proceeding with 
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the strike. As a result of the interdict, the employees then made a submission for the 
establishment of a conciliation board, alternatively that the matter be referred for adjudication.239 
A conciliation board was set up which reached a deadlock regarding the matter. The matter was 
then referred to the court for determination. However, before the matter could be decided on, 
employees engaged in a second strike after taking a strike ballot. Consequently, an application 
was made to the court to interdict the proposed strike pending the determination of the court. 
This application was granted.240 
The decision of the court was primarily based on two elements, namely: the lawfulness of the 
strike and whether the strike was fair. This case illustrates how the Industrial Court could 
determine that a strike was lawful on the one hand and also decide that it was unfair. The court in 
this regard provides criteria for determining whether a strike is lawful. According to the 
Industrial Court, lawfulness depends on the provisions detailed by the Labour Relations Act of 
1988.241 In casu, the court held that the second strike was lawful as it followed the steps as 
determined by s 65 of the Labour Relations Act of 1988. The first strike, however, was deemed 
to be illegal as it did not follow the process as laid down by the Labour Relations Act of 1988.242 
It follows from this decision that in determining lawfulness of strike action, the court is primarily 
concerned with the procedure followed by employees. Hence, if the Labour Relations Act of 
1988 did not include strikes under the banner of unfair labour practice, the only enquiry for strike 
action would be whether such a strike was lawful in terms of its adherence to legislation’s 
dispute resolution framework. 
In determining the fairness of a strike, the court provided yet another criteria stating that “[a]ny 
strike to enforce a demand which is illegal or contrary to public policy is manifestly illegitimate 
and unfair”.243 It follows from this benchmark that the court is concerned with the effect of the 
strike on society and whether such action would be initiated to enforce something which is 
illegal. It is submitted that this criteria developed by the Industrial Court is correct and consistent 
with the principles of fairness which is that all people should be treated the same and that no 
person should be prejudiced by the illegal acts of others. Fairness denotes concepts of justice, 
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peace and equity. However, the Industrial Court provides a further standard by which to 
determine fairness in which it states that the court must look at whether a strike is functional to 
collective bargaining.244 It is submitted that this standard is incorrect. 
The reason for this submission is that the court in this regard based such a standard in light of 
National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold & Uranium.245 The case dealt with a lawful 
strike that ensued after employees reached a deadlock regarding wage negotiations. The 
employer issued an ultimatum that employees who engaged in strike activity would not be liable 
to be paid a back-dated wage. However, employees who did not participate in the strike would be 
entitled to the back-pay. The employees argued that this amounted to an unfair labour practice.246 
The court in East Rand Gold & Uranium supra agreed with this argument as it was held that 
“[s]trike action was a legitimate corollary of collective bargaining”.247 Furthermore, 
“discrimination against union members on the basis of their participation in strike action 
amounted to the imposition of a penalty for striking”.248 The court in East Rand Gold & 
Uranium supra arrived at its decision on the basis that the employer sought to unfairly 
discriminate against his employees because they had participated in a strike. The unfair 
discrimination was in the form of refusal to pay back pay to the striking workers. Therefore, the 
employer’s actions amounted to an unfair labour practice. 
It is imperative that the case of East Rand Gold & Uranium supra be distinguished from that of 
BTR Dunlop supra. In the former case the situation centered on collective bargaining of wage 
negotiations that ultimately led to a lawful strike. It is submitted that in this case there was a 
dispute of interest as a dispute of interest arises when parties have failed to reach an agreement at 
the bargaining table.249 Therefore, East Rand Gold & Uranium supra differs significantly from 
that of BTR Dunlop supra as in the latter case the dispute was one of rights. The court itself 
stated that the dispute in question of BTR Dunlop supra is a dispute of rights and further 
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expounds that such a right is where the “legal entitlements are assessed by reference to a known 
body of law (for instance a case concerning the lawfulness or fairness of a dismissal)”.250 
It is therefore submitted that the standard of functionality that is used in East Rand Gold & 
Uranium supra is correct as in the context of this case, strike action was deemed to advance 
collective bargaining. Hence, the strike was acknowledged to be functional to collective 
bargaining.251 It is further submitted that the court in BTR Dunlop supra is incorrect in applying 
the same standard of functionality, because BTR Dunlop supra does not deal with an interest 
dispute but rather a rights dispute as stated by the court. A rights dispute does not operate the 
same as an interest dispute. It is evident that in terms of interest disputes, parties engage in 
collective bargaining. However, disputes of rights have to be referred to the Industrial Court for 
determination where a conciliation board has been unsuccessful in settling the dispute.252 
Therefore, it follows that the same standard of functionality cannot be applied to BTR Dunlop 
supra as this matter did not even concern collective bargaining. Even though the court did hold 
that the strike was not in relation to the dismissal of the shop steward but rather that the strike 
was a result of a failure to refer the matter for adjudication, the standard for functionality yet 
again does not become relevant to the decided case. The concept of adjudication differs 
substantially to collective bargaining as bargaining is concerned with negotiating on the interests 
of employees regarding terms and conditions of their employment and other matters that are 
deemed to be of mutual interest to the parties.253 Hence, it is respectfully submitted that the 
court’s findings are unsound. Thus the case of BTR Dunlop supra blatantly conveys the pitfalls 
of the inclusion of industrial action under the banner of unfair labour practice. It also illustrates 
that legislature’s lack of clarity on the separation of rights and interest disputes allowed the court 
to develop a benchmark which as discussed did not adequately entrench concepts of reason and 
justice. 
Additionally, by allowing disputes of right and disputes of interest to be decided on by a court of 
law, legislation and the court structures negated the concept of collective bargaining principles 
and adjudication. It has been asserted that the court was viewed as a mechanism to reduce strike 
                                                          
250 BTR Dunlop Ltd supra note 238 at 711G-H. 
251 BTR Dunlop Ltd supra note 238 at 705F. 
252 Food & Allied Workers Union v Clover Dairies (1986) 7 ILJ 697 (IC). 
253BTR Dunlop Ltd supra note 238 at 706B-D. 
43 
 
action by employees as any disputes which arose would be adjudicated through judicial 
inquiry.254 It is respectfully submitted that this was not correct; rather, it created even more 
problems for the worker who had to submit to the dictates of the judiciary which often gave one 
party an advantageous position over the other.  
The Industrial Court achieved this by removing disputes of interest, which should have been 
resolved through negotiation and compromise at industrial level between parties, and left them at 
the discretion of a judiciary whose aim was to make a final judgment that would create a win-
lose situation for the parties.255 Furthermore, the system took matters which should have been 
decided through arbitration that is a process of investigation and consultation with both parties, 
and placed it in the hands of an overloaded court system that did not have required skilled and 
expertly trained staff. Moreover, the court’s procedures were too technical, thus making it 
difficult for lay people to access.256 
In BTR Dunlop supra, the court dealt with another issue of unfairness. The court asserts that 
parties possess a right of paramount significance in that they can have their matter adjudicated by 
the Special Labour Appeal Court, which is the highest court where a matter may be decided. 
Therefore, the court reasoned that the strike was a “coercion to compel a party to abandon his 
right to have the matter adjudicated by a court of law”. Consequently, it was unfair on that basis. 
It is submitted that the rationale of the court itself is unfair. If the strike was deemed unfair as it 
coerced the employer to arbitration, then the opposite should also hold true in that it would be 
unfair for an employee to be forced to have the matter decided by a court of law when the law 
provides that a party may waive his right to have the matter heard in court and may decide on an 
alternate forum such as adjudication.257 It is submitted that this reasoning is unjust and does not 
take the employees’ rights into consideration. Consequently, the employee retained his position 
as the underdog. This case provides an ideal illustration of how the Industrial Court applied 
contradictory and unreasonable principles of fairness. However, much fault in this area rests on 
legislature and its inability to properly define terms and to provide simple and clear mechanisms 
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for dispute resolution depending on the classification of the dispute. By not distinguishing 
between disputes of rights and interest, parties could unilaterally decide what type of right that 
particular dispute fell under. 
Consequently, the door to abuse was opened.  In such instances, parties would intentionally 
pursue a matter under the term ‘dispute of right’ to ensure that strike action would not be a 
recourse available to employees.258 The Industrial Court’s reaction in these circumstances was 
against the employer. In regard to disputes of interest there was persuasion to the argument, 
reinforced through the court’s judgment, that in terms of such disputes employers were 
compelled to engage in bargaining in order to resolve the dispute to ensure that it would not 
escalate to strike action.259 
After a succession of cases, this was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Natal Die Casting v 
President, Industrial Court & others.260 In Natal Die Casting supra the employer and employees 
engaged in negotiations regarding wages, the most significant aspect being that of a bonus. 
Consequently, there was a letter written to the employer informing it that a dispute will be 
declared following failed negotiations of which the third respondent alleged that it was due to the 
employer’s failure to negotiate in good faith, thus rendering it an unfair labour practice.261 The 
dispute was then referred to the Industrial Council within the particular sector to resolve the 
dispute.  
The employees sought resolution and the suspension of any dispute proceedings on the basis that 
the employer negotiated in good faith. However, after further unsuccessful negotiations the 
employer made an offer which was refused by the employees. Consequently, the dispute was 
invoked yet again.262 A strike ballot was then taken which favoured a strike and as a result the 
employees refused working. This led to the dismissal of the employees. It was argued that the 
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Industrial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. The court held that it did in fact have 
jurisdiction over the matter. The court itself highlighted the lack of clarity within the Labour 
Relations Act in that it was silent as to the exact powers of the Industrial Court regarding the 
kind of ‘determination’ it could make.263 
Therefore, the court agreed with the case of Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd v John NO & Others,264 
where the court stated that the Industrial Court may not only make a declaratory order, but it may 
also make any order that would settle the dispute between the parties.265 It is submitted that this 
lack of clarity by legislature ultimately provided the Industrial Court with unlimited jurisdiction. 
It could thus make any order according to its discretion that would bring the dispute to an end. 
The court, once satisfied of its jurisdiction, turned to the merits of the case. The fact that a strike 
in Natal Die Casting supra was deemed unlawful because it did not follow the conciliatory 
procedure before engaging in strike action, does not mean that the issue which brought about the 
strike cannot be deemed an unfair labour practice. In reaching its decision, the court gave 
consideration to s 1 of the Labour Relations Act of 1988 and its definition of unfair labour 
practice. The court decided that the failure of the employer to engage in negotiations in good 
faith on the issues which gave rise to the strike as well as the dismissal of the employees based 
on the strike over these issues, amounted to an unfair labour practice. The reinstatements of the 
dismissed employees were thus ordered. It is submitted that there are two very significant issues 
which are raised in this case. 
The first issue which the court highlights is that of legislature’s poor drafting of the Labour 
Relations Act of 1988 in light of its silence on the powers of the Industrial Court. This is 
pertinent in that such silence consequently led the court to assume unlimited jurisdiction in terms 
of any order it deemed fit to end a dispute. This was a key aspect of one of the pitfalls in the 
Labour Relations Act as the Industrial Court through its interpretation of section 46(9)(a), could 
construe a ‘determination’ to mean anything it saw fit. This effectively meant that the Industrial 
Court not only interpreted section 49, but also developed that respective section to enable it to 
perform unlimited functions. 
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The second issue which arises is that the term unfair labour practice can extend to an employer’s 
refusal to settle a dispute, which would lead to industrial action. Therefore, in terms of this 
decision, an employer would be compelled to accept the demands of employees so as to prevent 
them from engaging in industrial action. Nowhere in the decided case does the court make 
reference to the employees' wage and bonus demands being reasonable so as to convey that the 
employer was unreasonable in not consenting to their demands. This begs the question as to 
which circumstances would give rise to where an employer would not be compelled to accept the 
demands of the employees.  
Furthermore, in circumstances where employees demand salaries or bonuses which exceed the 
economic capability of the employer, would such an employer be deemed to have negotiated in 
bad faith if he cannot consent to the employees’ demands? It may well be that in this given case 
the employer had sufficient means of increasing wages and paying bonuses, however, it is 
submitted that the court does not provide clarity as to when the demands of employees are 
unreasonable and whether employers in such cases would also have to submit to the demands of 
their employees. It is submitted that the court’s assumed extended jurisdiction and its 
interpretation of unfair labour practices was a recipe for inconsistency. The extended jurisdiction 
of the court also allowed it to interpret and develop legal concepts. 
The term ‘unfair labour practice’ was broadly defined which extended the net over a wide variety 
of acts within the labour relations framework.266 It was held in Consolidated Frame Cotton 
Corporation v President, Industrial Court,267 that “[t]he concept of an “unfair labour practice” 
covers a wider field than the matters referred to in paragraph (a) and (b) of s 43 (l)…”. As a 
result of legislature’s lack of clarity on the term ‘unfair labour practice’, the Industrial Court had 
to extend its powers and develop the law rather than simply interpret it. This effectively meant 
that the Industrial Court had to define the term ‘unfair labour practice’.268 Therefore, the 
overlapping of the criteria for unfair labour practice led the Industrial Court to become burdened 
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by the volume of cases continuously being presented to it.269 One such case was that of NUMSA 
v Vetsak Co-Operative Ltd & Others.270 The Appellate Division was called upon to decide on the 
dismissal of employees who engaged in a lawful and legitimate strike. The strike was regarded as 
a legitimate purpose, as it sought to obtain a wage agreement through the process of collective 
bargaining. The strike was also regarded as being lawful, because it complied with the statutory 
requirements of the LRA.271 
However, upon receiving an ultimatum to return to work, the employees refused to do so thus 
resulting in the dismissal of the striking workers. The court was therefore presented with the 
issue as to whether the employer’s dismissal of the employees amounted to unfair labour 
practice. In its dissenting judgment, the court made significant points regarding the freedom to 
strike. The court stated that workers may not be dismissed merely for engaging in strike action. If 
this were to be the case, then the purpose of strike action would be nullified and the whole 
process of collective bargaining would be undermined. However, regardless of whether a strike 
is within its statutory requirements or not, an employer may be validated for dismissing 
employees on the basis of breach of contract due to prolonged absenteeism.272 
In deciding whether the employer’s actions amounted to unfair labour practice, the court made 
reference to s 1 of the Labour Relations Act of 1988. It reasoned that the court has to have due 
regard to both the employer and employee when making a decision on fairness.273 Cognisance 
must be given to the fact that merely because a strike is lawful in terms of the Labour Relations 
Act of 1988, it does not automatically render the dismissal of striking workers to be unfair. 
Similarly, if a strike is regarded as unlawful, then that warrants the dismissal of striking 
employees.274 
The court reasoned that unfair labour practice cases could not be decided according to a rubber 
stamp basis, but rather, each case had to be assessed on its own merits taking in into account 
whether a strike was lawful, whether the conduct of both employer and employee was lawful, 
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whether such parties acted in good faith and the nature of the strike in regard to its aims and 
purpose.275 The court acknowledged that the test adopted to determine unfair labour practice was 
too widely construed for any party to foresee the outcome of the case.276 It is submitted that the 
decisions of the courts presented much inconsistency that ultimately left parties with a lack of 
direction regarding industrial disputes. This in turn meant that parties were constantly unsure of 
the consequences of their conduct and whether or not their actions would have had devastating 
consequences. Indeed it is submitted that each case has to be decided on its own facts, however, 
the Industrial Court did not provide a sufficient guideline or criteria that allowed different facts 
to be assessed according to the same standards. It is for this reason that there were many 
contradictions in its decisions. 
The contradictory application of the law was applied in another case that was brought before the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), namely National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) v Black 
Mountain Mineral Development Company (Pty) Ltd.277 A strike ensued as a result of an impasse 
in negotiations regarding wages, which consequently led to the dismissal of such workers. The 
respondent gave the striking workers a choice to return to work on their own terms. Those who 
accepted this were re-instated to their positions. However, those who did not were dismissed. 
This resulted in the dismissed employees having to return to their homelands. Subsequently, the 
union instituted proceedings on behalf of the dismissed employees on the basis that it constituted 
unfair labour practice and claimed the re-instatement of such employees.278  
The matter was initially dismissed by the Industrial Court. The SCA in making its decision stated 
that: 
“striking as such does not amount to misconduct. There is accordingly an important distinction 
between dismissal for misconduct and dismissal in consequence of strike action, and it follows 
that considerations relevant to the former are not necessarily relevant to the latter”.279 
This rationale that the court adopted is an excellent portrayal of the inconsistency of labour 
relations under the Labour Relations Act of 1988. In light of the above extract from the court’s 
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judgment, it would follow that only misconduct arising out of the strike action would be relevant 
to the merits of a case. Misconduct that did not form part of or was a result of strike action, 
would therefore not have a bearing on the strike action. Even though the court stipulates that this 
is a standard can be used to determine an employee’s conduct, the standard is not applied to all 
cases. The inconsistency of the court is evident in its lack of application of the same standard to 
all cases. 
In the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) v G M Vincent Metal Sections 
(Pty) Ltd,280 dealt with by the SCA, the matter was first heard by the Industrial Court, then taken 
on appeal to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) and finally reached the SCA. Employees of the 
respondent and members of NUMSA engaged in a number of unlawful activities in the first half 
of 1992, which resulted in written warnings being given to all NUMSA members and the final 
step being that of dismissal. On the 3rd of August 1992, employees engaged in a strike. The 
respondent then effected the dismissal of the striking employees from the 24 of August 1992. 
NUMSA then decided to call off the strike based on a judgment handed down by the SCA in 
another case that was not in their favour. Of the striking workers who returned to work, 2000 
were not accepted back into employment.281 
In reaching its decision, the court took into account a number of factors. The first factor was that 
of the financial position of the respondent’s business. The court made reference to the substantial 
losses that the business suffered due to a downward spiral of the steel sector. The court also 
raised the fact that the respondent tried to communicate with NUMSA on various occasions, but 
without success. The respondent even mentioned to the union that the strike was having severe 
ramifications on the business and asked for an exemption from the strike. However, the union 
only responded on one occasion concerning the retrenchment of the workers. The third factor 
that the court raised was that of the violence, which took place on the 21st of August. The court 
also made reference that the requirements of the Labour Relations Act of 1988 stipulated that a 
strike ballot had to be taken and had thus rendered the strike unlawful282 
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(1989) 10 ILJ 357 (IC). 
281 NUMSA v G M Vincent Metal Sections (Pty) Ltd supra note 280 at 4-6. 
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The court ultimately had to decide whether the striking employees’ failure to heed to the 
ultimatum given by the employer amounted to an unfair labour practice. The court reasoned that 
the concept of fairness had to be applied according to the precedent that had developed through 
various cases presented before the court.283 However, pertinently to this discussion is that the 
court held that the employer was justified in taking into account the disciplinary record of the 
employees and that in refusing to re-employ or re-instate the employees it had dismissed, it had 
not committed unfair labour practice. This disciplinary record included employees’ behavior that 
was not in the course of the strike.284 It is respectfully submitted that the standard for 
determining unfair labour practice differed greatly. By not applying the same standard to all 
cases, the court was actually being unfair and contradictory to the purpose and intent it sought to 
uphold. 
If individuals could not have known how the court was going to interpret cases, they could not 
have known whether their actions were permissible or not. This was prejudicial considering that 
employees were rooted in a past of insecurity. It is submitted that the Industrial Court created 
much doubt and uncertainty on significant issues of the law. This is turn resulted in a very shaky 
justice structure, which left those dependent upon it with very little hope. Much of this could 
have been avoided if legislature had provided adequate tools for the courts to build with. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Chapter two presented and discussed the chronological evolution of industrial relations and in 
particular the right to strike action from a legislative perspective in South Africa between the 
years 1640 and 1990. The chapter presented this discussion in five sections namely the time 
periods 1640 - 1910; 1910 to 1946 and 1946 to 1990, as well as special mention of the important 
role of the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry and finally the evolution of relevant case law. It is 
only in fairly recent times that the right to freedom of association and right to strike of all 
workers in South Africa have been endorsed and finally embedded in the interim constitution and 
final Constitution of 1996. Labour union development and existence was along racial lines and 
recognition of unionisation of white labour was a specific political goal to entrench policies of 
apartheid and continue the subjugation of black workers to their white counterparts. South Africa 
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has indeed evolved from an oppressive state to a country that now enjoys constitutionalised 
labour rights. However, the journey has been long and bitter.  There has been much bloodshed 
over centuries during violent strike action that has paid for the changes we see today. However, it 
is worth noting that these strikes have had a cathartic effect on the country, as the apartheid 
Government in every instance was adamant about preventing such a horrific repetition through 
the enactment of legislation. 
It is for this reason that one can acknowledge that there is an inextricable link between strike 
action and the progress of legislation. This emphasises the pertinence of strike action and the 
necessity of preserving and protecting its role and function within society today. 




INTERNATIONAL LAWS REGULATING STRIKE ACTION 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The protection of workers’ rights has recently been the focus of many scholars and state officials. 
This is largely due to the fact that workers’ rights have been positioned under the banner of 
human rights and thus necessitates greater protection.1 The right to strike has been acknowledged 
as an essential right not only in South African law, but also within international law.2 This is 
primarily due to the paramount role industrial action has within society at large. Where any 
labour market exists, strikes are to be regarded as an unavoidable and indispensable corollary3 to 
the employment relationship, particularly to the rights pertaining to trade unions.4 International 
laws form the mould which shapes legislation within individual countries.5 The Constitution 
compels South African courts, tribunals and forums to give effect to international laws.6 In 
addition, the international treaties signed and endorsed by various countries impresses an 
obligation on such states to submit to the policies enshrined by the binding treaty.7 Various 
countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, France and South Africa have constitutionalised the right 
to strike.8 The constitutionalisation of strike action as well as the promulgation of supporting 
legislature, which gives effect to this right, emphasises the mandate that these international 
frameworks seek to achieve.9 
                                                          
1 O V C Okene ‘Human rights at work: Measuring the democratic rights of Nigerian workers by international 
standards’ (2015) 35 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 125. 
2 M A Chicktay ‘Defining the right to strike: A comparative analysis of international labour organizational standards 
and South African law’ (2012) 33(2) Obiter 260. 
3 O V C Okene ‘Derogations and restrictions on the right to strike under international law: the case of Nigeria’ 
(2009) 13(4) The International Journal of Human Rights 553. 
4 S Leader Freedom of Association: A Study in Labor Law and Political Theory (1992) 182. 
5 E Manamela & M Budeli‘Employees’ right to strike and violence in South Africa’ (2013) 46(3) CILSA 3. 
6 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; s 39. 
7 R Kruger Implementing the Right to Equality in Selected South African Equality Courts (unpublished Phd, Rhodes 
University, 2008) 55. 
8 Italy endorsed the right to strike in 1948, Spain in the year 1978, Portugal in the year 1976, France in the year 1946 
and South Africa in the year 1994. 
9 R Bernikow ‘Ten years of the CCMA – An assessment for labour’ (2007) 11 LDD 15.  
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This chapter seeks to highlight the significance of the right to strike within an international 
framework. It is imperative to do so, firstly, because strike action is synonymous with the right to 
freedom of association. Even though strike action has not been unequivocally enunciated as a 
right in a number of States’ legal frameworks as well as international policy, the right to freedom 
of association is universally protected and therefore confers protection on industrial action. 
Secondly, industrial action has been protected by a number of universal bodies. This alone is 
indicative of the significance of this right, as the conventions and resolutions which have been 
ratified by these international instruments have subsequently been adopted by states 
internationally. Thus, States are compelled to protect the right to strike. 
This chapter will firstly illustrate the necessity and limitations that are required to enforce the 
right to strike and ensure that it is not subject to the abuse of employees. The discussion will then 
go on to highlight the international bodies which protect strike action. The discussion will focus 
on three instruments namely, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the European Charter 
on Human Rights (ECHR) and the African Charter on the Human Rights of the Peoples (African 
Charter) as a discussion of all international instruments is beyond the scope of this work. 
3.2 THE NECESSITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
Strike action has conventionally been construed as an integral element to collective bargaining10 
necessary for the enhancement of employment conditions, wages and the hours of work.11 
Strikes are regarded as a collective ‘movement’12 which derives itself from the disputes between 
workers and employers relating to the employment, requiring the temporary suspension of work 
by the employee in order to compel a change in employment.13 
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However, this right has far exceeded its ambit, as it accomplishes much more than its 
contribution towards the work interests of employees.14 The purpose of industrial action may 
lead to improved dialogue between workers and management and thus contribute to 
revolutionary policies which could mobilise workers against socio-economic difficulties.15 It is 
for this reason that industrial action has been classified as a socio-economic right within 
international law.16 
Socio-economic rights are attributed a lesser degree of protection, due to the criticism that they 
are regarded as dictatorial and cause severe economic losses to countries. This is primarily due to 
the purpose of a strike being to cause economic losses to the employer in an attempt to coerce the 
employer to yield to the negotiated demands of the employees.17 The economic losses incurred 
by employers as a result of loss of production and profit18 ultimately impact negatively on 
society19 and the economy as a result of a low annual growth rate which retards the country’s 
GDP growth.20 Therefore, socio-economic rights are regarded as second generation rights. Civil 
and political rights on the contrary, are afforded a significantly greater level of protection within 
international law,21 mainly because of the fundamental freedoms civil and political rights have 
always sought to advance such as the right to free association,22 the right to free speech and the 
right not to be subjected to forced labour among other rights.23 
Thus, the right to strike necessitates greater protection within international human rights because 
if individuals are not able to engage in strike action then their basic human rights could be 
                                                          
14 B Nkabinde ‘The Right to Strike, an Essential Component of Workplace Democracy: Its Scope and Global 
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CFEA; Case No. 1068 (Greece) 214th Report of the CFEA; Case No. 1018 (Morocco) 214th Report of the CFEA; 
Case No. 1131 (Upper Volta) 22nd Report of the CFEA. 
15   M Servais ‘The ILO Law and the freedom to Strike’ available at https://www.law.utoronto.ca/.../Strike 
Symposium09_ Servais.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2015; Case No. 1381 (Ecuador) 248th Report of the CFEA; 
Case No. 1081 (Peru) 214th Report of the CFEA. 
16 T Novitz International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (2003) 102. 
17 NUMSA v Boart MSA [1996] 1 BLLR 13 (LAC). 
18 Z Qinghong ‘Regulate the right to economic strike so as to create harmonious labour relations’ 7 March 2011, 
available at http://www.jttp.cn/a/report/opinion/2011/0307/942.html, accessed on 15 September 2015. 
19 International Labour Office Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (Report iii, Part 4 A) (1992) 226. 
20 L Krugel ‘Strike season and its impact on the economy’ 6 November 2013, available at http://www.sablog.kp mg- 
.co.za/2013/11/strike-season-impact-economy/, accessed on 15 September 2015. 
21 ibid 102. 
22 Collymore v Attorney-General, [1970] AC 538. 
23 M A Chicktay ‘Placing the right to strike within a human rights framework’ (2006) 27(2) Obiter 348. 
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violated.24 The right to strike allows employees to improve working conditions and wages25 that 
ultimately lead to the improvement of an employee’s livelihood as well as their dignity within 
society.26 There is an undeniable correlation between industrial action and the right to life 
because if employees are able to obtain a living wage that allows them to afford food, clothes, 
housing, medical treatment etc. then there is a greater possibility that such employees would 
have a healthier life.27 If employees are prevented from engaging in strike action, they would 
also be prevented from withholding their labour at their own will. Consequently, workers would 
be forced to carry on their work against their will and be compelled to accept any condition of 
employment dictated to by the employer thus, their right to be free from slavery.28 Furthermore, 
strikes are a form of voicing employees’ dissatisfaction with the conditions of employment 
enforced by management, thus, if employees were prevented from striking then their right to 
freedom of speech would also be violated.29 
Parties to the ILO have for over 60 years, acknowledged that strike action is indeed a right and 
that there is an inextricable relationship between industrial action and the right to freedom of 
association.30 Furthermore, human rights cannot subsist without the implementation of social 
justice.31 Freedom of association is viewed as a conduit to realise subsequent rights. The United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights which is tasked with the promotion and protection of the 
right or freedom to strike, has enunciated that freedom of association cannot solely safeguard the 
best interests of employees because industrial action is the best effective means of worker 
protection.32 It is significant to emphasise that in approximately 3000 international cases, the 
ILO33 has, unopposed, validated and applied the right to freely associate and the right to strike.34 
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Therefore, if protection is given to the freedom of association, which is a first generation right 
and not to the right to strike, this would be an illusory notion of democracy.35 The right to strike 
has been acknowledged as the cornerstone of the right to freedom of association, therefore they 
are both regarded as integral rights to the implementation of democratic values.36 The majority 
decision of McLachlin CJ, LeBel, Binnie, Fish, Bastarache, and Abella JJ in Health Services and 
Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v British Columbia37 held that an 
employee’s right to collective bargaining and freedom of association endorses democratic values 
such as the right to dignity, the right to freedom of choice and the right to equality.38 
Secondly, the right to strike necessitates protection as it is fundamental to the practice of 
collective bargaining and in obtaining effectual relations between capital and labour.39 The 
success of collective bargaining is thus dependent upon industrial action,40 as without strike 
action employees lack negotiating power.41 The ILO does not contain a clear endorsement of 
strike action within the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention42 (hereinafter referred to as the Freedom of Association Convention) and the Right 
to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention43 (hereinafter referred to as the Right to 
Organize Convention).44 However, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations have affirmed 
that industrial action is an essential prerequisite to the Freedom of Association Convention and 
as such necessitates a responsibility to protect the right to strike.45 The reason for the affirmation 
by the CFA is that the right to strike has been acknowledged as an integral part of the furtherance 
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41 Davis v Henry 555 So. 2d 457- (La.1990).  
42 The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention No. 87 of 1948. 
43 The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention No. 98 of 1949. 
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of the right to freedom of association and the freedom of organization.46 Esson JA in Dolphin 
Delivery Ltd v Retail Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local47  held that freedom of 
association includes the right to join and take part in union activities. Every union member has 
the right to jointly pursue the shared interests of its members.48 The majority decision in which 
Bayda CJS and Cameron JA concurred in Re Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, 
Locals,49 held that there is a vital connection between freedom of association, collective 
bargaining and industrial action.50 Cameron JA held in his judgment that as freedom of 
association protects the right to enter into unions for the function of bargaining then it follows 
that this right should also include the right to participate in the bargaining process as well as the 
right to strike.51 In Black v Law Society of Alberta,52 Kerans JA held that the freedom of 
association includes the activities that are related to the enforcement of this freedom and 
necessitate constitutional protection if they are associated to a fundamental right that is enshrined 
to enforce human rights.53 In Baena-Ricardo et al v Panama54 the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights based its findings on the Committee of Experts and the CFA in deciding that the 
dismissal of 270 strikers by Panama violated Article 16 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights which entrenched the right to freedom of association.55 The decision of the Committee of 
Experts and the CFA was endorsed in Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union56 
where the court stated that the principle of freedom of association which is the protection of the 
interests of individuals can only be actualised through the pursuit of other supporting rights.57 
In the landmark decision of Demir and Baykara v Turkey,58 the European Court on Human 
Rights (ECHR) enforced the protection of the right to strike within Article 11 of the ILO, which 
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enforces the right to Freedom of Association. In Demir and Baykara the ECHR dealt with an 
application against Turkey which was brought by the president of the trade union, Tum Bel Sen. 
The applicants claimed that their right to form unions as well as undertaking collective 
bargaining and entering into collective bargaining agreements had been violated by the domestic 
courts and essentially were in breach of Article 11 of the Convention, or with Article 14. 
The union had engaged in a collective agreement with the Gaziantep Municipal Council for a 
period of two years. According to the agreement, the municipal council was obliged to fulfill a 
number of tasks and responsibilities. This, however, it did not do. Civil proceedings were then 
brought to the district court, which ruled in favour of the union. However, when taken on appeal 
the decision was overturned. The fourth civil division found that although the law allowed civil 
servants to establish and join trade unions, they did not possess the capacity to enter into binding 
collective agreements.59 In making its decision, the court made note of the fact that public 
servants hold different positions in society as compared to private employees and as there was an 
absence of legislation governing collective agreements concluded by public employees and 
unions, the court must look at international instruments such as the ILO which would give 
guidance to the court’s findings.60 
When the matter was brought before the Grand Chamber, the court viewed the government’s 
objection of the European Social Charter as not even being a preliminary objection because an 
application cannot merely become inadmissible on the basis of the instruments, but rather until 
the court has assessed its merits.61 In deciding on the case the Grand Chamber made continuous 
reference to the ILO’s conventions.62 The court held that the right of public employees to 
participate in collective bargaining was entrenched in international law, which included 
international and regional instruments. The judiciary is required to interpret legislation in the 
light of international laws.63 Collective bargaining is based on the notion that employers have 
always possessed superior power in labour relations due to the fact that the employee is 
dependent on the wage paid to him for work rendered. Employees are thus required to work 
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collectively to acquire adequate influence that would enable them to negotiate and bargain 
successfully with their employer. Employees exercise this collective power through strike 
action.64  The right to join a trade union was a right that inferred more than mere membership to 
an organisation. It also included the right of a trade union to be heard through representing its 
members’ interests which includes striking in order to be heard.65 Furthermore, European 
practice illustrates that this right has been adopted by numerous member states. In addition, the 
Grand Chamber stated that the ILO Convention No. 98 had been ratified by Turkey. There is no 
evidence in this Convention that would exclude the applicant's rights based on Article 6 of the 
Convention.66 Based on these findings the Chamber held that it could not accept an argument 
based on the omission of law and a delay in legislation. Neither was this sufficient to nullify an 
agreement that had been in place for two years and restrict the union members’ rights to freedom 
of association.67  
If employees were denied the right to strike then this would vitiate the common goal that the 
implementation of these rights seeks to achieve as these freedoms together with the right to strike 
share a reciprocal relationship.68 The right to strike has been acknowledged to be so closely 
entwined with the right to organise and the freedom of association that the right to strike should 
be afforded some level of constitutional protection.69 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) 
recently affirmed the correlation between the right to strike and the right to freedom of 
association in the landmark decision of Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan 
(SFL).70 The Saskatchewan Federation of Labour along with other unions contested the 
provisions of the Public Service Essential Services Act71 (hereinafter referred to as the PSEA) 
and The Trade Union Amendment Act (hereafter referred to as the Trade Union Amendment 
Act)72 on the grounds that they contradicted the constitutional provisions of s 2(d) of the 
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms73 (hereinafter referred to as the Charter). The PSEA 
was the first statute in Canada that prevented essential service employees from striking. The 
essential service employees were compelled to continue working according to the previous terms 
of their bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the PSEA did not provide any significant framework 
for resolving disputes for essential service employees such as compulsory arbitration or 
additional processes for conciliating the dispute.74 The Trade Union Amendment Act increased 
the necessary written support while reducing the time limit which employees had to furnish 
written support. It also amended the provisions pertaining to communication between 
management and employees.75 
The SCC stated that in determining whether there was an infringement of s 2(d) of the Charter 
there had to be an investigation into whether the intrusion on the right to strike amounted to a 
considerable interference in the procedure of collective bargaining.76 The intrusion on the right to 
strike should not be impaired more than is absolutely necessary. The mere fact that a service is 
performed by a public employee does not automatically categorise the service as ‘essential’.77 
The SCC considered that the provision under the PSESA which allows an employer of a public 
employee to unilaterally make a decision that the service the employee is providing is an 
essential service. The employer is also entitled to unilaterally decide how the essential service 
should be carried out, as well as the classification of employees, their names and the number of 
employees who are allowed to engage in the strike.78 The SCC held that these provisions of the 
PSESA are an intrusion on the right to strike which exceeds what is absolutely necessary to 
maintain continued essential services during the subsistence of a strike and thus causes prejudice 
to the essential service employees.79 Even though the right to strike requires more stringent 
regulation due to the severe impact strikes have on the disruption of vital services that the public 
are dependent on, these regulations should not be so extensive that employees are prevented 
from striking regardless of whether or not their services are indeed indispensable.80 International 
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law requires that individual countries’ domestic laws effectively regulate the right to strike, 
however, it does not provide for a complete elimination of the right to strike without an alternate 
dispute resolution procedure for essential service employees.81 Furthermore, industrial action is 
an integral element of collective bargaining, thus, if industrial action is limited in such an 
intrusive way that it hampers collective bargaining then strike action has to be substituted with 
another dispute resolution mechanism that would be as effective as strike action.82 However, the 
PSESA does not provide any substitute dispute resolution mechanism. Thus, the unilateral 
entitlements of the public employer together with the lack of any dispute resolution mechanism 
led the SCC to determine that the provisions of the PSESA were unconstitutional.83 
 The SCC was then called upon to determine the constitutionality of the Trade Union 
Amendment Act. The court stated that in terms of this provision there was no interference with  
the right to freedom of association as the provision merely introduced amendments to the 
bargaining process which affected how a union could acquire or lose the position of a negotiating 
agent.84 Furthermore, the rules which govern the relationship between employer and employee 
did not largely impede with the right to freedom of association to an extent that it weakened the 
right to freedom of association more than was realistically essential.85  
The case of SFL supra highlighted three essential characteristics of the right to freedom of 
association. The first was that employees have a right to organise and to choose a union to 
bargain on their behalf, as is evident in the decision of the SCC that the provision within the 
Trade Union Amendment Act which increased the requirements on how a representative could 
obtain or lose his representativity was not unconstitutional.86 Secondly, the decisions in SFL 
supra highlight that employees possess the right to bargain and that legislature’s restrictions on 
bargaining should not excessively impair the right to freedom of association. Thirdly, the SCC 
emphasised that the right to strike is an imperative component of collective bargaining.87 The 
right to take joint action which includes the right to strike necessitates that the right to strike be 
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recognised as an essential right that should be enforced through domestic laws.88 Thus, it is 
undeniable that the right to freedom of association provides a channel for the implementation of 
the right to engage in collective bargaining and industrial action.89 
The ILO acknowledges that the rights pertaining to collective bargaining and trade unionism 
which could result in strike action is one of the core foundational principles enshrined within 
international labour policies.90 Collective bargaining presents a platform that enables unions to 
engage in deliberations regarding conditions of employment,91 as collective bargaining seeks to 
even out the battle field by instilling necessary checks and balances to prevent an abuse of power 
from either party in the employment relationship.92 The right to strike is thus a crucial weapon in 
the bargaining arena without which workers would be left entirely defenseless in economic 
combat with employers.93 
An essential component of collective bargaining is power. The employer is mindful that the 
employee is dependent on him as he pays him a wage. This is the ‘power’ that the employer 
possesses over the employee. However, the employee is at the same time aware that without his 
labour the employer’s production would cease.94 The employee’s power is thus in his ability to 
withhold his labour through the implementation of strikes. In this way the power between the 
employer and the employee in the employment field is balanced which gives both the employer 
and the employee equal footing during collective bargaining.95 Therefore, strike action provides 
the employee with power which is essential during collective bargaining or else collective 
bargaining would amount to collective begging.96 This essentially means that employees are 
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provided with bargaining power through strike action so that they do not have to beg the 
employer to accede to their demands, but rather that they can pressurise the employer to reach 
consensus during negotiations.97 The pressure that the employer experiences is through the loss 
of production, the inability to conduct business efficiently and the loss profits that are a direct 
consequence of the withholding of labour by employees.98 The withholding of labour through 
strike action can thus be viewed as the economic power that brings an employer to agree on the 
contradicting viewpoints between it and the employees.99 Thus, industrial action threatens the 
employer to enter into bargaining negotiations, because the employee is supported by his or her 
trade union that represents the employee’s employment interests and so can implement his power 
by way of strike action if negotiations are unsuccessful.100 The right to strike is thus intrinsic to 
collective bargaining. Freedom of association is necessary to facilitate collective bargaining, 
which needs to be supplemented by the right to strike.101 Collectively, these rights become 
indistinguishable in the pursuit of parity in the employment relationship.102  
Thirdly, the right to strike necessitates protection as it improves the socio-economic position of 
society. It is worth reiterating that the impetus for collective bargaining and trade unionism is to 
create a symmetrical balance of power between employers and workers.103 This in turn inculcates 
an ethos of social justice such as equality, acceptance and respect for fundamental human rights 
and labour rights of workers as well as economic development that transcends the parameters of 
employment to manifest itself within society.104 Conventionally, the right to strike was construed 
as being essential to the pursuance of improved remuneration and employment conditions.105 
However, it must be acknowledged that an increase in wages stimulates the economy by placing 
more disposable income in the hands of the working.106 Furthermore, an improvement of 
working conditions has a synonymous effect, as this leads to a happier workforce results in 
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greater productivity. Therefore, this could be a probable way in which the socio-economic 
welfare of society could be ameliorated.107 The Committee of Experts has reaffirmed that the 
right to strike far surpasses its primary role in improving working conditions, but it can also 
assist in “solutions to economic and social policy questions and to labour problems of any kind, 
which are of a direct concern to workers”.108 The CFA confirmed the sentiments of the 
Committee of Experts by stating that strike action is an integral component of trade union 
activities and is a fundamental mechanism accessible to employees to promote and protect their 
social and economic concerns.109 
3.3 THE NECESSITY FOR LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
As was previously discussed, the right to strike is indeed a paramount right which requires 
protection within international and regional law.110 The protection that this right necessitates 
personifies its vital responsibility and significance within society.111 It is therefore crucial that 
effective restrictions and limitations are enforced to prevent an abuse of this right and ensure that 
the implementation of strikes is effected in an orderly manner.112 Even though the right to strike 
has been described as an essential right, it cannot be regarded as an absolute right and is 
therefore subject to limitations which are enshrined in legislation and are vital to freedom and 
democracy, including the protection of fundamental rights and morals, health and security and 
the general concern over public interest.113 
The right to strike is regarded as a ‘fundamental right’. Hence, no law can explicitly exclude 
specific categories of workers from embarking in strike action. However, workers engaged in 
essential services may be restricted from this right on the basis that the furtherance of their work 
is guaranteed through legislation and is validated by concern over the interests of society.114 The 
ILO identifies three groups of workers that may not engage in strike action, these being workers 
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who form part of essential services such as the police or the nation’s armed forces and specific 
public officers who exercise authority on behalf of the country.115 Essential services have been 
categorised as a service whose “… interruption … would endanger the life, personal safety or 
health of the whole or part of the population”.116 This prohibition on essential service employees 
is applicable to workers in both private and public services, which are deemed to be essential, or 
conditionally, that there is an unequivocal or impending danger to the welfare, wellbeing or right 
to life of society at large or a part thereof.117 The CFA noted that the purpose for restricting 
strikes in essential services would be distorted if there was no clear distinction made between 
undertakings involving the state and those of essential services. Therefore, the CFA sought to list 
various services which constitute essential services. These are “the police and armed forces, 
firefighting services, prison services, provision of food to pupils in schools, cleaning of schools 
and air traffic control services”.118 Even though these institutions engaged in essential services 
are prohibited from striking, this does not guarantee that such employees will never engage in 
strikes nor does it ensure the safety of employees during the subsistence of a strike.119 These 
bans on strikes by employees in essential services have been upheld in numerous constitutional 
cases brought before the courts.120 
In order to determine how the right to strike should be limited with regard to essential service 
employees, the judiciary is required to apply the test of proportionality.121 In Regina v Oakes,122 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) stated that there is a two stage inquiry to determine the 
proportionality of limiting a constitutional right. The SCC stated that the first stage necessitates 
an inquiry into the way in which the particular legislation contravenes the constitutional rights.123 
                                                          
115 Matee (note 36 above; 13). 
116 Freedom of Association: 1985 Digest, para 540-564. 
117 Servais (note 15 above; 4). 
118 Matee (note 36 above; 22). 
119 D T Masiloane ‘Guaranteeing the safety of non-striking employees during strikes: The fallacy of policing’ (2010) 
23(2) Acta Criminologica 35. 
120 M S Weiss ‘The right to strike in essential services under United States labour law’ available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2189&context=fac_pubs., accessed on 15 
September 2015. 
121 Sunday Times Case 30 ECHR (Ser. A) 1 (1979). 
122 Regina v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR. 103, Ts’epe v IEC and Others (2005) AHRLR 136 (LeCa 2005). 
123 Regina v Oakes supra note 122 at 135. 
66 
 
The second stage necessitates an investigation into whether the legislation endorsed is evidently 
and reasonably justifiably reasonable.124  
Even though the ILO places limitations and restrictions on the right to strike, it does not condone 
the enforcement of overly constrictive limitations. The CFA has indicated that the restricting 
conditions implemented on the right to strike should be reasonable and not restrict the actions of 
unions without just cause.125 This essentially infers that a strike should only be limited if it 
threatens the public interest of society and would be detrimental to the health and safety of 
individuals.126 The Californian Supreme Court analysed the term ‘essential services’ undertaken 
by public employees in County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Assn127 
and for the first time in Canada the Judiciary permitted public employees to engage in strike 
action. In July 1976 approximately 75% of the employees of Sanitation District engaged in an 11 
day strike over failed wage negotiations. An injunction was obtained to restrain the strike, 
however, the injunction was futile as the strike continued. The service which these employees 
rendered were regarded not only as public services but also essential services. Their services 
included providing and maintaining sewage and treatment facilities across the country. During 
the strike the District was able to secure some of its operations through the labour of 
management and non-striking employees. The employees then accepted a new offer which ended 
the 11 day strike. The District immediately proceeded with instituting action for civil damages as 
a result of the strike. The high court first considered the common law position of striking public 
employees. The high court considered that there was no clear direction from legislation on 
whether all public employees should be prohibited from striking.128 The court also analysed other 
cases that stated that if there was an absence of legislation authorising strike action by public 
sector employees then such an action undertaken by these public employees would be illegal.129 
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These cases based their view on the postulation that strikes by public employees were a revolt 
against the government and would lead to chaos and immense disruption.130  
In Sanitation District supra the Supreme Court rejected the lengthy line of precedent and stated 
that the prohibition on striking public employees is no longer supported. The court reasoned that 
the outmoded precedent which prevented public employees from striking was based on the 
notion that the government was sovereign and could not be questioned because they could never 
be accused of doing wrong.131 The Supreme Court also stated that these cases do not 
acknowledge that that there is an imbalance between the socio-economic interests of employees 
and large-scale enterprises and government organisations.132  Furthermore, the line of precedent 
failed to take into account the modern reality that employers possessed more power than 
employees and that the law in modern society sought to empower employees to overcome this 
imbalance of power.133 Bird CJ held that the only way of effectively combating this imbalance of 
power and opposing the abuse inflicted by employers is through the constitutional right to 
strike.134 The Supreme Court stated that due to the size and power of government as well as the 
undertaking of a wide variety of services by government this necessitated that public sector 
employees be treated the same as private sector employees.135 Thus, the Supreme Court held that 
the common law position which prohibited all public sector employees from striking could not 
be supported.136 The court acknowledged though, that there were public services which were 
regarded as essential whose disruption would be detrimental to the safety and health of the 
public.137 If the employees within these essential services engaged in strikes then their actions 
would be deemed illegal.138 The case of Sanitation District supra illustrates that there is a 
distinction between the services undertaken by public sector employees and services undertaken 
by public employees engaged in essential services.139 
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In another landmark case of the ECHR, the Grand Chamber affirmed that Article 11 of the ILO 
contained the right to strike which was enforced through the case of Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v 
Turkey.140 The case dealt with a Turkish trade union which represented public employees 
employed in various field such as motorway construction, energy, registration of land and 
roadworks. The union expressed its intention to strike in 1996.141 This was countered with the 
government’s immediate ban on striking by all civil employees which was expressed in the form 
of a circular. The members of the union, notwithstanding the circular, engaged in industrial 
action and accordingly received disciplinary action. As a result of obtaining no recourse in the 
domestic courts of Turkey, the union escalated the matter to the ECHR on the basis that the 
ministerial circular which was handed to the union breached the employees’ right to engage in 
trade union activity.142  
The Grand Chamber approached the matter based on the decision handed down in Demir supra. 
The court first considered whether the Turkish government had infringed the employees’ rights 
enshrined in Article 11 of the ILO. The ECHR stated that the Grand Chamber compels countries 
to develop laws that allow trade unions to battle for the rights of their members within the legal 
limits provided by Article 11.143 The ECHR affirmed that “the strike which allows the unions to 
make their voice heard constitutes an important aspect for the members of a union to protect their 
interests”.144 The court stated that this assertion is supported by the fact that international 
instruments such as the ILO and the ESC have enunciated that the right to strike, the right to 
collective bargaining and the right to trade unionism are inseparable rights which are 
fundamental to the pursuit of employees’ rights. The ECHR was thus satisfied that the court 
should give effect to the right to strike especially in light of the significance that these 
international instruments mentioned above have placed on the right to strike and its connection to 
collective bargaining and trade union rights.145  
The ECHR then considered whether the circular which entrenched the ban on striking by all 
public employees interfered with the right to trade unionism. The ECHR determined that the 
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circular was vague and included all public employees who were banned from striking. This was 
deemed to be excessive in a democratic society.146 The ECHR held that the right to strike was 
not regarded as an absolute right but was subject to a number of limitations and conditions. 
Therefore, the ban on strikes should only be acceptable for employees engaged in essential 
services. The ECHR emphasised that there are categories of workers who can be prohibited from 
striking based on the type of service that they provide, however, this ban cannot extend to all 
public employees.147 The court stated that a reasonable and lawful restriction on the right to 
strike would clearly indicate the types and categories of employees who could engage in strikes 
as well as those employees who could not engage in strikes.148 The ECHR held that the circular 
sent out by government did not indicate the categories of workers who could strike and those 
who could not strike. The circular was elusive and included all the public employees employed 
by government and did not adequately balance the rights of the employees and the requirements 
enshrined in Article 11(2).149 Therefore, the ECHR held that the rights of the Turkish employees 
to engage in trade union activities were infringed.150 
The case of Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey elucidates that member states that have ratified the 
Conventions of the ILO are compelled to promulgate national laws and interpret legislation 
which generally or specifically restrict the right to strike in accordance with the ILO’s 
Conventions.151 Furthermore, the ratification of the European Community Social Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, ratified by 11 European Council, states and has stated, 
that the “right to resort to collective action in the event of a conflict of interests shall include the 
right to strike subject to the obligations arising under national regulations and collective 
agreements”.152 The United States of America (US) has promulgated legislation, namely the 
National Labour Relations Act (29 USC 151 (2006), (hereinafter referred to as the NLRA), 
which protects the rights to strike. In terms of s 7 of the NLRA, the right to strike, the right to 
freely engage in collective bargaining as well as the right to freedom of association forms the 
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basis of the NLRA. In terms of s 13, the NLRA unequivocally states that there should be no 
interpretation of the NLRA that would encumber the right to strike.  
However, the Judiciary’s interpretation of the NLRB has been inconsistent with the values 
enshrined in the international instruments mentioned above. This inconsistency is evident in the 
case of NLRB v Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.153 The American Radio Typographists 
Association (ARTA) entered into negotiations regarding an increase in wages, union recognition, 
hours of work and the enforcement of a contract of employment, failing which the union 
threatened strike action. As a result of failed negotiations a two day strike commenced. The 
company hired 11 men during the strike to maintain the functionality of one of their offices. 
After the strike had been declared unsuccessful, the company announced that the entire 
workforce could return to work with the exception of the 11 men who were replaced during the 
strike. The company did indicate that these 11 strikers could be rehired provided that posts 
opened up. Two days later, the company rehired 7 of the 11 strikers as posts became available. 
The four men who had not been rehired, were the strongest supporters of the union.154 
The ARTA directed a complaint to the NLRB. The Board transferred the matter to the national 
board, which decided that the four men had been discriminated against due to their affiliation to 
the union. The company declined to enforce the decision of the Board, which was then referred 
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice Roberts summed up the judgment in addressing the 
issue of the constitutionality of the NLRA and the issue of replacing posts of striking employees 
by referring to s 13 of the NLRA,155 and stating that: 
“it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the 
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is 
not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to 
resume their employment, in order to create a place for them”.156 
This decision effectively weakens the right to strike as the court construes striking as a freedom 
and not a right. With regard to freedoms, there is no duty to prevent a person from acting. If 
employees are given the freedom to engage in a strike, an employer would not have a right to 
stop that employee from engaging in the strike. However, at the same time the employer does not 
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possess a positive duty to not interfere with the strike.157 The decision in Mackay supra has been 
criticised by the international community as the replacement of striking employees’ posts 
prejudices and unreasonably limits an employee’s right to engage in protected strike action. An 
employee cannot effectively assert the right to strike if there is a fear that if the employee 
engages in a strike then there is a possibility that his or her post will be replaced. Therefore, the 
whole process of collective bargaining is rendered futile, as it curtails the equal footing that the 
bargaining table is supposed to instill because employers would be allowed additional power 
over the employee by hiring replacement labour.158 This in turn is a violation of international 
frameworks such as the ESC,159 the ILO Conventions Nos.86 and 98, which enshrine the right to 
effective collective bargaining and trade union rights, as well as the ECHR,160 which give effect 
to right such as freedom of association and freedom of assembly that ultimately facilitates 
productive collective bargaining.  
The European Court of Justice in the leading case of ITWF v Viking Line ABP,161 has highlighted 
core human rights issues regarding the right to freedom of establishment and when it is 
permissible to limit the right to strike.162 In ITWF supra, Viking Line operated a ship named The 
Rosella between the areas of Finland and Estonia. It decided to carry its operations under the 
Estonian flag, so that it could reduce its costs by replacing the highly paid Finnish crew with an 
Estonian crew who earned lower wages. The ITWF had a policy against ‘reflagging’ of ships for 
convenience in areas where the labour cost was lower, when in reality their seat was in another 
country. An affiliate member of the ITWF, the Finnish Seamen’s Union, planned strike action. 
The ITWF advised its members to not enter into negotiations with Viking, as this would obstruct 
its business. Viking then sought an injunction, claiming that the proposed strike action would 
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infringe their right to freedom of establishment provided for in TEC, article 43 (now amended to 
article 49 of TFEU). 
The High Court of Justice granted the order, which was subsequently reversed by the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales. The matter was then taken before the European Court of Justice. 
In reaching its decision, the court made reference to international instruments, which protect 
collective bargaining and the right to strike, such as the European Social Charter and Convention 
No. 87 of the ILO regarding the freedom of association and organisation. The court also 
highlighted the instruments enacted at national or community level such as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.163 The case law regarding fundamental rights is 
highly dependent on the ECHR as well as the constitutions of ILO member states. Unions are 
confronted with a massive problem when defending their rights, as the right to strike is not 
explicitly contained in Article 11 of the ECHR.164 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union states that the right to strike must be protected in accordance with the laws at 
community and national level.165 The court also observed that the right to strike for promoting 
the protection of workers can be regarded as a legitimate interest, which justifies a restriction of 
one of the principle rights which the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
provides for, such as the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, the rights of workers are to be 
regarded as one of the overriding reasons of the public concern acknowledged by courts.166 
The court stated that even though the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike has 
been credited as a ‘fundamental right’, this does not mean that it is exempt from restrictions. 
“The right to strike may not be relied on, in particular, where the strike is contra boni mores or is 
prohibited under national law or community law”.167 Even though the courts have acknowledged 
that there is a positive right to strike; this right is subject to the limitations enshrined in national 
laws. This essentially means that any member state of the ILO may limit the right to strike either 
generally or specifically through the enforcement of the member state’s national law, however, 
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the member state has to ensure that such limitations are in compliance with the Convention No. 
87 and Convention No. 98.168  
3.4 THE ENTRENCHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
3.4.1 THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO) 
The ILO was established in 1919169 and is regarded as a specialised bureau within the United 
Nations. The ILO serves as a custodian of international labour standards which are contained in 
its recommendations and conventions.170 The ILO postulates that there is a necessity to formulate 
an economic and social framework that would provide the building blocks for employment and 
security, synonymously with retaining the ability to adapt to increasing competition globally.171 
The conventions and recommendations of the ILO have had a significant impact on international 
labour law. It accomplishes this through two methods. The first is that when countries ratify 
conventions of the ILO, they fall under the umbrella of the ILO’s supervisory framework. The 
second method is that the ILO provides technical assistance to countries in an attempt to 
facilitate the implementation of their policies.172 
It is imperative to highlight that there is no explicit reference to the right to engage in strikes in 
the ILO conventions. A possible explanation for the exclusion of the right to strike was that both 
ILO conventions were signed into force during a prevalent communist sphere that subsisted after 
the Cold War. Therefore, the western community was wary of enforcing socio-economic rights. 
At the time the ILO was enforced, an Anglo-American position was established, which separated 
freedom of association to be given protection under first generation rights and the right to engage 
in strike action as socio-economic in nature.173 Britain was the key player in the ILO’s 
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establishment as well as its consolidation and progression during the inter-war period that gave 
rise to the 1948 and 1949 conventions which form the basis of the right to strike as will be 
discussed in detail further on in the chapter.174 
It is imperative to note that the ILO does not contain any express right to engage in strike 
action.175 This should not lead to the assumption that the ILO discounts or refrains from creating 
a framework that seeks to protect and advance the right to strike.176 However, the right to strike 
can be construed from the pronouncements of the IOL’s supervisory instruments,177 such as the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR),178 as 
well as the ILO’s Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA).179 Firstly, the 
right to strike can be inferred from the ILO’s two foundational conventions, which are, the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the right to Organize Convention No. 87 of 1948180 
and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention No. 96 of 1949.181 Both the 
CEACR and the CFA have enunciated that the right to strike cannot be isolated from the rights 
entrenched in the ILO Conventions above which are the Freedom of Association and the right to 
engage in collective bargaining and trade unionism, as these rights  together form the impetus for 
employers and employees to reach consensus on disputes.182 
Of the 185 parties to the ILO, 153 states have ratified the No. 87 Convention and 163 states have 
ratified the No. 98 Convention.183 Even more so both these conventions constitute the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), which is esteemed as the core 
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principles of International labour standards. Every constituent to the ILO, which has enforced 
these conventions are compelled to give effect to the terms enshrined in these conventions.184 
Articles 3, 8 and 10 contained in the Freedom of Association Convention form an integral basis 
to the right to strike. Article 3 pertains to the rights of unions to freely and collectively organise 
themselves and engage in activities as well as enforcing the prohibition on any interference that 
would in any way constrict organisations from lawfully exercising this right. Article 8 stipulates 
that the national laws which are enacted to regulate organisations should not in any manner 
impede or impair the rights of organisations guaranteed within the convention. Article 10 
specifies that the word ‘organisation’ refers to any workers’ organisation or organisation of an 
employer which is purposed for the advancement and protection of the interests of its 
members.185 
The Committee has consistently reaffirmed that the right to strike is intrinsic to the essence of 
workers’ rights and that of organisations. The particular use of the word ‘worker’, rather than 
‘trade union’, elucidates that the Committee emphasises that federations as well as 
confederations together with trade unions, should not be prevented, either directly or indirectly 
through state legislation, from exerting the right to strike.186 
The Committee has further highlighted that the lawful implementation of strike action should not 
cause sanctions or punishments that would amount to anti- union discrimination that would 
contradict the intent and purpose of the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 
1949 (No. 98).187 The Committee has made various rulings in accordance with these principles, 
such as in Jamaica where strike action resulted in the state banning union meetings. The 
Committee decided that the right to strike as well as conducting trade union meetings is 
imperative to the rights of trade unions.188 
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In addition to the two ILO Conventions (No. 87 and No. 98), the ILO has formulated resolutions 
which have been adopted to give effect to the right to strike.189 One of these is the resolution 
concerning the Abolition of Anti- Trade Union Legislation in the States’ members of the 
International Labour Organization that was adopted in 1957. This resolution provides for “the 
effective and unrestricted exercise of trade union rights, including the right to strike, by 
workers”. The second is the resolution concerning Trade Union Rights and their Relation to Civil 
Liberties, which was adopted in 1970. This resolution entails, “further action to ensure full and 
universal respect for trade union rights in the broadest sense”, in particular the, “right to 
strike”.190 
3.4.1.1. REPORTING PROCEDURE 
All member states which are party to the ILO are required to produce reports at various points in  
time detailing the mechanisms they have adopted to carry out the provisions detailed in the 
conventions. Representatives of workers’ unions and employers’ associations are entitled to 
critique these reports.191 Constituent states are required to submit reports on,  
“the position of the law and practice in their countries in regard to matters dealt with in the 
Recommendation, showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be 
given to the provisions of the Recommendations and such modifications of these provisions as 
it has been found or may be found necessary to make in adopting or applying them”.192 
The Committee of Experts (CoE) then examines these remarks and makes various comments, 
which are then presented as a report at the International Labour Conference (ILC). These reports 
are further examined by the Committee on Application of Standards (CAS), from where a 
conclusion is then drawn. The end products of both these committees are publicised. Where 
member states have deviated from compliance, they are requested to then bring into line their 
policies or practices in keeping with ILO provisions. The ILO also provides technical support to 
member states to ensure that their suggestions are implemented.193 
The CoE and the CFA maintain a relationship of concurrence in their decisions in order to 
sustain consistency within the ILO’s supervisory framework. Even though the CoE and CFA 
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vary in composition and their supervisory functions, the committees undertake the application of 
universally approved principles, which are not selectively enforced.194 
3.4.2 THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (ECHR) 
Regional human rights are imperative frameworks, which are key role players in the 
development of national laws. There are three human rights systems which regulate European 
countries, two of which will be discussed under this section, namely the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the European 
Social Charter (ESC).195 In 1950 the ECHR was adopted by the Council of Europe, and 
explicitly entrenches the protection of civil and political rights, while excluding the protection of 
socio-economic rights. This has led to numerous controversies regarding the right to strike.196 
The reason socio-economic rights had been explicitly excluded from the ambit of the ECHR was 
due to a view held that socio-economic rights were not at that time being completely observed, 
and that only in years to come would European countries be able to fully afford all citizens with 
equivalent respect. It was postulated firstly to be essential to establish civil and political 
democracy.197 Therefore, the ECHR does not contain an express right to strike action. However, 
numerous members of the ECHR have consistently asserted that the right to strike can be derived 
from Article 11 of the ECHR, which provides for the right to freedom of association.198 
However, ten years into the adoption of the ECHR, social and economic rights were included in 
the European Social Charter (ESC), which came into effect in 1961.199 The ESC was regarded as 
the first treaty to bind international states to explicitly protect and recognise the right to strike.200 
The ESC expressly entrenches the right to strike in Article 6(4) which provides for “the right of 
workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to 
strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered 
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into”.201 Even when the Article was revised in 1996, Article 6(4) remained unchanged.202 This 
provision provides the foundation for which employees may exercise their right not only for the 
right to strike but also for an employer’s right to collective action in the form of lock outs.203 
Article 6(4) does not make any reference on who may authorise strikes. Thus, the Article opens 
the door for deciding which groups would be afforded this right. Although, any decision taken 
must be in accordance to the limiting provisions that are enshrined in Article 31 of the ESC.204  
The ESC acts as a reporting mechanism on the ILO’s policies and constituents of the ILO. The 
European Committee on Social Rights is assigned to supervise member states’ compliance with 
ESC provisions.205 The European Committee on Social Rights is comprised of subcommittees 
such as the Independent Experts Governmental Committee and the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe. These committees include expert delegates from member states of the 
Council of Europe.206  Member states of the Council of Europe are required to submit biannual 
reports of their compliance with the ESC provisions to the Council of Europe’s Secretary-
General. The Committee of Independent Experts examines these reports.207 There are essentially 
two mechanisms which the European Committee on Social Rights adopts to supervise member 
states’ compliance with the ESC.208 The first mechanism is through the Collective Complaints 
Procedure which are complaints submitted by non-governmental organizations and social 
partners of the Council of Europe.209 The European Committee of Social Rights investigates the 
report according to formal requirements to decide on whether the complaint will be allowed. The 
European Committee of Social Rights then examines the merits of the complaint. Their decision 
is then submitted in the form of a report to the relevant parties as well as to the Committee of 
Ministers. This report is publicised within a four month period of its submission to the relevant 
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parties.210 The second mechanism that the European Committee of Social Rights follows is the 
Reporting System. The Reporting System comprises of reports that have been submitted to the 
European Committee of Social Rights by member states.211 The decisions which are agreed upon 
by the European Committee of Social Rights are termed ‘conclusions’ and are published on a 
yearly basis.212 Although these conclusions are revered by the member states they are not 
enforceable in member states’ national laws. Essentially, this means that even if the European 
Committee of Social Rights concludes that the report submitted by the member state was not in 
compliance with the ESC, the decision cannot be enforced through that state’s national 
legislation.213 
3.4.3. AFRICAN CHARTER  
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the African Charter as a means of protecting 
the fundamental rights of African people. This decision was a milestone within the African 
continent as for the first time African leaders acknowledged that violations of human rights 
cannot be tolerated within Africa and that the rights of individuals should coincide with the 
standards entrenched by the international community.214 The African Charter has received 
universal ratification as the members of the African Charter are also members of the African 
Union. This means that member states of the African Charter are obliged to ensure that their 
domestic laws conform to the standards of the international community and the African 
Charter.215 The African Charter has become the basic and fundamental regional instrument that 
has been enshrined to protect and promote human rights within the African continent as well as 
create unity between all African member states of the African Charter.216  
The African Charter is the first international convention on human rights to secure every 
category of human rights within one instrument. The African Charter enshrines civil and political 
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rights which are regarded as first generation rights.217 However, it is imperative to also note that 
the African Charter enshrines social and economic rights which are regarded as third generation 
rights. Therefore, the African Charter provides the basis for the right to strike by enshrining the 
“right to economic, social and cultural development forms”.218 The African Charter does not 
make any explicit reference to the right to strike, however, Article 10(1) of the African Charter 
entrenches the right to freedom of association and Article 11 entrenches the right to freedom of 
assembly which have been connected to the right to strike as well as Article 5 which prohibits 
slavery. Furthermore, Article 15 provides that all individuals are entitled to perform “work under 
equitable and satisfactory conditions”.219 Even though Article 15 is vague in its scope of what 
constitutes “equitable and satisfactory conditions”, this Article together with the socio-economic 
rights entrenched in Article 22 give effect to the right to strike, as striking has been 
acknowledged as a mechanism to further employees’ socio-economic rights which was discussed 
previously in the chapter.220  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHRP) has been appointed as a 
supervisory body to ensure compliance with the provisions enshrined in the African Charter. The 
ACHRP has affirmed that the provisions discussed above must be interpreted from the viewpoint 
of when workers were enslaved during colonisation. Therefore, ACHRP has also reasoned that 
the drafters of the African Charter sought to remind African governments of the painful past of 
black workers in order to develop their socio-economic interests at present.221 The ACHRP has 
affirmed that social and economic rights are fundamental components of human rights within the 
African continent.222 The ACHRP has thus construed the Articles discussed above as an 
enforcement of the right to join and form trade unions as well as the right to strike that would 
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further workers’ socio economic rights.223 This has allowed trade unions to receive protection in 
furthering the interests of their members through strikes and other demonstrations.224   
The ACHRP has a responsibility to protect and uphold the rights of people.225 The ACHRP must 
also undertake any function that is required of it by the government and the Assembly of Heads 
of State.226 The ACHRP is entitled to perform any investigation including accepting 
recommendations provided by the Secretary General and OAU.227 The African Commission has 
been appointed to monitor member states compliance with the ACHRP through a reporting 
procedure. The reporting procedure is established through the Articles of the African Charter.228 
The ACHRP is tasked with gathering data relating to human rights and analyses reports 
submitted by member states and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The ACHRP is also 
commissioned to investigate complaints and violations of the ACHRP that have been submitted 
by member states and non-parties.229 The ACHRP will only consider a complaint if the member 
state has exhausted its internal remedies or if the matter was unreasonably delayed by the 
member state’s national courts.230 Even though the fundamental task of the ACHRP is to 
promote the values enshrined in the Charter, there are various international human rights 
standards which direct its functions such as the ESC, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.231  
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The specific political and socio-economic battles that have plagued each country’s past has 
necessitated the right to strike. This is illustrated in the paramount role organisations adopt in 
their militancy against authoritarian control, which has culminated in democracy and the 
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enforcement of worker rights.232 Although strike action inflicts economic and societal pains, it 
initiates a healing process through the use of international labour organisations, which have been 
discussed above, that sees the relationship between the workforce and the state being 
reconciled.233  
The right to strike has been acknowledged as fundamental to the pursuit of employees’ rights.234 
Therefore, it follows that the right to strike should not be understated or devalued as it has been a 
significant contributing factor to the attainment of workers’ rights both nationally and 
internationally.235 
The next chapter, Chapter Four, will deal with the entrenchment of fundamental labour rights.
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THE ENTRENCHMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE 
LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The most significant implication of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy was 
its transformation within the labour market. Democracy in the country essentially entailed the 
entrenchment of worker rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), the pursuance of workplace democracy through the 
restructuring of laws and the enforcement of affirmative action. Labour relations in a 
democratised society now faced the challenges of redressing the injustices of the past by 
harmonising the employment relationship to obtain peace in the workplace which would 
eventually lead to greater productivity.1 
In1994 the democratic government hastily instructed a drafting committee which comprised of 
attorneys who were integral to the liberation movement, representatives of prominent employers 
as well as international experts. The committee was tasked with the drafting of labour legislation 
which would instill much needed stability and reformation to an area that was characterised by 
uncertainty and inequality.2 The culmination of protracted negotiations between government, 
employers and employees saw the formation of the most significant labour legislative 
framework, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as LRA), which is the 
foundation of current labour relations.3 
This chapter will firstly discuss the role of the LRA within employment relations. The discussion 
will include the aim of the LRA which is to transform the relationship between employees and 
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their employers by moving away from dissention to harmony and co-operation.4 The LRA does 
this by enforcing a dispute resolution system aimed at resolving conflict through a framework 
that seeks to benefit both parties.5 The chapter will then go on to discuss the entrenchment of 
trade union rights. The enforcement of rights within the LRA pertaining to trade unions and their 
representatives is pertinent as these rights lead to consistent interaction between employers and 
their workers, thereby allowing any concerns or issues to be properly communicated so that 
amicable consensus can be obtained.6 The chapter will then discuss the role of collective 
bargaining within the dispute resolution framework of the LRA and its pivotal role in resolving 
conflict which is necessary to prevent the dispute from escalating to strike action.7 Lastly, the 
chapter will elaborate on the entrenchment of the right to strike and the protection afforded to 
strikes which fall within the definition of ‘strike’ enshrined in the LRA.8 
4.2 THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT (LRA) 
The promulgation of the LRA was a significant milestone within labour relations for two 
paramount reasons. Firstly, the LRA afforded almost all public servants who were once excluded 
from previous amendments of the current LRA with bargaining power rights. It changed 
industrial councils to become bargaining councils. Even though the LRA did not impose a duty 
on employers and employees to engage in bargaining, it did codify and fortify the rights of 
unions within the labour market.9 
Secondly, the LRA entrenches the protection of strike action.10 The right to strike is tantamount 
to the protection of lock-outs which is an employer’s right to recourse. However, for the 
purposes of this chapter emphasis will only be placed on the right to strike in light of the topic of 
this thesis. The right to strike is endorsed in Chapter Five of the LRA. According to the LRA, 
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strikes are afforded full protection if the act constitutes a strike under the definition of the LRA.11 
The protection of striking employees is vital as the old Labour Relations Act of 1956 and its 
subsequent amendments did not protect employees against dismissal.12 
This effectively meant that even though employees were given a framework for how strike action 
should be implemented, it did not enunciate strike action as a right. Therefore, employers could 
have still held employees liable on breach of their employment contract.13 This was a grave 
injustice as not only did employers have the use of lock-outs as their right of recourse, but also 
employers had control over the exercise of strike action. Hence, the LRA sought to redress this 
inequality by enshrining strike action as a right.14 
There are four fundamental objectives which the LRA seeks to achieve, namely; to promote 
economic growth, instill justice within society, create harmony in the once turbulent labour 
market and inculcate the concept of democracy within the workplace.15 There are a number of 
cases that portray how the courts have dealt with the enforcement of these objectives. For 
illustrative purposes the following cases will be discussed at this point in the chapter. It is 
essential to take cognisance of the objectives of the LRA in that they have firstly been enacted in 
the light of international obligations implemented through the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and its conventions. Secondly, it has been enacted to give effect to the labour rights 
enshrined in the Constitution.16 The objectives of the LRA are therefore synonymous with the 
objectives of the ILO and the Constitution. Therefore, the interpretation of the LRA’s objectives 
must be in conformity with international laws and the Constitution.17 This precedent was 
affirmed in the Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitay Ware & another v NCBAWU & others,18 
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where the court stated that the objectives of the LRA must be interpreted in conformity with 
international law and the Constitution.19 
It must be understood that the Constitution was enacted to redress the injustices of the past not 
only within society but also within the field of labour. It is for this reason that the LRA has the  
dual function of inculcating transformation in the workplace as well as in society at large. In 
Foodgro (A division of Leisurenet Ltd) v Keil,20 the court explained the objective of ‘economic 
development’ by stating that this objective must be advanced: 
“in conjunction with other goals, namely those of social justice, labour peace and the 
democratization of the workplace. This is to be done by fulfilling the primary objects of the 
Act: giving effect to fundamental rights and International Labour Organization (ILO) 
obligations, providing a proper framework for collective bargaining and the formulation of 
industrial policy; and promoting orderly collective bargaining, employee participation in 
workplace decision-making and effective resolution of labour disputes”.21 
The Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in this case conveyed a pertinent point in that the promotion of 
economic development cannot be achieved in isolation, but rather it is inter-linked with the 
concept of justice and unity within society.22 The court acknowledges that unjust laws that 
govern society negatively impact on labour relations. In addition, labour peace essentially entails 
the elimination of strife which takes the form of strikes and lock-outs.23 By engaging in 
collective bargaining, parties would be able to resolve disputes amicably and speedily rather than 
resorting to strikes and lock-outs.24 This in turn would result in a decrease of work days lost and 
greater productivity.25 Lastly, instilling equality in the workplace ensures that all employees are 
treated the same, therefore, employees would be able to work in an environment that is free from 
animosity. Thus, the morale of the workplace would be significantly improved.26 
One of the objectives that the LRA seeks to promote is successful dispute resolution which is 
achieved through collective bargaining aimed at enhancing co-operative decision making 
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between employers and employees.27 It does this through the establishment of workplace forums 
and consultation with the employee. Furthermore, it has established a simple process for dispute 
resolution that has been enforced through conciliation and arbitration and through the use of 
independent bodies designed to resolve conflict.28 The courts have addressed the issue of dispute 
resolution by emphasising the significance of collective bargaining which is evident in the 
following cases. 
In North East Cape Forests v SAAPAWU & others (2),29 the court held that where a dispute 
arises pertaining to the objectives of the LRA and a matter of contractual terms and conditions, 
the objectives of the LRA should take precedence over the contract. Collective bargaining and 
the right to strike should not be subordinate to the principles that regulate contract law.30 The 
court in this case illustrates that the fulfillment of the objectives of the LRA should be regarded 
with the greatest importance and that the right to strike action and collective bargaining should 
be viewed as paramount in giving effect to the objectives of the LRA.31 
The objectives of the LRA essentially signify that this legislation is deemed to be the foundation 
of dispute resolution. This was manifest in NAPTOSA & others v Minister of Education, Western 
Cape & others,32 where the court held that in the event of a grievance an employee is compelled 
to first seek resolution under the procedure prescribed by the LRA. If, however, no remedy is 
found through the LRA’s dispute resolution process then the LRA could potentially be held 
liable for not providing sufficient protection to rights enshrined in the constitution.33 The court 
sought to highlight through case law that the objectives of the LRA are a pertinent characteristic 
of the legislation itself. The LRA not only entrenches successful bargaining as a primary 
objective in an attempt to prevent industrial strife, but it also provides a comprehensive 
framework for resolving conflict.34 
                                                          
27 G Ferreira ‘Collective Bargaining and the public sector’ (2008) 43(2.1) Journal of Public Administration 194. 
28 F Howitz, H Jain & L Mbabane ‘Trade union consultation by employers under employment equity legislation’   
(2005) 29(1) SAJLR 5. 
29 North East Cape Forests v SAAPAWU & others (2) [1997] 6 BLLR 711 (LAC). 
30 North East Cape Forests v SAAPAWU & others (2) supra note 29 at 719, FAWU v General Food Industries Ltd 
[2002] 10 BLLR 950 (LC) at 12. 
31 H Cheadle ‘Collective bargaining and the LRA’ (2005) 9(2) LDD 147. 
32 NAPTOSA & others v Minister of Education, Western Cape & others (2001) 22 ILJ 889 (C). 
33 NAPTOSA & others supra note 32 at 896. 
34 P Molusi ‘The constitutional duty to engage in collective bargaining: notes’ (2010) 31(1) Obiter 161. 
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The court’s enforcement of the LRA’s dispute resolution framework is further illustrated in 
Mackay v ABSA Group &another,35 where the court stated that, 
“all disputes arising from the employer-employee relationship must be effectively resolved. 
Such disputes are resolved through conciliation, arbitration and adjudication, and those of a 
collective nature through collective bargaining. It is clear that it could never have been 
intended that some disputes arising out of the employer-employee relationship are incapable of 
resolution in terms of the Act”.36 
By handing down this judgment the court highlighted that the LRA’s dispute resolution 
framework is deemed effective in dealing with matters of conflict and that the LRA has a duty to 
protect the rights of employees.37 Furthermore, the protection of employees’ rights is enforced 
through the process of collective bargaining within the dispute resolution system. However, even 
though the courts have taken a stringent view point on the interpretation and enforcement of the 
LRA’s purpose and objectives, it does not involve itself within the actual bargaining process.38 
In National Police Services Union & others v National Negotiating Forum & others,39 the court 
pointed out that the LRA does not place any duty on either the employer or the employee to 
engage in the bargaining process. The courts are not given authority to determine or influence the 
result of the bargaining process. The outcome of such negotiations is entirely dependent on the 
parties themselves.40 This ruling essentially portrays that both parties to the bargaining process 
must be given equal power which instills democracy within labour relations.41 Industrial 
democracy seeks to undo the unilateral power that existed with employers over their employees 
which has been enforced through legislation for centuries. The LRA therefore seeks to empower 
the employee.42 
Ultimately, the promulgation of the LRA was to revolutionise labour law and in doing so give 
effect to s 23 of the Constitution which enshrines labour rights for all employees.43 Even more 
significantly, the LRA seeks to enforce s 23(2) that endorses trade union rights and the right to 
                                                          
35 Mackay v ABSA Group & another [1999] 12 BLLR 1317 (LC).  
36 Mackay v ABSA Group & another supra note 35 at 15. 
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South African labour law’ (2008) 19(3) Stell LR 387. 
38 J M Brown ‘Enforcement difficulties in the public and private sectors’ (2007) 11 LDD 104. 
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strike. Therefore, the objectives as stated by the LRA and the constitutionalisation of labour 
rights further emphasises the mandate that should be carried out.44 
4.3. THE ENDORSEMENT OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
4.3.1 THE ENDORSEMENT OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS 
The transitional phase of South Africa to democracy redefined the focal point of trade unions in 
that prior to democratisation, unions purposed themselves in the fight for liberation. However, 
the post-apartheid era saw unions engaging in policy formation with government.45 The 
endorsement of trade union rights46 within the Constitution47 as well as the LRA essentially 
provided for stronger protection of the rights of workers. In order to understand how trade unions 
protect and promote employees’ rights it is firstly necessary to comprehend what constitutes a 
trade union and how it undertakes to protect employees.48 
A trade union can be described as the ‘in-between’ body that bridges the gap between an 
employer and an employee.49 Essentially the role of a trade union is to safeguard the existing 
rights of its members and also improve and enhance these rights,50 and all employees are entitled 
to join and participate in trade union activities.51 The fundamental function of a trade union is to 
engage in the process of collective bargaining with employers on behalf of their members as well 
as provide representation for matters concerning disciplinary proceedings or on matters 
pertaining to grievances.52 
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The role of a trade union is essentially described in Amalgamated Engineering v Minister of 
Labour53 where the court stated that a “trade union concerned should act as the spokesman of its 
members whenever a dispute arises between employers and employees”.54 A trade union is 
confronted with the challenge to meet the requirements of the majority members’ needs, to 
obtain all “sources of power at its disposal and to achieve its goals by implementing strategies”.55 
Therefore, trade unions are essential to the furtherance of concepts of equality and democracy in 
the workplace as they promote the interests of employees by ensuring that employees are placed 
in an equal position to their employers.56 
It is therefore imperative that trade unions are given adequate protection by legislation.57 It is for 
this reason that the LRA prescribes the steps which unions may follow to acquire organisational 
rights.58 The LRA prescribes the requirements for the registration of trade unions and its 
regulation. The effect of the registration of a trade union establishes the union as a body 
corporate. Hence, rights and obligations are conferred upon the trade union.59 In Vidar Rubber 
Products (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) & 
others,60 the court held that mere compliance with the requirements stipulated in s 97(1) for the 
registration of unions or employers' organisations does not in itself bring a union within the 
definition of a trade union. The ‘purpose’ of that given union is an additional element which 
would have to be satisfied to determine whether the union does constitute a trade union under the 
definition of the LRA.61 It must be noted that the purpose of a trade union is essentially to protect 
and promote the interests of its members, thus only employees may become members of trade 
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unions.62 The protection of its members can only be achieved if a trade union is a separate body 
corporate.63 
The LRA further stipulates that a trade union must be an independent body which requires that a 
union must not be within “the direct or indirect control of an employer or employer’s 
organization” and that a union must be “free of any interference or influence of any kind from 
any employer or employer’s organization”.64 
 The independence of a trade union is vital as it ensures that it operates as a body that is free 
from any bias or undue influence. The best interests of employees can only be appropriately 
obtained if a union can acquire the trust, cooperation and dependence of its members.65 This will 
only come about if members are convinced that their representatives will always act on their 
behalf without prejudicing their interests. The LRA attempts to assist in acquiring the trust of 
members by ensuring that a trade union does not undertake its duties for its own benefit.66 
The purpose of a trade union is enshrined in its constitution; therefore the LRA seeks to regulate 
the constitutions of trade unions so as to ensure that they engage in ethical and fair practices.67 
The LRA does not require a union to strictly adhere to its constitution unless the unions’ 
constitution includes requirements under s 65(2)(b) of the LRA, which stipulate the requirements 
for a protected strike.68 The LRA specifies that a trade union may not be purposed to gain a 
benefit and that it may decide on the criteria for membership to that particular union. 
Furthermore, a union may determine what payments are to be made by members, how such 
payments are to be determined as well as other payments required from members.69 In NEWU v 
Mtshali & another,70 the court dealt with s 95(5)(a), (b) & (f) of the LRA. The particular union had 
decided to amend its constitution which entailed that under this proposed amendment members 
                                                          
62 NEWU v Mtshali & Another (2000) 21 ILJ 1166, Midland Chamber of Industries Staff Committee v Midland 
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would be compelled to make payments of disbursement costs and fees.71 The proposed 
amendment conflicted with s 95(5)(a) and (f) as the payment of these fees was more than the 
required payment by  members and such proceeds would thus be a beneficial gain to the union. 
The court upheld the decision taken by the registrar.72 In Mtshali supra a further proposed 
amendment was made to the union’s constitution which allowed job seekers or applicants’ 
membership into that given union. The court upheld the decision of the registrar who denied the 
registration of that amendment as it conflicted with the LRA’S definition of an employee.73 
Even though the LRA prescribes mandatory steps for the registration of trade unions,74 union 
representatives may still act on behalf of members in court proceeding and on matters taken to 
the CCMA where such unions have not been registered.75 The LRA confers rights upon a trade 
union that take effect immediately when a trade union is registered. This is pertinent as the LRA 
stipulates that members of a union cannot be held liable for any obligations or liabilities incurred 
by the trade union nor would any of its members, office-bearers, officials as well as union 
officials be held personally accountable for losses incurred to any given person in the pursuance 
of conducting union functions.76 However, this protection is only afforded if such an act or 
omission was performed in good faith.77 The requirement that protection only be given to bone 
fide acts emphasises that unions may not engage in criminal activity in the pursuit of their 
members’ interests as they would be held liable for any damages that ensue as a result of their 
conduct.78 Although the registration of a union essentially affords unions rights, this however 
does not mean that because it is a corporate body that they are a law unto themselves. This would 
vitiate the function of a union. The acquisition of organisational rights is enshrined to assist in 
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the furtherance of a union’s functions. Therefore, the LRA prescribes further mechanisms for the 
acquisition of trade union rights. 
 Organisational rights can also be acquired through the conclusion of a collective agreement 
which would encompass the organisational rights permitted to a union as well as the limitations 
and exercise of such rights.79 The acquisition of organisational rights is imperative as it allows an 
employer to recognise and acknowledge the union as a bargaining agent during wage 
negotiations.80 Minority unions who do not have sufficient representivity of the workforce are 
not recognised by the employer as bargaining agents during negotiations,81 as was illustrated in 
National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & another.82 In Bader 
Bop supra the General Industrial Workers Union of SA represented the majority of employees 
employed by Bader Bop.83 Thus, the union was entitled to all the rights accrued to a majority 
union in terms of part A, chapter III of the LRA. The National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa (NUMSA) who only represented 26% of Bader Bop’s workforce approached Bader Bop 
in an attempt to persuade it to entitle the union with organisational rights.84 The employer was 
only willing to afford NUMSA access to the business premises in terms of s 12 of the LRA and 
stop order facilities in terms of s 13 of the LRA. However, Bader Bop was unwilling to recognise 
NUMSA as a bargaining agent and therefore the representatives of NUMSA could not bargain 
with the employer on behalf of its members.85 The dispute pertaining to organisational rights was 
referred to the CCMA for conciliation; however, the issue was not resolved. NUMSA then 
                                                          
79 D Bosch, E Molahlehi & W Everett The Conciliation and Arbitration Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to 
Labour Dispute Resolution Procedure (2004) 126, Transnet Soc Ltd v National Transport Movement [2014] 1 
BLLR 98 (LC), Bravo Group Sleep Products (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers 
Union (2009) 30 ILJ 1090 (LC), Fakude v Kwikot (Pty) Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 2024 (LC), Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) 
Ltd [2001] 8 BLLR 857, Aunde South Africa (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA [201]1 10 BLLR 945 (LAC).  
80 Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union and others v Rustenburg Transitional Council (2000) vol ILJ 377 
(LC), Wilson v UK [2002] 35 EHRR 523, Keshwar v SANCA (1991) 12 ILJ 816, National Police Services Union & 
others v National Negotiating Forum & others (1999) 20 ILJ 1081 (LC) 
81 South African Post Office Ltd v Commissioner Nowosenetz [2013] 2 BLLR 216 (LC), Chamber of Mines of SA  v 
Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union (2014) 35 ILJ 1243 (LC), Kem-Lin Fashions CC v Brunton 
(2001) 22 ILJ 109 (LAC), Glass, Cement and Soil Industries Workers’ Union Case No. 2303 (Turley) (2003), 
United Association of SA v BHP Billiton Energy Coal SA Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 2118 (LC), POPCRU v LEDWABA 
[2013] 11 BLLR 1137 (LC), Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Banking Insurance Finance & Assurance 
Workers Union (1996) 17 ILJ 241 (AD).   
82 National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & another 2003 (3) SA 513 (CC), (2003) 
24 ILJ 305 (CC). 
83 National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Bader Bop supra note 82 at 306D-E. 
84 National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Bader Bop supra note 82at 306G. 
85 National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Bader Bop supra note 82 at 306H. 
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informed the employer that it intended embarking on a strike in accordance to chapter IV of the 
LRA. The employer contended that the union was not able to strike over organisational rights 
and thus approached the LC where the court ruled that the employees were entitled to strike over 
organisational rights.86 On appeal at the LAC, the court overruled the decision of the LC and 
interdicted the strike. The union then approached the Constitutional Court (CC) on the basis that 
the provisions of the LRA infringed on their constitutional right to engage in strike action.87 
O’Regan J who represented the majority decision of which Chaskalson CJ, Langa DCJ, 
Goldstone J, Kriegler J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, Ngcobo J, Sachs J and Yacoob J concurred in the 
judgment of O'Regan J. The CC analysed the applicant’s argument in light of the purpose of the 
LRA as enshrined in s 1 of the LRA.88 Firstly, the LRA is required to give effect to the rights 
enshrined in the Constitution. Secondly, it has to give effect to the international conventions 
endorsed by the International Labour Organization. Thirdly, the LRA is required to enforce a 
framework for the resolution of disputes through the mechanism of collective bargaining. 
Fourthly, the LRA seeks to instill the concept of orderly collective bargaining which includes the 
participation of employees in working together with the employer to resolve disputes.89 O’Regan 
J stated that in interpreting the Bill of Rights the court is required to consider international law 
and foreign law as well as promote values that are based on human dignity.90 
The CC firstly considered that the international conventions adopted by the ILO91 were pertinent 
to the issue before the court. O’Regan J averred that Article 2 of the Convention 87 of 1948 
provides that both workers and employers are entitled to establish and join organisations without 
any authorisation or distinction on any terms.92 The Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations and the Freedom of Association Committee of the 
Governing Body of the ILO have affirmed that Article 2 promotes the significance of the 
fundamental right of freedom of association afforded to all workers and their employers to join 
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and participate in any organisation of their choice.93 The CC considered that if there is a broader 
interpretation of the LRA that would not limit fundamental rights then that interpretation should 
be followed. The LRA in terms of part A of chapter III evidently entrenches organisational rights 
on unions who are either sufficiently representative94 or majority unions.95 These rights are 
enforceable through mechanisms provided for through conciliation which is then followed by 
arbitration. There are two options available to employees and employers if conciliation is 
unsuccessful, either arbitration or industrial action.96  O’Regan J stated that the LRA does not 
include any provision which seeks to exclude unions who do not meet the threshold requirements 
to receive organisational rights from utilising mechanisms such as collective bargaining and 
strike action to pressurise the employer to afford the union organisational rights.97 Organisational 
rights which pertain to the recognition of shop stewards, stop-order facilities and access to the 
workplace are ‘matters of mutual interest’ to both employees and the employers and as such are 
capable of forming the issue in dispute for purposes of collective bargaining and industrial 
action.98 
Furthermore, O’Regan J elucidated that s 20 of the LRA provided that there was nothing in Part 
A which prevents parties from concluding collective agreements that would regulate 
organisational rights. The CC went on to further affirm that the intention of international bodies 
was that minority unions should be provided the equivalent rights of majority unions.99 The 
conclusion of collective agreements has been further endorsed in subsequent cases.100 The CC 
thus upheld the appeal by affording minority unions the right to strike to obtain organisational 
rights.101 
Another mechanism for acquiring organisational rights is where the given employer and the 
union is party to a bargaining or statutory council. The acquisition of organisational rights 
through this mechanism takes precedence over a collective agreement which may be concluded 
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between the employer and union that would give the union complete exclusivity. These rights 
basically provide an automatic access to workplaces as well as the right to stop orders within the 
registered sphere of the given council, regardless of whether such a union is representative 
within the workplace.102 A union’s representivity within the workplace is pertinent as the 
endorsement of union rights is enshrined according to a union’s representivity in the given 
workplace.103 
The term ‘workplace’ is significant in that union officials are entitled to enter the workplace 
when it is reasonable to do so in order to recruit members and fulfill their obligations.104 The 
attainment of organisational rights for all trade unions is fundamental to the concept of collective 
bargaining as it is through the process of collective bargaining that unions engage in negotiations 
regarding issues pertaining to the employment relationship.105 
4.3.2. THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
In order to acknowledge the purpose and aims of collective bargaining, it is firstly imperative to 
understand the nature of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining can be described as “the 
joint determination by employees and employers of the problem of the employment 
relationship”.106 There are also other definitions which broaden our understanding of the term.107  
There are three significant characteristics that can be extracted from these definitions. Firstly, 
collective bargaining involves the collaboration of trade unions and an employer or his 
association. The term ‘collective’ in itself signifies that bargaining cannot be achieved 
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unilaterally but that parties must voluntarily come together.108 Secondly, collective bargaining 
refers to a process of negotiations.109 This is an essential point as the essence of collective 
bargaining is defined by its attempt to resolve issues through discussion, dialogue and 
compromise110 rather than resorting to a more militant approach through strikes and lock-outs. 
Thirdly, an agreement must be reached pertaining to the terms and conditions of the employment 
relationship. At the end of successful collective bargaining, parties must conclude a collective 
agreement that will become binding on the parties within the employment relationship. 
Collective bargaining is dependent on the cooperation, trust, mutual aspirations and the 
willingness to compromise within the employer-employee relationship.111 This point is further 
illustrated in Macsteel (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA,112 where the court stated that: 
“the LRA creates machinery which makes collective bargaining not only possible but 
compulsory. Its aim is to avoid if possible industrial strife and to maintain peace. Its operation 
is such that, if parties negotiate genuinely and in good faith, and their demands and offers are 
reasonable, settlement will be reached before disruption takes place…”.113 
Therefore, it is submitted that the function of collective bargaining is to ensure that parties come 
to an understanding about the issue and that the dispute will not necessitate industrial action or 
lock-outs to reach a resolution. This would benefit both the employer and the employee in that 
the employer would save on production time lost and the employee would not forfeit the right to 
be paid. Collective bargaining has many objectives; however, the main objective is the 
conclusion of collective agreements pertaining to conditions of employment as well as matters 
relating to the mutual interest of both an employer and an employee.114 
A collective agreement can be defined as a written agreement that is concluded by a trade union 
and the employer or his/her representative which would stipulate the conceded conditions of 
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employment or other matters pertaining to the mutual interest of employees and employers.115 
The LRA provides that collective agreements are regarded as a contract between the parties and 
that the general nature of a contract should apply by binding the parties to the collective 
agreement.116 The LRA stipulates that a collective agreement may vary any employment contract 
concluded by an employer and his employee. The effect would be binding on both parties.117 
Furthermore, the LRA allows the terms of a collective agreement to override its general 
provisions. Collective agreements may even limit rights enshrined in the constitution, such as the 
right to strike.118 However, such a collective agreement must not be contrary to the interests of 
society. 
This point was reiterated in Mthimkhulu v CCMA & another119 where the court stated that it will 
uphold “the products of collective bargaining save for the instance where the collective 
bargaining agreement itself is contra boni mores and therefore void on that basis”.120 This case 
elucidates that the contents of collective agreements are given a wide range of power to regulate 
the employment relationship with merely one exception. Even though the Labour Court (LC) 
would be willing to uphold a collective agreement, it does not intervene if there is a dispute 
regarding its contents. This was evident in NPSU & others v The National Negotiating Forum & 
others,121 where the court refused to make a decision regarding whether a particular trade union 
had recognition as the matter pertained to the interpretation of the provisions of the collective 
agreement and had to be decided through conciliation and arbitration proceedings.122 
These have been pertinent improvements to the conventional process of collective bargaining as 
employees have made significant progress by extending their power over the substance of 
policies which relate to them.123 The LRA provides for three aspects of the right to collective 
bargaining. Firstly, it promotes the freedom to engage in collective bargaining by establishing 
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institutions for voluntary collective bargaining within sector level and the conclusion of 
collective agreements. Secondly, the LRA ensures that parties have the right to utilise “collective 
economic power” such as strikes and lock-outs. Thirdly, there is a positive right within the public 
sector placed on parties to engage in collective bargaining. However, it does not impose a 
positive duty within the private sector.124 These elements will be discussed in more detail within 
dispute resolution. 
4.4. THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESOLUTION OF INTEREST DISPUTES 
The dispute resolution framework is essential to the right to strike as it is this framework which 
seeks to remedy conflict before employees engage in strike action. The LRA has established 
avenues for dispute resolution that are speedy and easily available in keeping with its primary 
objective which is to resolve conflict.125 However, more significantly is that employees are 
compelled to engage in a conciliatory phase which is a precondition for a protected strike as 
enshrined in s 64(1) of the LRA.126 In light of the topic of this dissertation, the mechanisms for 
dispute resolution will only be analysed in terms of interest disputes.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the old LRA did not expressly provide clarity on disputes of right 
and disputes of interest which resulted in many inconsistencies on whether the matter had to be 
referred for negotiation or whether the matter had to be decided by a court. The LRA which 
regulates the present dispute resolution has resolved this issue by expressly stating those disputes 
which should be referred to the CCMA for arbitration and to the LC for resolution.127 This is 
highly pertinent as employees may only lawfully strike over disputes of interest.128 This was 
further endorsed in MITUSA v Transnet (Pty) Ltd,129 where the court stated that the dispute 
resolution system distinguishes between rights which are resolved through arbitration and those 
which must be resolved through a display of power.130 
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The distinction of disputes is pertinent as there are different mechanisms for resolving rights and 
interest disputes.131 The LRA prescribes two categories of disputes which may be referred to the 
CCMA for arbitration, namely: disputes which relate to the terms of the LRA such as those 
pertaining to the actual provisions of the LRA which are referred to as rights disputes132 and 
disputes which relate to matters of mutual interest which are referred to as interest disputes.133 If 
employees merely want to approach the CCMA for a demand on an increase in wages, they will 
be instructed that the correct procedure would be to engage in collective bargaining and 
industrial action.134 Similarly, if a dispute pertains to a rights dispute, such a dispute has to be 
referred to the CCMA for arbitration to be resolved.135 It is therefore imperative that there is a 
distinction made between rights and interest disputes as it determines which resolution technique 
to adopt.136 
Disputes of interest essentially pertain to the enactment or alteration of a new set of rules,137 
whereas, disputes of rights pertain to the way in which existing rules and norms are interpreted 
and applied.138 In all disputes, regardless of their nature, parties are required to engage in 
conciliation before the matter can be referred for arbitration or the process of adjudication.139 It 
must be noted that legislation does not impose a mandatory duty to bargain.140 Therefore, in such 
cases, conciliation would be the first point of dispute resolution for interest disputes.141 
 Such a referral is made to the bargaining council within that given sector or if one does not exist, 
the dispute is referred to the CCMA.142 If a matter is categorised as a dispute of interest and is 
not resolved within the 30 day time frame stipulated by the LRA, then parties are entitled to 
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engage in industrial action or lock-out.143 There are specific interest disputes which have to be 
referred to for arbitration if conciliation fails as industrial action cannot be an option because it 
would be detrimental to the health and safety of the country.144 Additionally, there are disputes 
such as rights disputes which must be referred to the CCMA for arbitration such as dismissals 
and then there are other disputes which cannot be solved through arbitration but must be referred 
to the LC for adjudication.145 
4.5. THE ENTRENCHMENT AND REGULATION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
Industrial action is protected by both the Constitution146 and the LRA. However, this protection 
is not absolute, but rather the LRA places a number of conditions on its protection.147 The 
entrenchment and regulation of industrial action which is specified by the LRA is enforced to 
give effect to the spirit of the Constitution.148 The significance of the entrenchment of the right to 
strike within the Constitution was emphasised in Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, ex 
parte: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of SA.149 The CC was called upon to 
consider whether the proposed amendments to the new constitution complied with the 
constitutional principles enshrined in the interim constitution.150 There were essentially two 
objections. The first objection was that the inclusion of the right to strike within the new 
constitution and the exclusion of an employer’s right to lock-out was in violation of the 
constitutional principles II and XXVIII. The second objection raised was that the proposed 
provision failed to identify and protect an employer’s right to participate in collective bargaining 
in terms of the constitutional principle XXVIII.151 However, for purposes of illustrating only the 
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superiority of the entrenchment of the right to strike, the discussion will only focus on the first 
objection. 
In terms of the first objection, it was argued that effective collective bargaining necessitates that 
parties utilise economic power to counter each other. This economic power usually takes the 
form of lock outs and strikes. Therefore, the right to lock out should be recognised in exactly the 
same way that the right to strike is recognised and protected.152 This argument is based on the 
standard of equality that the right to strike is the equivalent to the right to lock. Thus, both the 
right to strike and the right to lock out should be included in the new constitution.153 In response 
to the first objection, Chaskalson J held that this objection cannot be accepted. The CC arrived at 
this decision by considering that collective bargaining is founded upon the acknowledgment that 
employers have always possessed superior social and economic power over their workers.154 
Collective bargaining is enforced to counteract the unequal power that has existed between 
employer and employee.155 The unequal power apportioned to employers and employees was 
highlighted in Bader Bop supra where O’Regan J emphasised that the right to strike is a critical 
mechanism that allows employees to declare their bargaining power within employment 
relationship.156 Furthermore, the right to strike is essential in furthering the dignity of employees 
as it allows workers to assert their demands and not to be intimidated into unilateral conditions of 
employment that are implemented by the employer.157 Workers are compelled to work together 
in order to exert their power in the form of strikes which is an employee’s only weapon against 
the employer. However, employers implement their power through an array of weapons such as 
dismissal, the replacement of current labour with substituted labour, and the unilateral 
introduction of new working conditions and terms as well as the right to lock out.158 The 
significance of the right to strike as a fundamental right for employees has therefore resulted in 
the right being more commonly enshrined within constitutions of various countries than the right 
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to lock out. Thus, Chaskalson J concluded that the right to strike and the right to lock out are not 
always equivalent in importance.159 
The second objection was that the explicit inclusion of the right to strike without the explicit 
inclusion to the right to lock out diminishes an employer’s right to collective bargaining and 
affords less significance to the rights of employers than that which is afforded to employees.160 
In light of the second argument, Chaskalson P enquired into the requirements of constitutional 
principle XXVIII. The CC stated that in terms of this principle there was no request that the 
proposed text include an express reference to the economic power available to either workers or 
employers.161 The court further elaborated that when the right to collective bargaining is 
recognised there is an implied inference to the right to utilise economic power against the parties 
involved in collective bargaining.162 Furthermore, the inclusion of the right to engage in strikes 
does not weaken an employer’s right to participate in collective bargaining and neither does it 
diminish an employer’s right to effect lock out against employees.163 
The third objection was that by including the right to strike within the Constitution infers that 
legislation such as the LRA which protect lock outs would be unconstitutional and would 
consequently be in violation of constitutional principle XXVIII.164 Chaskalson J held that this 
objection was unfounded as the effect of the entrenchment of the right to lock out within the 
LRA is merely to ensure that the right to lock out is regulated in accordance with constitutional 
principles.165 Furthermore, the CC stated that the progression of the LRA will arise through the 
expertise of the labour courts and labour legislation. The LRA and its provisions will always be 
under constitutional inspection so that the rights of both employers and employees are always 
upheld.166 Furthermore, in light of the third objection, it was argued that the failure to expressly 
endorse the right to lock out in the new constitution is not in accordance with constitutional 
principle II which requires that the new constitution entrenches and protects “all universally 
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accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties”.167 Chaskalson J responded to this 
objection by stating that the right to lock out has not been accepted as a universally fundamental 
right as none of the main international conventions entrenches the right to lock out. Only a few 
countries have acknowledged the right to lock out within their constitutions. Thus, the CC 
concluded that the exclusion of the right to lock out is not in violation of constitutional principle 
II.168 
The purpose of a strike in its most simple description is to coerce the employer to do or not to do 
something.169 However, the implementation of strike action is not as simple, as this action 
sometimes has devastating consequences that affect the economy and society, thus the regulation 
of strikes is paramount to guard against abuse.170 However, it is the devastating consequences 
that often compel the employer to accede to the demands made by workers.171 Therefore, it is 
firstly imperative to understand what a strike is in order to identify those actions of employees 
that are protected by the LRA.172 
There are certain characteristics that can be extracted from the definition of a strike and if such 
characteristics are not present then such a strike would not be afforded protection. Consequently, 
the definition of a strike seeks to emphasise that there is a difference between lawful and 
unlawful strikes.173 There are three essential elements which constitute a strike as stated in 
Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Plascon Decorative (Inland) (Pty) Ltd.174 In Plascon 
supra, the court stated that the first requirement is that there must be a refusal to perform work, 
secondly, the refusal must be undertaken by employees175 and lastly, such refusal of work must 
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be purposed to resolve a matter of mutual interest as stated by the LRA.176 In regard to the first 
element, the refusal to perform work can be carried out partially or completely.177 
In Steel Mining & Commercial Workers Union & others v Brano Industries (Pty) Ltd,178 the 
court held that the employees’ refusal to work amounted to a strike. This decision was held even 
though the employees alleged that they had not engaged in a strike but rather a meeting over the 
dismissal of the shop steward where at such meeting employees demanded that disciplinary 
proceedings be suspended.179 The court illustrated that the partial refusal to work even though 
not for a lengthy period can amount to a strike. Furthermore, the LRA provides that an act can 
constitute a strike even if there is a retardation180 or obstruction of work.  
In SA Breweries Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union & others,181 the court held that the term 
‘work’ has to be given a narrow interpretation to define only those actions which the employee is 
obliged to perform in terms of the employment contract.182 The court mentioned three significant 
constituents of a protected strike. Firstly, there must be a failure, retardation or the obstruction of 
work. Secondly, the action must be undertaken as a collective183 and thirdly, the action must be 
initiated to compel the employer to submit to the demands of the employees.184 
The third requirement is that the strike must be initiated to resolve a dispute concerning a matter 
of mutual interest.185 The first aspect of this requirement pertains to the dispute over which the 
strike is initiated. The LC and the LAC have on numerous occasions verified that there has to be 
an actual dispute over which the employees are engaged in strike action.186 The judiciary is 
required to investigate the true nature of the dispute and not merely the way in which the dispute 
is presented.187 In SA Scooter & Transport Allied Workers Union & others v Karras t/a 
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Floraline,188 the court held that the employees had engaged in an illegal strike as there was no 
actual dispute over which the employees had left the employers’ business premises and 
continued to stay away from work based on an alleged threat by the employer.189 Thus, the mere 
stoppage of work without a ‘purpose’ does not render the employees’ actions as a strike.190 In 
addition to the employees' collective refusal to continue work, they are also required to assert a 
demand and it must be made known that the refusal to continue work will persist until that 
demand is met by the employer.191 The cessation of work must be to induce the employer to 
accede to the demands of the employees.192 In regard to the term ‘dispute’ there has been further 
clarity pertaining to strikes. In TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & 
others,193 the court mentioned that there are three categories of strikes namely strikes over which 
employees have a demand, strikes that have a grievance with an absence of a demand and strikes 
which revolve around a dispute.194 
The mere collective refusal to work without asserting an actual demand cannot constitute a 
strike. In Simba (Pty) Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union & others195 the issue centered on a 
change in staggered tea-breaks. The applicants alleged that this would not have been 
implemented without properly consulting the employees. The employees then engaged in a 
strike.196 In arriving at its decision, the court considered the definition of a strike under the LRA. 
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It was noted that even though the actual definition in s 213 does not mention ‘issue in dispute’, 
this term can be read into the definition by referring to s 64(1) of the LRA.197 
The court highlighted that this was necessary to prevent any confusion and problems which were 
encountered under the old Labour Relations Act of 1956 where employees as a collective would 
engage in a refusal to work without actually asserting the demand that initiated such refusal.198 It 
is for this reason that ‘issue in dispute’ should refer to a demand, grievance or a dispute that 
would establish the basis for a protected strike.199 The court held that the employees in casu 
failed to use their refusal to work as a method of compellation. The employees were merely 
exercising their collective right not to work. The situation would have been different if the 
employees refused to work the staggered breaks until there was a grievance resolved.200 
There was no actual demand, grievance or dispute which the employees were striking over. The 
employees’ refusal to work was held to be a consequence of the implementation of the staggered 
breaks, however, it was not regarded as the initiator of the refusal to work.201 It can be concluded 
from this case that the court was interested in very specifically, whether there was an articulated 
demand, grievance or dispute that initiates the strike. It is quite evident from the facts of a case 
whether this is indeed present, as if this was so then the employees in casu would have resumed 
work once the dispute over staggered breaks was resolved.  
The requirement of the existence of a demand, dispute or grievance as contemplated by s 1 of the 
LRA was reiterated in Food & Allied Workers Union & others v Rainbow Chicken Farms.202 The 
employees were employed as butchers at Rainbow Chicken Farms on the basis of their Muslim 
faith that permitted them to slaughter chickens in terms of Halaal principles. The other 
employees of Rainbow Chicken Farms were dependent on the work undertaken by the 
slaughterers and could not perform their tasks without the Muslim employees.203 All the Muslim 
butchers refused to work on their Muslim religious holiday, Eid ul Fitr. The collective agreement 
which regulated the employees’ days off stated that they were only entitled to gazetted public 
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holidays and Eid ul Fitr was not a gazetted public holiday.204 The employees refused to work on 
Eid and were thus held liable in breach of the collective agreement by collectively refusing to 
work. They were given two choices. Firstly, they could be dismissed with leave to appeal the 
decision. Secondly, they could be given a final warning without leave to appeal the warning. The 
employees chose to be dismissed. The employees argued that their dismissals were automatically 
unfair in terms of s 188 and s 187(1)(f) of the LRA.205 Reveals J held that the employees had not 
been unfairly discriminated against in terms of s 187. However, for purposes of illustrating the 
requirement of a collective refusal to perform work in pursuit of a demand, the discussion will 
only focus on the employer’s contention that the employees refusal to work amounted to a 
strike.206 
The employer argued that the actions of the employees constituted a strike. If this was the case 
then the strike would have been unprotected and this would have been viewed in a more severe 
position than mere unauthorised absenteeism.207 Reveals J considered this argument in light of s 
1 of the LRA which endorsed the definition of a strike. The LC placed emphasis on the purpose 
of a strike which is to remedy a grievance or resolve a dispute.208 The LC stated that even though 
the actions of the employees were collective, they did not refuse to continue work to resolve a 
dispute or grievance. There had been no demand asserted by the employees. The employer was 
not pressurised to comply with any request declared by the employees.209 If indeed the actions of 
the employees amounted to a strike then the employer would have been placed in a situation that 
if it had agreed to the employees’ demands then the employees would have returned to work. 
The grievance or demand would have disappeared and there would have been no cause for 
continuation of the strike. However, this was the reality of the situation in Rainbow Chicken 
Farms supra.210 Reveals J held that the employees merely refused to work on Eid because of 
their religion. Their actions were the same as the actions of any other employee who would 
absent themselves from work for any random reason. The fact that the employees had provided 
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notice of their absenteeism made no difference to the situation as a notice of absenteeism could 
be submitted for other reasons of absenteeism as well.211 Therefore, Reveals J held that the 
actions of the employees could not amount to a strike as there the necessary element of a 
grievance or dispute absent from the employees’ refusal to work.212 
Furthermore, it is required that this demand, dispute or grievance is clearly communicated to the 
other party as was illustrated in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v SA 
Municipality Workers Union & others.213 The applicants in City of Johannesburg supra sought 
an interdict declaring the strike to be unlawful while awaiting the enquiry of the certificate 
declaring that the dispute in issue was unresolved after conciliation. The applicants questioned 
the jurisdiction of the conciliator as well as that the six disputes which were referred for 
conciliation were not issues which had reached a deadlock as they were merely issues under 
discussion and was therefore at that stage not capable of being referred for conciliation.214 
In terms of the facts of this case, the court identified that were three issues which could not be 
regarded as issues in dispute. The first issue concerned transport of the employees. The court in 
this instance highlighted that this issue was not even raised in the meeting held with the 
employer and on that basis could not even be regarded as an issue in dispute. The second issue 
pertained to parity. The court gave due cognisance to the minutes of the meeting held with the 
employer which stated that the agreement which was reached in terms of parity was that 
SAMWU would consult with SALGA regarding its proposals and SAMWU would then report 
back to the employer.  
This would effectively allow the employer to either accept or refuse the demands made by the 
unions. SAMWU had not complied with this agreement. Hence, parity was held not to be an 
issue in dispute. The last issue raised was that of casualisation. The court did not consider 
whether the matter was one that was to be determined by the LC, but rather it studied the minutes 
of the meeting held with the employer and determined that this was not an issue that arose as a 
dispute. Therefore, it could not be regarded as a dispute which could have been referred to for 
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conciliation as the parties had not reached a stalemate.215 There is a distinct similarity in the 
method the court adopted for arriving at its decision. This similarity pertains to the fact that all 
three issues were not regarded as a demand in the meeting held with the employer. The court 
elucidates why this is imperative in dispute resolution and in determining whether a strike would 
be afforded protection under the LRA.  
The court in casu highlighted that a protected strike can only commence if there is an ‘issue in 
dispute’.216 It was further stated that it is during negotiations between the employer and the other 
party that an agreement can be concluded on the dispute in issue. Therefore, a strike cannot take 
place if the dispute in issue is absent.217 When parties engage in discussions regarding a dispute, 
this dispute must be objectively unambiguous so that the other party undoubtedly acknowledges 
that this is the dispute in contention. In addition to clearly stating what the issue is, the other 
party is required to provide a solution to the dispute in issue.218 The mere fact that the other party 
conveys discontent regarding an issue does not automatically give rise to a dispute.219 
The court in this regard clearly stipulated that a dispute can only arise if both parties have 
contradicting opinions and positions regarding a specific factual situation.220 Essentially, a 
dispute emerges if one party says yes and the other party says no. There must be an existing 
contention regarding the viewpoint of a particular issue.221 The reason that the court viewed that 
the parties should be clearly made aware of the dispute is that the employer should be given the 
opportunity to express his viewpoint and deliberate with the other party that would either 
conclude in an agreement or result in a deadlock.222 
It is submitted that the decision of the court correctly reflects the intention and objectives of the 
LRA. The requirement that a dispute be clearly raised during negotiations has two purposes. 
Firstly, it allows that both parties obtain complete understanding as to what needs to be decided 
                                                          
215 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v SA Municipality Workers Union & others supra note 213 at 
661E-I. 
216 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality supra note 213 at 658C. 
217 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality supra note 213 at 658E. 
218 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality supra note 213 at 658F-G. 
219 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality supra note 213 at 658H. 
220 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality supra note 213 at 658H. 
221 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality supra note 213 at 658A, SACCAWU v Edgars Stores Ltd & 
another (1997) 18 ILJ 1064 (LC), Durban City Council v Minister of Labour & another 1953 (3) SA 708 (D). 
222 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality supra note 213 at 659E-I. 
111 
 
on. This is important because only if one knows what a dispute is about can  a resolution be 
found. Secondly and more pertinently, it furthers the objectives of the LRA by ensuring that 
there is an opportunity to engage in amicable deliberations regarding the dispute that would 
allow both parties equal participation in a way forward. It is submitted that this forms the essence 
of the LRA which seeks to obtain peaceful dispute resolution.  
In Pikitup (SOC) Ltd v SA Municipal Workers’ Union on behalf of Members & others,223 the 
court considered the requirement that a demand has to be a matter of mutual interest. The case 
centered on the proposed implementation of a breathalyser testing procedure for all its drivers. 
This implementation was a result of approximately 250 drivers reporting drunk to work. The 
union opposed this implementation.224 The matter remained unresolved after conciliation and 
consequently employees engaged in a strike. The company applied to interdict the strike and 
declare same unlawful. The court held that this was not a matter of mutual interest, but rather 
that it pertained to the operational management of the company and was excluded from being an 
issue which could be collectively bargained. The strike was thus interdicted.225 Upon the return 
date of the case, the court found that the strike was a matter of mutual interest and as such was 
lawful. The matter was then taken on appeal to determine firstly whether the breathalyser test 
was unlawful and secondly, whether health and safety issues were matters of mutual interest.226 
However, for purposes of drawing attention to the term ‘matter of mutual interest’, this 
discussion will only focus on the second issue brought on appeal.  
Musi AJA first analysed the significance of construing the term ‘matter of mutual interest’ 
widely, as to hold otherwise would have severe ramifications for the right to engage in collective 
bargaining. The court considered that the term ‘matter of mutual interest’ was extremely wide 
and could encompass a number of issues. It was agreed that this term should include any issue 
that directly or indirectly affects the employees within the employment relationship.227 It is 
submitted that this is the precise intention of legislature, because  if it wanted to restrict this term 
to specific issues it would have done so. By interpreting this term broadly, legislature tacitly 
acknowledged that there is an unquantified list of issues which would have a bearing on a 
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particular trade that would affect an employee and his employer.228 This was also the position of 
legislature prior to the promulgation of the LRA.229 Therefore, the term must be construed in a 
literal sense to include any issue within the employment relationship.230 However, Musi AJA 
stated that even though the LAC should broadly interpret the term ‘matter of mutual interest’, the 
LC and the LAC must be careful not to afford an overly extensive interpretation of the term that 
would include any issue as a subject matter of a strike. The court stated that where the issue 
pertains to a socio-economic or political nature, then such a dispute cannot be regarded as a 
subject matter for a strike as the employer would be confronted with uncertainty and would be 
completely out of his control.231 This is a correct reflection of the intention of legislature as the 
LRA has provided an extensive regulation of the right to strike to ensure that the right can be 
adequately controlled and its potential destruction minimalised.232 
The LAC turned to the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 85 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to 
as the OHSA) to determine that a wide interpretation of the term ‘matter of mutual interest’ was 
essential to give effect to the right to engage in collective bargaining. Musi AJA highlighted that 
the OHSA requires both the employer and the employee to work together to provide a safe and 
healthy workplace. The LAC held that the purpose of the OHSA is in line with the intention of 
collective bargaining which is to ensure that employers and employees engage in cohesive 
interaction to resolve disputes.233 It was further held that the decision handed down by Snyman J 
in the LC was too narrow as it limited collective bargaining to only issues which pertained to 
terms and conditions of employment. Furthermore, Musi AJA stated that the LC’s decision did 
not take into account that there is an implied condition within an employment contract which 
entails that employees are entitled to work in a healthy and safe environment.234 
It was thus argued that due to the power that management possesses, it is capable of 
implementing health and safety procedures that ostensibly appear to be in the employees’ best 
interest. However, the employees may hold that such procedures are contrary to their interests. If 
health and safety issues were exempt from collective bargaining then employees would be 
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prevented from deliberating on issues that could potentially be obtrusive to their rights.235 It is 
submitted that this ruling is in accordance with the primary purpose of the LRA which is to 
ensure that employees engage in collective bargaining so that their rights are not in any way 
infringed by the dictates of the employer. It was on this basis that the court concluded that health 
and safety issues are matters of mutual interest.236 
This point was further elucidated in Itumele Bus Lines (Pty) Ltd t/a Interstate Bus Lines v 
Transport & General Workers Union & Others,237 where the court held that a demand over 
equity shareholding of 20% amounted to a dispute of mutual interest and is therefore a matter 
over which employees may engage in industrial action.238 The court arrived at its decision based 
on the fact that the right to strike can be used as an instrument to obtain fair conditions of 
employment as well as acquire new rights. The employment environment is one that has to 
constantly adapt and reform according to new developments in society. Therefore, issues which 
revolve in and around bargaining have to be flexible to accommodate these changes.239 It follows 
from this case that the court is not willing to apply a stringent test in determining whether a 
dispute is one that amounts to a matter of mutual interest. The most pertinent issue which can be 
derived from precedent is that the dispute must affect both the employer and employee. The mere 
fact that an act constitutes a strike does not in itself render the strike lawful.  
4.5.1. SECONDARY STRIKES 
The LRA not only provides for the protection of primary strikes but also for secondary strike 
action.240 Essentially, a secondary strike is initiated to further and support the primary strike. 
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Therefore, it is not necessary for secondary strikers to have a dispute with their employer.241 A 
secondary strike must comply with the general requirements of a strike as defined in the LRA.242 
The first requirement for the protection of the secondary strikes is that the primary strike must be 
protected in order for the secondary strike to also receive protection.243 This was clearly 
explained in Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Plascon Decorative (Inland) (Pty) Ltd supra 
where the LAC emphasised that a secondary strike will be afforded protection if the primary 
strike has followed the procedure for a protected strike as enshrined in s 64 of the LRA.244 The 
case centred on a deadlock between the Industrial Chemical Group (ICG) and the union. The 
union followed the stipulated process and for all intents and purposes, the strike was deemed to 
be protected.245 However, the focal point which the court addressed was how far  the protection 
extended and whether protection was only for those employees of the employer who were 
directly affected by the strike demand or whether employees who were not directly affected by a 
dispute were prohibited from engaging in a strike to support their co-workers.246 
Cameron JA considered the employer’s contention that the terms and conditions of employment 
of employees outside of the bargaining unit differed from the terms and conditions of those 
employees who were part of the bargaining council. The interests of non-bargaining unit 
employees were different from those who were members of the bargaining unit.247 The dispute 
which the employer had referred to the CCMA related to the ICG’s failure to reach consensus on 
demands pertaining to the bargaining unit. The strike was in furtherance of these demands. 
However, the non-bargaining unit members were not party to the strike dispute and had no 
interest in the outcome of the strike. Therefore, their participation in the strike was 
unprotected.248 
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Cameron JA considered that where a constitutional right is entrenched without express 
limitations, such limitations should not be “cut down to read implicit limitations into them”.249 
Cameron JA highlighted that the LRA imports express limitations on the right to strike. These 
express limitations include formal procedures for a protected strike and material limitations on 
who is permitted to strike.250 The court noted that there was no express limitation in the LRA 
which limited strikes by only those who are directly affected by a dispute and consequently went 
on to consider whether such limitation could then be imported into s 66(1) of the LRA. This, 
however, had to be interpreted in light of the LRA.251 
The LC went on to analyse the definition of the term ‘strike’. Cameron JA stated that the 
definition consisted of three basic elements. Firstly, there has to be non-performance of labour, 
secondly, this must be undertaken by employees and thirdly, it must be for a purpose.252 The 
court decided that the most significant aspect of the definition stated that there has to be a 
common purpose of resolving the dispute of mutual interest between the employer and the 
employee. The court further noted that this is as far as any mutuality extends. There is no 
evidence to support the assertion that employees have the same employer or have the same 
interest in the dispute. It was further highlighted that the definition of ‘strike’, more specifically 
does not indicate who the parties of the dispute have to be.253 Cameron JA held that the 
definition of term ‘strike’ was broad enough to include both primary and secondary strikes. The 
definition can also include strikes which involve the same employer who are not directly affected 
by the strike dispute.254 
The LC stated that this broad definition was in line with the LRA’s definition of ‘issue in 
dispute’ which does not specify the identity of the parties to the dispute and thus poses no 
limitation on who they may be.255 Furthermore, the word ‘other’ within the definition of 
secondary strikes enshrined in s 66(1) of the LRA denotes that legislature intended that other 
employees who are not employed by the same employer may embark on strike action in support 
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of co-employees on condition that their actions are protected under s 66(1) of the LRA.256 
The LC agreed that the purpose of s 64(1) was intended to ensure that employees followed the 
procedure stipulated by the LRA. Once such requirements are met, there are no other procedures 
specified by the LRA. There are no express or implicit limitations which prove that the LRA 
envisaged that employees be limited to only demands which directly had an interest in.257 
Therefore, it was held that once the statutory procedures have been fulfilled, a strike will be 
deemed protected and a union is permitted to call all its members in support of the strike.258 It is 
submitted that this decision is correct. A significant aspect that the court deals with is the 
purpose of the LRA. It is imperative to note that the LRA has been promulgated to enforce the 
constitutional right to strike. The reason the LRA imposes statutory procedures is to ensure that 
the dispute resolution process is first followed and that strikes are only a last resort.259 Once 
statutory procedure is followed, a strike would be afforded protection. Once such protection is 
afforded and the main aim of the LRA is fulfilled, there is no logical reason why an additional 
limitation should be imported. The LRA provides express limitations on the right. It serves to 
reason that if the LRA envisaged that this right be limited to employees who are directly affected 
by a dispute, then it would have expressly entrenched the limitation along with the other 
limitations.260 The LRA does not merely require that a nexus exists between the primary 
employer and the secondary employer. There is an additional requirement that the secondary 
strike be reasonable in a way that the pressure exerted on the secondary employer is the same as 
that placed on the primary employer.261 
The second requirement for a lawful secondary strike is that the employer must receive seven 
days’ notice of the intended strike. The third requirement is that there has to be a link between 
the primary employers’ business and the secondary employers business so that the nature and 
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extent of the secondary strike affects the business of the primary employer.262 The effect on the 
primary employer must be economic in nature.263 
The test for reasonableness was established in Billiton Aluminium SA Ltd supra,264 where the 
court determined that the secondary strike has to be “reasonable in relation to the business of the 
primary employer”.265 The employees of Samancor embarked on a protected strike which was 
followed by a sympathy strike by workers employed by Billiton Aluminium SA Ltd (BASAL) in 
support of the members of NUMSA employed by Samancor.266 The employer sought an interdict 
to restrain the strike at BASAL on the basis that it was unprotected.267 
Pillay J first considered that s 66(2)(c)268 of the LRA requires that a secondary strike have an 
effect on the business of the primary employer. This is based on the acceptance that there has to 
be a nexus linking the secondary employer or the employees to the primary employer or the 
employees. If no nexus exists there can be no effect on the business of the employer. Thus, there 
would be no further enquiry.269 Additionally, the secondary strike is also expected to be 
reasonable to the primary employer’s business. This reasonableness is what qualifies the 
necessary effect between the secondary and primary employer.270 Reasonableness pertains to the 
extent and the nature of the secondary strike. The scope of the strike concerns the actual strikers 
and workplaces which participated in the strike as well as the length of the strike.271 However, 
there only needs to be a possible direct or indirect effect in terms of the nature and the extent of 
the secondary strike.272 There are no clear limitations embedded within s 66(2)(c), thus the 
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judiciary has a very wide discretion in determining whether a secondary strike is reasonable or 
not.273 
In application of s 66(2)(c), Pillay J highlighted that there was a nexus which existed between the 
secondary and primary employer for three reasons. Firstly, BASAL was completely owned by 
BPH Billiton. BPH Billiton owned 60% of shares in Samancor the business of the primary 
employer.274 Secondly, the LC noted that Samancor, BPH Billiton and BASAL were 
administered by independent boards although they were public bodies and thirdly, all three 
entities were vulnerable to a negative market reaction if industrial action had to take place.275 
Pillay J reasoned that the secondary strike could indirectly affect the primary employer as a 
result of the inter-connected construction of these three bodies, the level of ownership by BHP 
Billiton in the secondary and primary employer’s business and the market reaction on shares 
caused by the secondary strike.276 
Once the court was satisfied that a nexus existed between the primary and secondary employer’s 
business, Pillay J was also called upon to investigate the second enquiry which was whether the 
nexus had a possible effect on the business of the primary employer. In doing so, Pillay J 
considered two pertinent cases. The first case that was analysed was Samancor Ltd & another v 
National Union of Metalworkers of SA.277 The employees of Samancor and Manganese Metal 
were interdicted from engaging in a secondary strike on behalf of NUMSA members employed 
by Columbus Steel Joint Venture.278 The basis for the applicants’ contention was that the 
secondary strike was not reasonable or proportional to the primary employer’s business as 
required under s 66(2)(c). 
In making a determination, Landman J stated that an enquiry into the corporate relationship of 
the Columbus Steel Joint Venture, Manganese Metal and Samancor had to be undertaken to 
determine the possible direct or indirect effect of the secondary strike on the primary 
employer.279 In light of the facts of the case, Landman J held that Manganese Metal and 
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Samancor apparently conducted business together as some of Manganese Metal’s plants were 
carried out together or was within the ambit of Samancor’s management. However, Manganese 
Metal was not an instrumental supplier of chrome to Columbus Steel.280 It is imperative to note 
that chrome was a pivotal metal which underpinned the processes of Columbus Steel. Therefore, 
the strike which took place at Manganese Steel could not have had a possible effect either 
directly or indirectly on the business of Columbus Steel.281 Even though Manganese Metal was 
completely owned by Samancor, this only created a nexus between Manganese Metal and 
Columbus Steel. A simple nexus between the primary employer and the secondary employer 
without the secondary strike having an effect on the business of the primary employer was 
insufficient.282 
In regard to Samancor, Landman J held that 80% of Columbus Steel was supplied by Samancor. 
Furthermore, Samancor and Columbus Steel had embarked on a joint undertaking. Therefore, the 
strike at Samancor would have influenced the operations of Columbus Steel.283 The LC 
specifically highlighted that it was insignificant that Samancor did not have authority over the 
everyday running of Columbus Steel as this strike was not about the everyday running of the 
business, but rather it was about capital and an increase in wages to NUMSA members.284 
Therefore, Samancor had an evident and justifiable economic interest which could have been an 
incentive to influence negotiations between the union’s members and Columbus Steel.285 The LC 
accordingly held that on these grounds that a nexus existed between the primary employer’s 
business and the secondary strike.286 
Landman J then engaged in the second enquiry which pertained to whether the secondary strikes 
at Samancor and Manganese Metal were reasonable in light of the nature and extent of these 
strikes in regard to Columbus Joint Venture.287 The LC considered this in light of s 66(2)(c) 
which in terms of the nature and extent of the strike compel an investigation into the reservation 
of performing work, the timing of the strike as well as other considerations such as the possible 
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effects on the business of Columbus Steel.288 The court held that it would have been reasonable 
if NUMSA only engaged in strikes against chrome ore mines, chrome or ferro alloy plants under 
Samancor’s ownership as these plants have an effect on the production of chrome which is 
necessary for production at Columbus Steel.289 However, Landman J held that in regard to 
Manganese Metal the secondary strikes which took place at its plants and mines would not have 
had an effect on the primary employer as the business was not a major supplier of chrome to 
Columbus Joint Venture.290 Therefore, the court held that an interdict against Manganese Metal 
was justified, however, an interdict against Samancor had to be limited only to the chrome, alloy 
and ferro plants as this would have had a reasonable effect on the business of the primary 
employer.291 
The court in Billiton supra also highlighted the case of Sealy of SA (Pty) Ltd & others v Paper 
Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union292 in its judgment. In Sealy supra the LC was called 
upon to adjudicate an urgent interdict against a proposed strike by the secondary employers. In 
analysing s 66(2)(c) of the LRA, Basson J quoted legal authors who stated that s 66(2)(c) 
establishes a concept of proportionality. The legality of the secondary strike is founded upon the 
impact such a strike might have on the primary employer’s business.293 Basson J determined that 
the secondary employers and the primary employer operate in two entirely different trades. The 
secondary employers are engaged in manufacturing of mattresses, wall units, furniture as well as 
supplying bedding to other businesses. The primary employer is engaged in the production of 
paper and pulp industry.294 The LC stated that on this basis there can be no nexus between the 
secondary employer and the primary employer. 
The court then considered the argument by the union that there was a nexus between the primary 
employer and the secondary employer on the basis that Anglo American is a shareholder in the 
primary employer’s company.295 Basson J addressed this argument with the fact that Anglo 
American’s shareholding only amounts to 1% of Afcol, the primary employer and on this basis 
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such a contention is weak. The court stated that there was an insufficient nexus between the 
secondary employer and the primary employer in respect of the scope and nature of the 
secondary strike would have on the direct or indirect impact on the business of the primary 
employer.296 
The court in Billiton supra stated that these cases emphasised two points namely that there has to 
be a nexus between the primary employer and the secondary employer, however slight that nexus 
might be.297 Secondly, the effect of the secondary strike must be reasonable in terms of the 
nature and the extent of the secondary strike on the primary employer’s business.298 In light of 
Sealy supra, it can be acknowledged that the nexus must not weak in nature. There are three 
reasons that Pillay J proffers which validates the strong indirect nexus between the secondary 
employer and BHP Billiton. Firstly, the common factor is that all three bodies are administered 
by autonomous boards. Secondly, they are all public bodies and thirdly, they would all suffer 
some loss in share prices as a result of the secondary strike.299 
The second enquiry that the LC made was in light of Samancor supra which necessitates that the 
extent and nature of the secondary strike has to be reasonable to the primary employer’s 
business.300 The court in Billiton supra held that the complete stoppage by all employees of the 
secondary employers would have a possible effect on the business of the primary employer. 
Even if the primary employer continues its business through the use of replacement labour, the 
secondary strike would still have an effect on the primary employer’s business.301 The court 
further elaborated that this effect would be colossal as the applicant had a business in which 
unhindered production was essential. The cost to re-commission smelters would be too great and 
furthermore, the length of time that it would take to do this would be vast. This meets the 
requirement of the possible reasonableness of the extent and the nature of the secondary strike on 
the primary employer.302 
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In Hextex & others v SACTWU & others,303 the court considered the term ‘possible’ in terms of s 
66(2)(c). An urgent application was brought by Hextex, Romatex and Berg River, which were all 
subsidiaries of the Seardel Group Trading (Pty) Ltd, to declare the secondary strikes that were to 
take place to be unprotected.304 The court noted that the union bore the onus of proving that it 
had complied with the jurisdictional prerequisites that entitled it to invoke the provisions of s 
66(2)(c) of the LRA.305 Furthermore, the LC acknowledged that s 66 (2)(c) stated that the effect 
on the primary employer merely be a possibility of being direct or indirect. Pillay J emphasised 
that the term ‘possible’ possessed two meanings. The first meaning in terms of the common 
interpretation of the provision was that the word alluded to something that was likely to happen, 
probable of occurring or existing. This interpretation reduced adherence with the provision 
considerably low.306 
Pillay J stated that in terms of the second interpretation the word ‘possible’ could be substituted 
with the word ‘potential’. This would infer a greater level of adherence to the provision.307 This 
interpretation would require a valid assessment and would place an onerous task on determining 
the powerfulness that the effect of the secondary strike could have on the primary employer.308 A 
further implication of the second interpretation is that if the secondary strike is deemed to have a 
powerful effect then it should be allowed; however, if the strike has a slight effect or has no 
effect on the primary employer then such a secondary strike would not be permissible.309 On the 
other hand, the second interpretation would also imply that even if there is no powerful effect by 
the secondary strike, such a strike would be permissible because it has an insignificant impact on 
the country’s economy. However, in terms of Billiton supra the effect that the strike has on the 
secondary employer is of no concern. Thus, the second interpretation would cause much 
uncertainty.310 Furthermore, this interpretation would be intrusive on the right to collective 
bargaining which is based on the concept of self-regulation of industrial affairs. Lastly, Pillay J 
noted that the second interpretation overlooks that fact that secondary strikes do not occur 
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suddenly but rather that they grow gradually.311 This interpretation presupposes that there are 
different stages of a strike. Consequently, the question arises during which stage the secondary 
strike’s powerfulness or potential should be evaluated?312 
Pillay J stated that because the right to strike is a constitutionally protected right then the least 
restraining interpretation should be afforded to this right.313 Furthermore, the court highlighted 
that due to the lack of evidence presented the LC was unable to assess the powerfulness that the 
secondary strike would have on the primary employer. This would be a continuous problem as 
urgent applications do not allow sufficient time to submit an investigator’s report nor does the 
urgent application allow for an analysis of the primary employer’s participation in the strike. In 
terms of the second interpretation the court would be required to anticipate the effect that the 
secondary strike would have on the primary employer on a balance of probabilities.314 The court 
thus decided to follow the first interpretation of the word ‘possible’. Pillay J stated that the effect 
of s 66(2)(c) is to ensure that the secondary strike’s extent and nature is capable of creating an 
effect on the business of the primary employer.315 A secondary strike would be reasonable if the 
workers of the secondary employer exert pressure on their employer who in turn exerts pressure 
on the primary employer to negotiate with its employees to reach a resolution to their dispute. If 
the possible result of the secondary strike is to facilitate bargaining between the employer and 
the employees then the secondary strike will be deemed to have a probable effect on the primary 
employer and should thus be afforded protection.316 The court stated that the effect that the 
secondary strike should have must be of an economic or commercial nature. The mere 
inconvenience incurred by the primary employer would be insufficient to meet this 
requirement.317 
Pillay J analysed the above principles in light of the facts of the case. Pillay J held that the link 
with the other divisions of the applicant is indirect; however, these divisions are capable of 
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exerting force on the applicant who will be compelled to order its divisions which have a direct 
link with Team Puma to stop trading with Team Puma.318 This would have an effect on Team 
Puma regardless of whether this effect was great or not. The LC was thus unwilling to conclude 
there would be no effect on the primary employer as a result of the secondary strike.319 Pillay J 
held that this nexus between the primary employer and the secondary employer was sufficient to 
pressurise the primary employer to engage in bargaining with its employees.320 The pressure 
inflicted by the secondary strike on the primary employer would be in the form of a complete 
cessation of work. This would be extremely harmful to the secondary employer which would be 
an incentive for the secondary employer to pressure the primary employer. Pillay J thus 
concluded that in light of the above reasons the applicant had failed to prove that there was an 
evident right to interdict the employees from engaging in the secondary strike.321 
4.5.2. PROTEST ACTION 
The LRA also provides for the right to engage in protest action.322 This is indeed a great 
advancement, as this right has not received protection in our country previously.323 Protest action 
can include actions such as picketing, go-slows, stay-aways, work-to-rule and sit-ins.324 The right 
to protest action extends further than the employment relationship, as it differs from strikes in 
that it seeks to advance the “socio-economic interests of workers”. In Government of the Western 
Cape Province v Congress of SA Trade Unions & another (COSATU) 325 the court considered 
the term ‘socio-economic interest’. The applicant applied for the interdict against the protest 
action on the ground that the demands referred to educational issues and not to socio-economic 
issues. The court in this regard noted that it is difficult to put an exact definition to the term 
‘socio-economic interest’, as its interpretation would depend on the circumstances of each 
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case.326 It was held that this term refers to any demand in pursuance of “social status and 
economic position of the workers in general”.327 
The court considered that this term has to be broadly defined given our country’s past.  It was 
held that the demands regarding education fell within the ambit of socio-economic interests as 
COSATU through these demands attempted to undo the inequalities of our past especially with 
regard to education.328 Therefore, due to the interests protest action seeks to uphold, the court 
requires that very persuasive reasons be given to limit this right.329 In Business SA v COSATU & 
another,330 the court held that the right to protest action has to be construed in a wider context 
than merely the workplace. It extends to society and has an impact on the economy.331 
Another aspect of protest action which the LRA endorses is the right to picketing.332 Picketers 
are obliged to comply with the Code of Good Practice on Picketing,333 which regulates the 
enforcement of this right. The court in Picardi Hotels Ltd v FGWU & others,334 sets out the 
activities which are deemed acceptable. If employees engage in violence or any other criminal 
act, their conduct will be regarded as unlawful335 and will not be protected against dismissal.336 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
It is essential to note the LRA has been a defining piece of legislation in South Africa. It has 
effectively included every employee under its banner in an attempt to implement transformation 
in labour relations.337 The main purpose of the LRA, which has been discussed extensively 
throughout this chapter, is to provide an economic and accessible dispute resolution framework. 
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The essence of these procedures is to ensure that employers and their employees equally 
contribute to growth, harmony and productivity of the workplace.338 
The increased productivity and stability in the workplace in turn seeks to advance the purpose of 
the LRA which is to ensure the improvement of the socio-economic interests of society at large. 
It is clearly evident from the exploration of the LRA in this chapter that an extensive framework 
has been developed to resolve disputes rather than having employees resort to strike action. The 
entrenchment of the right to strike is therefore indicative of legislature’s attempt to balance the 
interests of both employees and employers. The enforcement of this right illustrates positive 
developments in our law. The right to strike, however, is not an absolute right and consequently 
various limitations are included in the LRA to ensure that the right is not abused. These 
limitations will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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THE REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The entrenchment of the right to strike necessitates proper guidelines on how it should be 
enforced to guard against the abuse of the right to strike.1 Therefore the LRA includes explicit 
prohibitions which indicate when strikes are regarded as illegal.2 These prohibitions are relevant 
as they form a guideline that determines whether a strike is protected. Even though s 23 of the 
Constitution enshrines the right to strike, this right must be exercised according to the limitations 
provided by the LRA.3 Furthermore, these limitations are necessary to ensure that public peace 
and order are maintained. 
If strikers engage in criminal behavior during a strike that threatens the health and safety of 
society, then there are a number of measures which the LRA implements to quell the illegal 
strikes.4 Such consequences are essential to deter strikers from criminal activity during a strike in 
order to protect the basic human rights of employees and society at large. These repercussions 
for illegal behavior are vital to ensure that strikers who do not comply with the LRA are held 
accountable for their actions.5 However, the mere fact that the LRA enshrines various limitations 
does not mean that they are adhered to.  
5.2. PROCEDURE FOR PROTECTED STRIKES 
The LRA has entrenched a clear procedure which must be followed for a strike to be protected,6 
however, if these specific procedures are not followed, then employees forfeit the protection 
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attributed to the right to strike.7 The LRA provides for two procedural requirements to be 
followed to ensure the protection of a strike.8 The first procedure is that employees and 
employers are compelled to engage in conciliation. If conciliation is unsuccessful or if the matter 
has been referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) for 30 
days without resolution then a certificate will be issued indicating that the dispute remains 
unresolved.9 The second requirement is that the union must furnish the employer with 48 hours 
notice of its intention to strike.10 Thus, for the purposes of this section pertaining to procedure, 
the discussion will only focus on the second requirement pertaining to 48 hours’ notice. 
5.2.1 The requirement of 48 hours notice 
The primary element that makes way for a lawful strike is that the parties must provide 48 hours 
notice to the employer of the intended strike.11 The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was called 
upon to adjudicate on the requirement of 48 hours notice in the landmark case of Equity Aviation 
v SATAWU.12 In Equity Aviation, SATAWU represented 725 of the 1157 Equity Aviation’s 
employees. As a result of failed negotiations, SATAWU supplied the employer with the required 
48 hours notice of its intention to strike. The strike persisted for four weeks involving both 
represented employees and unrepresented employees. The strike was deemed lawful for the 
represented employees who had complied with the LRA; however, the unrepresented employees’ 
participation was not regarded as lawful as they had failed to give a separate notice of their 
intention to strike.13 Consequently, the unrepresented employees were dismissed for prolonged 
unauthorised absenteeism. The dismissed employees referred the matter as an automatically 
unfair dismissal. The Labour Court found that the employees formed part of the union’s 
membership at the time of the strike; however, regardless of this ruling the employees’ 
membership was not a prerequisite for their lawful participation in the strike.14 On appeal this 
decision was set aside by the LAC. The majority decision, in which Khampepe ADJP and Davis 
JA concurred, reasoned that to necessitate a separate strike notice by non-represented employees 
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would also necessitate a separate referral of the dispute for conciliation. The majority court 
considered this premise in light of the purpose of s 64(1)(a), which is to ensure orderly collective 
bargaining. The purpose of s 64(1) was merely to ensure that there was a referral in order to 
ensure a lawful strike, it did not intend to require the indication of the identity of the parties. 
Once the union had referred the matter for conciliation then another referral of the same dispute 
by non-represented employees would be futile.15 The reason for this decision was that the issue 
in dispute affected both the represented employees and non-represented employees. When the 
matter was referred for conciliation, the union represented the interests of both represented and 
non-represented employees. Therefore, once the majority union had referred the dispute and was 
unsuccessful, then non-represented employees were entitled to strike along with the represented 
employees.16 The majority court held that there was no rationale to draw a distinction between 
categories of workers as if legislature intended this to be the case then it would have done so. 
The employer is entitled to notice of intention to strike but not to the identity of the individuals.17 
The crucial question in Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport & Allied Workers 
Union & Others18 which the SCA had to decide on was whether the unrepresented employees 
were required to submit a separate notice of their intention to strike or whether the notice 
submitted by the union was sufficient to include the unrepresented employees that would 
ultimately render their participation in the strike as being lawful.19 In the SCA, Lewis JA 
considered the two chief arguments made by the respondents in the LAC. The first argument 
which was presented by the respondents was that s 64(1)(b) did not require more than one notice. 
In the majority decision, Khampepe ADJP agreed with this argument and held that to confer any 
further requirements into s 64(1)(b) that legislature has not expressly included would contradict 
labour law jurisprudence. Furthermore, it would be overly formal which would negate the 
simplistic framework of dispute resolution. This would be contrary to the objectives of the 
LRA.20 
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Davis JA proffered another line of reasoning when he concurred with Khampepe ADJP in his 
judgment by stating that if “a significant group of workers” provide notice of their intention to 
strike, then it would ensure satisfactory compliance with the implementation of organised 
industrial relations.21 Zondo JP in the dissenting judgment held that this decision was entirely 
incorrect and would lead to immense uncertainty within the law. Zondo JP reasoned that this 
could not suffice as a sound justification because the term ‘significant group’ would mean that if 
an insignificant group of the employees provided the notice first then a further notice would be 
required by a significant group of employees.22 Consequently, if a significant group of 
employees provided notice then it would not necessitate those who are form part of an 
insignificant group of employees to provide separate notices.23 The SCA agreed with the 
decision of Zondo JP in this regard as Lewis JP held that this was an illogical rationalisation of 
what s 64(1)(b) requires.24 Furthermore, it is submitted that the conclusion reached by Davis JA 
is invalidated by the first argument of Khampepe ADJP which states that labour law 
jurisprudence would be undermined if you include further requirements which legislature had not 
expressly included.25 The LRA in s 64(1)(b) does not make mention of any term regarding a 
“significant group of people,” therefore, to infer such a term would be contrary to labour law 
jurisprudence.26 
 
The second argument raised by the respondents in the LAC was that requiring non-represented 
employees to furnish separate notices would be a limitation of the right to strike without 
justification.27 The decision held by Khampepe ADJP in regard to the respondents’ argument 
pertained to a strict interpretation of the right to strike in accordance to leading cases which 
compelled the interpretation of the right to strike to be construed without importing implicit 
limitations that were not expressly conferred by legislature.28 The SCA disagreed with this 
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decision and held that this requirement does not affect the enforcement of the right, but rather 
how the right is exercised. It was merely a procedural requirement that is required to render the 
strike lawful.29 
 
The SCA considered the argument raised by the employer in the LAC. Equity Aviation averred 
that the majority decision did not appreciate the difference between s 64(1)(a) which necessitated 
negotiations between the parties to allow for a period of cooling off and s 64(1)(b) which allows 
for the employer to prepare for the strike.30 If this requirement were undermined then the 
employer would not be able to determine the magnitude, intensity and the actual focus of the 
strike. This would defeat the entire purpose of a strike as the employer would not be able to 
make an informed decision to accede to the employees' demands.31 Furthermore, an employer 
would not have knowledge of whether it should take adequate steps to protect the business or to 
make pre-strike regulatory decisions as well as necessary health and safety precautions that may 
arise during the strike.32 The union argued that due to the context that collective bargaining takes 
place in, Equity Aviation would have been aware of the magnitude of the strike and would have 
been able to prepare for it.33 However, this was not the case as Equity Aviation had made 
inquiries regarding the participants of the strike and it was informed that the strike would only 
involve union members. Thus, it had made preparations based on this knowledge.34 The court 
has to determine whether the purpose of s 64 was frustrated as was illustrated in Fidelity Guards 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Professional Transport Workers Union & others (1).35 The court on appeal 
dealt with non-compliance with s 64(1)(b). However, the court pointed out that there was no 
argument that the non-compliance in any way frustrated the purposes of the LRA. Therefore, 
reliance on the non-compliance failed on appeal.36 
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Zondo JP took the factors which were presented by Equity Aviation into account when he 
handed down the dissenting judgment that separate notices were required from non-represented 
employees. The SCA agreed with the dissenting judgment,37 and added a fifth purpose that 
providing a separate notice would protect the non-represented employees. Lewis JA was of the 
opinion that if all employees complied with the procedural requirements of the LRA then their 
conduct would be protected under the LRA. Therefore, it is in the best interests of all employees 
that an employer receive a notice of intention to strike by all its employees who intend to strike.38 
The SCA further approved Zondo JP’s interpretation of s 64(1)(b) who relied on labour law 
authors who claim that as soon as the procedural requirements for a valid strike have been 
fulfilled, namely that the matter has been referred for conciliation and the union has provided the 
employer with the notice of its intention to strike then the union is at liberty to call out all its 
members to engage in strike action, non-represented employees may also join in the strike 
provided that they furnish separate notice of their intention to strike.39 The SCA and Zondo JA 
were of the opinion that not to do so would result in disorderly collective bargaining. The SCA 
accordingly set the decision of the LAC aside.40 
 
The SCA’s judgment and the dissenting decision of Zondo JP in the LAC fall in line with the 
conclusion reached by Froneman DJP in Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v 
National Construction and Allied Workers Union.41 The LAC held that s 64(1)(b) has to be 
interpreted to advance the objectives of the LRA, one of which is to ensure orderly collective 
bargaining. The specific purpose of s 64(1)(b) gives effect to the objective of the LRA as this 
section is designed to ensure that the employer is aware of the strike so that he can prepare for it. 
The objective of the LRA and the purpose of s 64(1)(b) would be weakened and made ineffective 
if employers were not informed as to the exact terms of the strike.42 There are two ways in which 
orderly collective bargaining would be damaged by not informing the employer of the exact 
extent that the strike would take.43 Firstly, the employer requires this information so that he can 
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decide whether it is more reasonable to accede to the employees demand rather than allowing the 
strike to commence. The underlying purpose of a strike is to utilise the threat of economic harm 
to the employer’s business to allow the employer the opportunity to consent to the employees 
demands.44 
 
Secondly, separate notices from non-represented employees would enable an employer to protect 
the interests of the business when the actual strike commences as prior knowledge regarding how 
many employees will be participating in the strike will indicate the extent of the strike and thus 
allow the employer to plan ahead based on that knowledge.45 These are pertinent issues which 
are imperative in providing the employer with sufficient information to make informed decisions 
especially within the South African context given the spike in violent strikes that affect the safety 
of non-strikers and the general public.46 One can only implement measures to prevent harmful 
and dangerous occurrences if they can foresee that such harm or danger will occur.47 An 
employer cannot be expected to safeguard against severe financial loss or potential danger if it is 
unaware of the severity that the strike would inflict.48 This is a grave concern as if there are 
insufficient measures taken against potential harm then the damage to the business and society at 
large would be colossal.49 
However, the in SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto No & another,50 the 
Constitutional Court (CC) ruled against the decision in Equity Aviation supra, thus establishing a 
new line of precedent. As a result of failed negotiations pertaining to wages the union obtained a 
certificate that the dispute remained unresolved.51 The union which represented the majority of 
Equity’s workforce issued a notice to the employer indicating their intention to embark on a 
strike. Similarly to Equity Aviation supra, non-members of the trade union also engaged in the 
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strike. These employees were then dismissed because of their participation in an unprotected 
strike.52 
The CC was called upon to adjudicate on two arguments. The argument presented by the 
applicants pertained to the language expressed by the legislature which provided for a strict 
interpretation of the provision of s 64(1)(b) in light of the Constitution and the purpose of the 
LRA.53 The applicants claimed that to allow any further reading into the provision would entail 
that the employer is given an unfair advantage over the employees who are already placed in an 
inferior position within the employment field.54 The argument presented by the respondents 
pertained to a purposive interpretation of s 64(1)(b) which claimed that in order for the provision 
to contain any purpose at all, notices of the intended strike had to be given by all employees who 
intended to strike.55 
The majority in which Yacoob ADCJ, Froneman J, Nkabinde J, Cameron J and Van der 
Westhuizen J concurred held in favour of the applicants. The majority considered two primary 
aspects that followed from the factual context of the case as well as the principle of constitutional 
jurisprudence of statutes. The majority took cognisance of the recognition agreement that was 
concluded by the union and Equity Aviation which recognised the union as a bargaining agent 
which represented all the employees employed by Equity Aviation. Furthermore, there was also 
an agency agreement in place which permitted the union to engage in negotiations regarding 
wages on behalf of both non-union employees and members of the union.56 The CC stated that it 
is in this context that the notice to strike should be interpreted, as from the beginning of 
negotiations both members of the union as well as non-union members were represented by the 
union regarding this wage dispute.57 Equity Aviation could not reasonably have believed that the 
strike notice did not include non-union employees from the facts of the case.58 
The majority further considered was that the right to strike was a Constitutional right which 
afforded it significant value. Consequently, there should not be any implicit requirement read 
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into the right without proper justification.59 The majority held that there was no proper 
justification to read an implicit requirement into the right, as the LRA only envisaged one strike 
in respect of one dispute, thus, there was no rationale or language from statute to assume that 
there should be two notices given for one strike.60 In Moloto supra the court held that the LRA in 
s 64 has explicitly stated the procedural requirements that have to be met for the protection of a 
strike and that once these requirements have been satisfied there does not have to be any further 
procedures conferred upon it.61 Yacoob ADCJ, Froneman J, Nkabinde J, Cameron J and Van der 
Westhuizen J further held that the LRA sought to regulate the right to strike thus there does not 
have to be any further justification or additional limitations to these explicit limitations which are 
necessary for the effective regulation of the right.62 Therefore, it can be deduced that the court in 
Moloto supra has effectively illustrated that the court is unwilling to read limitations into 
fundamental rights enshrined by the Constitution without adequate justification.63 
The majority court further reasoned that in terms of the principle of constitutional jurisprudence 
if there was more than one interpretation of the statutory provision, such interpretation must 
conform to the spirit, purport and objective of the Bill of Rights.64 The CC considered that there 
were two consequences which would give effect to the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill 
of Rights from interpreting s 64(1)(b) to mean only what was expressly enshrined by 
legislature.65 
Firstly, a less intrusive interpretation would ensure greater certainty in enforcing the right to 
strike, as reading an implicit requirement would require more information in the notice and 
would lead to further implicit requirements being read into the provision.66 If this occurred there 
would be great uncertainty in enforcing strikes as employees would not be able to follow a clear 
guideline on protected strikes. This would negate the purpose of the LRA which endorses orderly 
collective bargaining.67 It is imperative to note that the majority’s reasoning regarding this first 
point on promoting orderly collective bargaining vastly contrasts to the reasoning proffered by 
                                                          
59 SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto supra note 50 at 2550F-G. 
60 SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto supra note 50 at 2551C. 
61 CWIU v Plascon Decorative (Inland) (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 321 (LAC). 
62 New National Party of SA v Government of the Republic of SA & others [1999] 5 BCLR 489 (CC). 
63 Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority [2002] 5 BLLR 433 (CC). 
64 SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto No & another supra note 50 at 2551C-D. 
65 SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto No & another supra note 50 at 2551C-D. 
66 SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto No supra note 50 at 2551E. 
67 SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto No supra note 50 at 2551F. 
136 
 
the SCA in Equity Aviation supra.68 The court in Equity Aviation supra concluded that orderly 
collective bargaining would be achieved if there was an implicit reading into the notice to strike. 
The reasoning of the SCA was more in line with how the employer would perceive the strike 
notice in order to prepare for the power play that was to commence.69 In Equity Aviation supra, 
the SCA rationalised that the enforcement of orderly dispute resolution would ensure that 
employers are not caught off guard and that a strike does not proceed to an extent that is 
uncontrollable, as this would be contrary to the intention of the LRA.70 In Moloto supra the 
majority’s reasoning was in line with the effect that the reading into of implicit requirements 
would have on the employees. In this regard the majority were of the view that reading into 
further requirements would make the enforcement of strike indeterminate as the employer would 
claim that further requirements be read into the provision.71 This would also erode the very 
essence of orderly collective bargaining which is to balance the unequal power that exists 
between the employer and employee.72 
Secondly, a less intrusive interpretation of the right to strike would enforce the underlying 
rationale for industrial action which is to balance the social and economic power within the 
workplace.73 If more information was required other than that which legislature expressed, the 
position of the employer would be further strengthened and contradict the purpose of the 
Constitution which is to level the playing field that has already been tilted in favour of the 
employer.74 The employer has possessed economic autonomy over workers for centuries.75 
Workers suffer from an inherent imbalance of power in the workplace as a result of the 
employer’s superior position of enforcing wages and employment conditions and workers have 
no option but to accept these conditions if he or she is in need of a job.76 Therefore, by not 
interpreting further implicit limitations employees would be able to level this imbalance of 
power that employers have possessed through strike action which would bring pressure upon the 
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dominant elite and compel employers to accede to the demands of employees.77 Furthermore, 
non-unionised employees would feel the impact of an additional strike notice much more 
severely that employees who are represented by a union, as this would be an additional 
requirement only non-unionised employees had to comply with.78 
In terms of the notice, if the employees want to serve notice on their employer who is part of the 
bargaining council and the dispute pertains to the collective agreement that has not yet been 
concluded by the particular bargaining council, then notice merely has to be served on the 
secretary of the bargaining council.79 The prescribed period that notice should be given varies 
depending on who the employer is. If the employer is a private body then the required notice 
period is 48 hours’.80 However, where the employer is the state, then there must be at least seven 
days’ notice given to the employer of the intended strike.81 In City of Matlosana v SA Local 
Government Bargaining Council,82 the court elaborated on the necessity of seven days’ notice 
required when the employer is the state. The court highlighted that the State is responsible for 
supplying essential and basic needs to the general public. These services are critical in 
dispensing services to provide for the needs of the public. It is for this reason that the employer 
being the State requires additional time to decrease any interruption that may occur as a result of 
the intended strike.83 The notice period is not the only requirement that the notice needs to meet. 
The notice does not have to indicate the exact time which the strike will commence.84 
Additionally, the strike does not have to commence at the time specified in the notice.85 The 
purpose of this section is to ensure that the employer is aware of when the strike will take place 
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to ensure that he can minimise any disruption caused by the strike or to give the employer the 
opportunity to accede to the employees’ demand.86 Even though much emphasis is placed on 
informing the employer when the strike is to commence, the employer does not need to be 
informed as to the complete details regarding the time and duration.87 It follows from the 
discussion of these two paramount cases that the LRA places clear and precise procedures which 
must be followed for the protection of a strike. However, there are circumstances which the LRA 
identifies as necessary to exclude the requirements prescribed by statute.88 
5.3. WHEN STATUTORY PROCEDURE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE FOLLOWED  
The LRA acknowledges that there are instances where employees may dispense with the 
requirements for statutory procedure and may still be afforded the protection of the strike. The 
first instance that the LRA envisages is if the collective agreement which binds the parties 
specifies that the dispute in interest is one that employees may not strike over, then such a strike 
will not be afforded protection in terms of the LRA.89 In Columbus Joint Venture t/a Columbus 
Stainless Steel v NUMSA,90  the Labour Court held that there are essentially two available means 
to guarantee the protection of a strike. Firstly, employees are at liberty to follow the statutory 
procedure indicated by s 64 of the LRA and secondly, employees may adhere to the requirements 
stipulated by the collective agreement. It is a choice of what the intended strikers would like to 
follow.91 Therefore, it follows that a collective agreement may override provisions of the LRA as 
was previously discussed.92 If strikers want the protection of the law, they merely need to follow 
the collective agreement or the provision stipulated in s 64.  
The second instance which the LRA allows for dispensing with statutory procedure is when 
parties are members of a particular bargaining council and that council’s constitution prescribes a 
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process for the resolution of the dispute that has arisen between the parties.93 The employees in 
such an instance are obliged to follow that process.94 The third instance that the LRA envisages 
is when an employer makes a unilateral amendment or threatens to make such an amendment to 
the conditions of employment and consequently refuses to withdraw from implementing the 
amendments.95 A further instance that the LRA permits for the non-compliance of statutory 
requirements is when the strike is in response to a lock-out that is unlawfully imposed by the 
employer.96 The LRA allows the implementation of strike activity in these instances to promote 
the right to strike and further the interests of justice to ensure that employees do not have to 
adhere to strict rules when their employers are not willing to follow due process. However, the 
interests of justice also ensure that there are certain situations which would result in detrimental 
consequences if strikes did occur. It is for this reason that there are certain prohibitions on the 
right to strike.97 
5.4. THE PROHIBITIONS ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
There are essentially four instances when strike action will be prohibited.98 The first instance is 
when parties conclude a collective agreement that specifically contain provisions which prohibit 
the use of industrial action as a means of resolution over certain disputes.99 These provisions are 
referred to as peace clauses whose enforcement would prohibit striking over certain disputes or 
be an absolute ban on all strike activity.100 In Enforce Guarding (Pty) Ltd v National Security & 
Unqualified Workers Union & others,101 the company proposed to make changes to the hours of 
overtime in conformity with ministerial requirements. However, these changes were not in 
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excess of the maximum hours as stipulated by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997 (hereinafter referred to as the BCEA). The dispute pertained to whether the collective 
agreement prohibited strike action as the agreement stipulated that only overtime that is less than 
the maximum hours of overtime will be dealt with according to the BCEA.102 The LC as per 
Pillay J held that the collective agreement did not prohibit the strike for two reasons. Firstly, the 
company’s proposed amendment did not exceed the 10 hours’ overtime stipulated by the BCEA. 
Therefore the dispute fell within the ambit of the collective agreement and was a matter that was 
subject to negotiation.103 Secondly, in terms of the contention that the matter had to be addressed 
at central level and not plant level, the court further held that there was no bargaining council in 
place as yet and no mechanisms to resolve the dispute had been set. Thus, the union was entitled 
to pursue the interests of its members through industrial action. Hence, the collective agreement 
did not prohibit the strike on this basis as well.104 
However, it is not only a collective agreement that may prohibit strike action, but rather there are 
further instances where the constitution of a bargaining council may prohibit strike action.105 The 
leading case which has developed this area of the law is that of SA Clothing & Textile Workers 
Union v Yarntex (Pty) Ltd t/a Bertrand Group.106 The employees of Yarntex engaged in 
unprotected strikes during the period of July and December of 2007. Consequently, such 
employees were issued with warnings that explicitly informed them that if they engaged in 
similar conduct during the next 12 months they would be dismissed.107 During this period the 
union reached a deadlock regarding wages and a dispute was declared. The provisions of the 
National Textile Bargaining Council (NTBC) specifically stated that all negotiations at plant 
level were prohibited. Therefore, all lock outs and strikes at this level were also prohibited. The 
company repeatedly reminded the union that this prohibition would render strikes unlawful, 
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however, this warning was ignored and in September 2008 the majority of the workers engaged 
in the strike.108 
There are various factors that the court took into account in deciding this case; however, 
emphasis will only be placed on the issue pertaining to the NTBC’s constitution.109 As a result of 
non-compliance by the employees, their dismissal was effected without a hearing. The union 
referred the matter to the LC stating that the employees’ dismissals were both substantively and 
procedurally unfair. The court reasoned that the strikers were made aware on numerous 
occasions that the constitution of the NTBC prohibited strike action at plant level. In this regard 
the union had a responsibility to comply with the rules of the bargaining council.110 The court 
stated that this was not a violation of the right to strike as this right is not an absolute right and is 
therefore subject to s 36 of the Constitution. The strikers had engaged in repeated misconduct 
and had failed to make representations against their dismissal. Therefore, the strikers had 
forfeited their right to hold such a hearing. The court accordingly held that the dismissal of the 
strikers were not substantively or procedurally unfair.111 
This matter was taken on appeal where the LAC upheld the decision of the LC.112 On appeal the 
court reasoned that the constitution of the NTBC served as a collective agreement as this 
constitution specified how disagreements should be resolved and further explained the everyday 
procedure of the NTBC. The parties specifically agreed that negotiations regarding wages and 
conditions of employment were to be taken at subsector levels, thus, if disputes arose at this level 
then the employees would be entitled to embark on strike action as a means of resolution.113 The 
LRA entitles parties to agree on the bargaining level, as well as the subjects who are involved at 
such levels.114 Hence, the fact that the constitution explicitly stated that negotiations could only 
take place at a specific level automatically ousts negotiations at any other level including the 
remedy of industrial action that would follow failed negotiations.115 The court concluded that the 
effect of the constitution of NTBC was tantamount to the content and purpose of a collective 
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agreement. Therefore, if strikes could be excluded in a collective agreement then it would follow 
that strikes could also be excluded in a bargaining council’s constitution.116 
It is submitted that the case of Yarntex supra effectively conveys an essential point, which is that 
the right to strike is regarded as a fundamental right enshrined by the constitution, thus greater 
significance is conferred upon this right.117 Consequently, any limitations must be narrowly 
interpreted and resorted to only when the circumstances necessitate that in doing so it would 
prevent lesser harm.118 The limitation of the right ultimately seeks to prevent conflict between 
other rights.119 In Yarntex supra, the lesser harm that the NTBC sought to prevent was that if 
industrial action took place at plant level then SATAWU would have been entitled to initiate 
industrial action against only one employer to the omission of the other employers. This would 
have collapsed the bargaining process and negated plant-level bargaining.120 This in turn would 
have conflicted with the purpose and objectives of the LRA which seeks to ensure orderly 
collective bargaining.121 
A second limitation that prohibits industrial action is if the issue in dispute is classified as a 
rights dispute, because the correct procedure for resolution of rights disputes is through 
arbitration and adjudication.122 There is a clear distinction made by the LRA between disputes of 
interest and disputes of rights, as only interest disputes may entail the use of industrial action.123 
The LRA in s 65(1)(c) clearly narrows those issues which are compelled to be referred to for 
arbitration or adjudication.124 In Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Adams & others,125 the court 
held that when determining whether an issue is one over which employees may engage in strike 
action, the form in which the dispute is presented does not distinguish a dispute. It is the nature 
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of the dispute that distinguishes the type of dispute.126 Consequently, employers may not simply 
label a dispute as one that cannot be strikeable just to avoid a strike action. Neither can 
employees label a dispute as an interest dispute simply to engage in strike action. In Ceramic 
Industries Limited t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v NCBAWU & others,127 the court affirmed the 
necessity of the procedural and substantive requirements which have to be adhered to in order for 
a strike to be protected under the LRA. In terms of procedure, employees are obliged to follow 
the process as stipulated in s 64 of the LRA. In terms of the substantive limitation that is placed 
on the right to strike, one such limitation is that issues which are subject to arbitration in terms of 
the LRA cannot be resolved through industrial action.128 
This is a vastly different position compared to that which governed substantive limitations under 
the old LRA where a strike could follow due procedure and still be deemed unfair in terms of its 
unfair labour practice provision.129 However, under the current LRA the substantive limitations 
revolve around the nature of the dispute and whether it is subject to resolution by industrial 
action.130  Furthermore, these limitations are only enforceable in terms of the LRA. This means 
that strikes will still retain their protection even if referred for arbitration under another 
legislation. In such circumstances, the nature of the dispute would not be relevant as it would be 
authorised by another Act.131 
The LRA in terms of s 64 limits the protection of strike action further by stipulating that a strike 
would lose its protection once the dispute over which the strike was called has been resolved.132 
In Afrox Ltd v SA Chemical Workers Union & others (2)133 the court dealt with the issue of when 
a strike loses its protection. The dispute arose over the employees’ refusal to work staggered 
shifts in its Pretoria site. The employees then engaged in industrial action over a demand in 
relation to the dispute. The strike ended in the dismissal of the employees as well as the 
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abandonment of the employer’s unsuccessful attempts to transport the gas to its customers. As a 
result of the employer’s inability to deliver its goods to its customers, Afrox enlisted the help of 
contract workers. The contract workers themselves were not required to work staggered shifts 
and thus the issue over staggered shifts was no longer in dispute.134 
In terms of the court’s stance on the termination of a strike, the court stated that a strike can end 
in two ways. The first way is if the strikers end their strike and unqualifiedly return to work. 
Secondly, a strike can end when the grievance or dispute disappears. This could occur if the 
employer consents to the strikers’ demands or if the dispute is resolved or if the grievance is 
removed.135 It must be noted that the purpose of a strike within the framework of collective 
bargaining is to resolve a dispute.136 Once there is an absence of a dispute, a strike loses its 
purpose, thus the strike terminates. Once a strike ends, the protection it has been endowed also 
terminates.137 It is submitted that the court’s reasoning in this regard is correct and adequately 
reflects the intention of the LRA regarding strikes. The purpose of a strike as envisaged by the 
LRA in s 213 is to pursue the resolution of a dispute or grievance. A strike in such an instance is 
afforded protection provided it complies with the requirements of a lawful strike, which request 
employees to engage in collective bargaining and provide 48 hours’ notice of their intention to 
strike.138 If the dispute is resolved, as in this case when the employer enlisted the help of 
contractors, then the strike no longer has a purpose. If a strike continues after the dispute has 
been resolved then such a strike would be unlawful. It is submitted that the dismissal of the 
employees was lawful as the employees engaged in an illegal strike and thus lost the protection 
against dismissal during the strike. The moment the dispute was resolved, the strike terminated 
as well as its protection.139 
The third prohibition on strikes which is when there is an arbitration award, a determination 
made by the minister or if the BCEA regulates the dispute in contention.140 The case of Afrox 
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supra elucidates this pertinent prohibition in terms of the resolution for disputes concerning 
dismissals. The employees in Afrox supra, after conceding that the dispute pertaining to the 
staggered shifts had been resolved, continued to strike over the issue that their employment was 
replaced by that of contract workers. In this regard, the court stated that strikers are not at liberty 
to change the dispute over which they are striking. Furthermore, the dispute over their dismissals 
was not subject to strike action according to the LRA. Disputes regarding dismissals are 
categorised as rights disputes and as such have to be arbitrated or adjudicated and thereafter 
referred to the LC.141 
One of the most significant introductions of the LRA is that of the differentiation of rights 
disputes and interests’ disputes.142 The intention of the LRA is quite clear in its reason for such 
separation of disputes. Disputes of existing rights require resolution by a prescribed set of rules 
which are implemented through arbitration or adjudication and the LC.143 This distinction is well 
reasoned and has provided a number of cautionary regulations regarding strike action. In terms 
of s 65(1)(c), employees may not strike over the reinstatement of dismissed employees. In such a 
case, employees are compelled to resolve the grievance by way of arbitration. However, even 
after this process has been exhausted employees may not engage in strike action as they would 
be bound by an award, which prohibits strikes in pursuance of such a dispute.144 Furthermore, if 
a dispute proceeds to the LC and has received an outcome, the outcome or determination is 
regarded as a resolution to the dispute. Therefore, employees are not permitted to strike over the 
issue as it is deemed to have been resolved.145 
The court in this instance has affirmed that there is a difference between protected strikes and 
unprotected strikes which are prohibited.146 Furthermore, the LC has identified that there are 
those strikes that fall into neither of these categories. In Early Bird Farm (Pty) v Food & Allied 
Workers Union & others,147 the court dealt with an issue of the middle ground which could 
provide another category of industrial action. In Early Bird Farm supra the respondents were 
dismissed from work for engaging in a strike. The matter was then referred to the LC. It was 
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contended by the respondents that the dismissal was automatically unfair on the basis that they 
had engaged in a lawful strike. Furthermore, the respondents contended that the dismissal even if 
not found to be automatically unfair should be found to be unfair for having no reason to dismiss 
the employees as well as being procedurally defective. The respondents not only sought their 
reinstatement but also compensation.148 On appeal, the court dealt with three essential issues. 
The first being of whether the court a quo was correct in deciding that the dismissal of the 
respondents did not amount to an automatic unfair dismissal. Secondly, whether the court a quo 
was correct in its decision that the dismissal was unfair and thirdly, that the dismissal was 
procedurally unfair. The court on appeal looked at the first issue in determining the subsequent 
answers to the second and third questions.149 In dealing with the first issue, the appeal court 
decided that the respondents had engaged in a protected strike. The court’s reasoning was that 
FAWU had included the respondents from the farm sector in its negotiations on wages when 
deliberating on behalf of the employees from the processing plant.150 
At all times FAWU had included the individual respondents in its negotiations as the wage 
increase included the respondents.  It was irrelevant to hold that the respondents were pursuing 
their own demands because their demands were one and the same of the employees from the 
processing plant.151 Furthermore, the respondents had also participated in the strike ballot and at 
all times believed that they were party to the dispute. The dispute within the strike ballot was 
whether the respondents were willing to strike for an increase; it did not at any time specify that 
such an increase was only to be given to those employees within the processing plant.152 This is a 
very critical point as there was no distinction made between the employees within the processing 
plant and the farm sector. The employees acted as a collective before and during the strike.153 
The appeal court highlighted that the demand which the respondents pursued was the same as 
that of the employees in the processing plant regarding the increase of wages. Therefore, when 
the dispute was referred to the CCMA, it was deemed to include the dispute of the respondents as 
it was one and the same to that of the other employees. On this basis, the appeal court decided 
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that the strike adhered to the requirements within s 64 and was thus a lawful strike.154 In arriving 
at its decision, the court turned to the question of what the respondent’s position would have 
been had they engaged in the strike on behalf of the employees at the processing plant.155 On this 
particular point the applicant argued that the respondents were bound by a collective agreement 
that required any dispute surrounding wages to be referred to conciliation, arbitration or 
adjudication. Furthermore, they contended that there had been no dispute to begin with because 
the respondents had accepted the wage increase.156 In determining whether the respondents were 
bound by the collective agreement the court looked at the requirement under s 23(1)(d) of the 
LRA, which requires that individuals be mentioned in the agreement. This, however, was not 
done. Therefore, the court reasoned that the respondents were not bound by the collective 
agreement on this basis.157 
The LC further considered the issue of whether employees belonging to a different bargaining 
unit or different part of the company may engage in strike action in support of fellow employees 
belonging to another bargaining unit without having referred the matter again for conciliation. 
The court based its decision in Afrox supra and Plascon supra, where the principle derived was 
that employees who are part of the same bargaining council and the same employer are not 
obliged to refer the same dispute which fellow employees are striking over if that dispute has 
already been referred for conciliation. Such employees are at liberty to join the strike as the 
strike has already been afforded protection.158 
The appeal court in Afrox supra arrived at the decision that even if the respondents were striking 
in support of the employees from the processing plant, such strike action would have still been 
deemed lawful as the dispute had already been referred to for conciliation.159 It is submitted that 
this decision is correct. The court effectively illustrates that the purpose of s 65 of the LRA is to 
ensure that the framework for dispute resolution is exhausted before employees engage in strike 
action. By highlighting this point the court emphasises that as long as the requirements of this 
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section are met, then the same dispute need not be referred for conciliation a second time.160 The 
section is meant to ensure that strike action is a last resort and is not meant to prevent employees 
from utilising it as a form of resolution when conciliation is unsuccessful.161 The case of Early 
Bird Farm supra clearly elucidates that the court must be satisfied that the dispute in issue has 
been referred for conciliation and still remains unresolved as a dispute, as resolved disputes 
cannot be an issue over which employees strike.162 
The fourth prohibition on the right to strike is when employees are employed within essential 
and maintenance services. An essential service is one whose “interruption … endangers the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or any part of the population”.163 This definition includes 
the SA Police Service and the Parliamentary Service.164 The LRA has further provided for an 
Essential Services Committee to investigate whether a service can be classified as an essential 
service.165 This prohibition on the right to strike does not require justification and has been 
numerously enforced by the judiciary.166 In SA Police Service (SAPS) v Police & Prisons Civil 
Rights Union & another (POPCRU),167 the CC was called upon for the first time to adjudicate on 
the term ‘essential service’. The members of POPCRU were called to join the 2007 public sector 
strike, but were challenged by an urgent interdict brought by the SAPS. After a succession of 
appearances in the LC and the LAC, the matter was brought directly to the CC to decide on.168 
The primary argument of the SAPS was that it is regarded as being a single body as defined in s 
213 of the LRA; therefore all employees employed by the SAPS are an essential service. It went 
on to assert that there was no difference between employees between the South African Police 
Services Act169 (hereinafter referred to as the SAPS Act) and the Public Services Act (hereinafter 
referred to as the PSA),170 as the employees employed under the SAPS Act required the 
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functions of the employees employed under the PSA.171 The union contended that this argument 
was far too inclusive, which would effectively restrict the right to strike of all public sector 
employees.172 This was indeed a significant constitutional right which would require an accurate 
analysis of the LRA.173 
The CC proceeded to interpret the term ‘essential services’ in light of the purpose of the LRA 
and the SAPS Act and its specific context. The court stated that it has to construe the term 
restrictively so that the right to strike would not be unjustifiably limited.174 It was held that the 
provisions of the SAPS Act imply a differentiation between members and other employees. 
Thus, the SAPS cannot be deemed to be a single entity.175 The Honourable Nkabinde J 
considered the LC’s reasoning that because the Minister is entitled to appoint persons who are 
employed under the PSA as members under the SAPS Act, there is a deliberate difference 
between these two groups of employees. Hence, the Nkabinde J held that not all employees 
employed by the SAPS were deemed as being part of an essential service.176 
It is evident from this case that the court is more inclined to construe a statute that will give 
effect to the right to strike rather than limit it.177 This interpretation is essential to ensure that 
fundamental rights are attributed adequate significance.178 Therefore, it has to be acknowledged 
that merely because an employee is employed within an essential services sector does not mean 
that they perform an essential task and they would be permitted to engage in industrial action, 
hence a minimum service agreement is necessary.179 However, this is not the reality as there is a 
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reluctance to discipline essential service workers who engage in illegal strikers, thus, the 
compulsion to conclude minimum service agreements have been greatly undermined.180 
It must be noted that in addition to interpreting statutes to give effect to the right to strike, as was 
portrayed in SAPS supra, the CC may affirm the invalidity of any statute or action that is 
inconsistent to the rights enshrined in the Constitution and still uphold the purpose of excluding 
essential service employees from striking.181 This was illustrated in SA Defense Union (SANDU) 
v Minister of Defense & another.182 In SANDU supra the CC was called upon to decide on 
whether the provision endorsed by the Defense Act 44 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Defense Act), which prohibited soldiers from joining a trade union was unconstitutional.183 
The argument presented by the applicants was that 126B(2) read with s 126B(4) violated rights 
of members of the Defense force to freedom of association, as these provisions prohibited 
members of the defense force from engaging in public protests, strikes and from joining trade 
unions. In this regard the CC firstly analysed the constitutional implications of s 126B(2) read 
with s 126B(4).184 However, the applicants only contended the constitutionality of the right to 
engage in public protests and joining trade unions. It was asserted that by joining trade unions, 
the interests of the soldiers would be better advanced without having them engaging in strikes.185 
The respondents contended that this inclusion would eventually lead to the decline in discipline 
and order of the defense force.186 Mokgoro J reasoned that the right to engage in public protest 
fell squarely within the right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of expression forms 
the foundation of a democracy which is integrated within further rights that are reciprocally 
supportive of each other.187 The Constitution provides for the right to freedom of religion, beliefs 
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and opinion,188 the right to freedom of association189 and the right to assembly.190 These rights 
collectively form the basis on which individuals are entitled to not only formulate opinions and 
express them through various manners, but also to form and join associations of people who 
share the same values and beliefs of such individuals who can promote and propagate the 
opinions of such individuals as collectives.191 It must be noted that these rights are enshrined 
within international instruments such as the ILO Conventions, which have enunciated the right to 
engage in freedom of association192 and right to join a trade union and engage in collective 
bargaining.193 Furthermore, our courts are compelled to give effect to these rights when 
interpreting legislation.194 
O Regan J stated that the ramifications of the prohibition contained ins 126B(2) read with s 
126B(4), had grave consequences for the fundamental rights of soldiers. The prohibition 
restricted all soldiers from either supporting or contending any objective or purpose of any issue 
that is of social concern that would necessitate the complete detachment and isolation from the 
activities and concerns of citizens.195 O Regan J rationalised that this perception of the defense 
force could not be accurate. This prohibition had too far reaching implications, as members of 
the defense force under s 199(7) of the Constitution merely requires soldiers to perform their 
roles impassively. This, however, did not mean that they had to be deprived of the rights and 
entitlements which are afforded to every citizen in other areas of their life.196 
Furthermore, O Regan J noted that in various countries, member states of the ILO, allow trade 
union formation. Even though they are not permitted to negotiate on their members’ behalf, such 
unions may engage in consultation and representation of their members’ rights.197 This elucidates 
that there can be different roles that a trade union can play without having its members resort to 
strike action. Consequently, O Regan J was not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence 
submitted by the respondents to prove that the discipline and efficiency of the defense forces 
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would be undermined if members joined trade unions on the basis of consultation and 
representation.198 On the contrary, it may prove that the discipline and efficiency of the defense 
force would be enhanced if members are allowed to engage in trade union participation as there 
would be adequate channels to address grievances, disputes and complaints.199 The CC held 
decided that in order to give effect to members’ rights to engage in acts of public protest and the 
participation in trade union activity, it was essential that the prohibition against protest action 
and trade union be severed from the provision. Consequently, members would be entitled to 
engage in acts relating to public protest, and trade union formation but not industrial action.200 
The case of SANDU supra effectively illustrates that it is possible to allow workers within 
essential services to advance their rights through trade union formation and protest action 
without eroding the fundamental purpose of the defense force.201 The CC in this regard had to 
ensure the purpose of the defense force which is to maintain the strictest form of discipline that 
would ensure the safety and security of all who reside within the country.202 In the dissenting 
judgment of L Heureux-Dube J it was stated that the country’s national defense as well as the 
international objectives to maintain peace would be unreachable if the defense force did not 
adhere to the strictest levels of discipline.203 The judiciary however is compelled to balance the 
interests of society with the fundamental rights of all citizens204 in order to prevent differential 
treatment.205 However, the judiciary has to also be mindful that disruption caused within 
essential services is more detrimental than disruptions which occur in any other sector due to 
vital services tendered by these employees.206 Therefore, O Regan J has highlighted that even 
though members of the defense force may engage in trade union participation and protest action, 
it is essential to ensure that adequate frameworks are implemented to regulate these rights in 
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order to prevent any disruption to strict discipline, as it would be harmful to the country as a 
whole if this was not done.207 
5.5. THE METHODS OF CONTROLLING AND DETERRING UNPROTECTED 
STRIKE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa has been overwhelmed by a torrent of strike activity in various sectors. These 
strikes have been noted for their violence and destruction.208 This is extremely disturbing as the 
LRA has enshrined specific provisions to regulate strike activity so as to prevent such criminal 
activity.209 As was previously discussed, there are a number of protections given to lawful 
strikes.  However, there are also a number of measures which are implemented when employees 
engage in unlawful strikes. Such consequences are enforced to deter illegal strike activity.210 It is 
thus imperative to discuss the provisions of the LRA which entrench consequences for 
unprotected conduct during strikes and their implementation through the LC and the LAC. 
It must be noted that the essential purpose of a strike is to engage in power play that would lead 
to improved working terms and conditions for the employee.211 When employees engage in 
protected strikes they do not commit delicts or breaches of their employment contract.212 
However, if a strike is illegal and unprotected, the LRA has provided various measures to control 
and deter unlawful conduct by strikers.213 The LC has extensive jurisdiction to deal with every 
illegal action committed by strikers whether the illegal action takes the form of a delict or a 
crime.214 The effect of the dismissal of strikers who engage in unprotected strikes is that such 
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dismissal results in the termination of the employment relationship which takes effect 
immediately upon the strikers’ dismissal.215 
The first method of deterring unprotected strike action is through  the LC which has been 
afforded extended jurisdiction to grant interdicts or orders of restraint that would effectively 
prevent individuals and organisations who engage in illegal strikes.216 However, such an interdict 
cannot be granted unless the respondent has given the applicant 48 hours notice.217 This does not 
mean that the court is rigidly bound to this rule. The LC may use its discretion in circumstances 
where the health and safety of citizens necessitate that a shorter notification period of the 
interdict should be given to the respondent.218 In some extreme circumstances notice may be 
verbally supplied.219 However, the key element for granting an interdict is to prove that urgency 
is required to prevent harm that may be caused by the unprotected strikers’ actions.220 
There are a number of immunities that are given to individuals who perform tasks within the 
course of their union functions.221 The LRA provides that members, officials, union officials and 
office bearers cannot be held personally responsible for losses which are incurred in pursuance of 
union activities. However, such immunity from liability is only provided if the act or omission is 
undertaken in good faith.222 This is a highly imperative section as there has been an increase in 
violent strike activity by trade unions.223 This section emphasises that if such individuals were to 
engage in violence, intimidation and destruction of property, such individuals would be acting 
                                                          
215 FGWU &  v Minister of Safety and Security & others [1999] (4) BLLR 332 (LC) at 21. 
216 The LRA, s 68(1)(a), Sappi Fine Papers (Pty) Ltd (Adams Mill) v PPWAWU & others [1997] 10 BLLR 1373 
(SE), Coin Security Group v SA National Union for Security Forces 1998 (1) SA 685 (C), Mondi Paper (a Division 
of Mondi Ltd) v Paper, Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union & others (1997) 18 ILJ 84 (D), Fourways Mall 
(PTY) Ltd & another v SA Catering & Allied Workers Union & another (1999) 20 ILJ 1008 (W), Administrator of 
Transvaal & another v Theletsane & others 1991 (2) SA 192 (A), Ex Parte Consolidated Fine Spinners & Weavers 
Ltd (1987) 8 ILJ 97 (D). 
217 The LRA, s 68 (2). 
218 The LRA, s 68(2)(a)-(c). 
219 Enforce Guarding (Pty) Ltd v NASUWU & others [2003] 1 BLLR 9 (LC).  
220 Edgars Stores Ltd v SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and others (1992) 13 ILJ 177 (IC), Blow 
Molders v NUMSA and others (case NHN 12/3/316 unreported), East Rand Plastics (Pty) Ltd v SACWU and others 
(case NH 12/3/693 unreported). 
221 F Barchiesi ‘Privatization and the historical trajectory of “Social Movement Unionism”: A case study of 
municipal workers in Johannesburg, South Africa’ (2007) 71(1) International Labor and Working-Class History 51.  
222 The LRA, s 97 (3). 
223 Ncgobo v FAWU [2012] 10 BLLR 1035, V Gosai ‘When a union fails its members’ 2013 Without Prejudice 68, 
‘Dear ANC, you’re failing. Love COSATU’ Daily Maverick 7 September 2012 at [2], available at 
http://dailymaverick.co.za, accessed on 7 September 2015. 
155 
 
mala fide and would consequently lose the protection afforded by the LRA.224 In Langeveldt v 
Vryburg Transitional Local Council & others,225 the court expressed a point in passing that 
where strikers engage in criminal acts of violence, assault, intimidation and damage to property 
the employer is entitled to seek recourse from the law to protect the interests of its non-striking 
employees, its customers, suppliers and property as well as implement discipline on those 
employees who have engaged in acts of misconduct.226 The LRA provides that employees who 
engage in unprotected strikes may be interdicted from engaging in misconduct such as violence, 
intimidation or damage of property, they may be dismissed, locked-out or they may be liable for 
compensation in instances where they have been proven to have caused damage.227 
The first case in which the High Court effusively dealt with criminal acts during a strike relating 
to intimidation of non-striking employees, harassment and violence was in Mondi Paper (a 
division of Mondi Ltd) v Paper, Printing, Wood & Allied Workers Union & others.228 The 
applicant sought and obtained an interim interdict preventing the employees from engaging in 
criminal behavior such as sabotage and intimidation of non-striking employees during a picket. 
On the return date, the court was called to determine whether the High Court had jurisdiction as 
well as whether the rule nisi should be extended.229 In terms of the issue pertaining to 
jurisdiction, Nicholson J held that the LC possessed the required jurisdiction to deal with the 
illegal actions of the employees.230 
However, in terms of the second issue regarding the rule nisi, the LC had concerns relating to 
application. In the application to the court, the employer could not identify any of the 
respondents who it alleged was in contempt of the interim order. Therefore, the cited respondents 
in the application was based on the criteria that excluded those employees who at the start of the 
strike had absented themselves from work and since then had returned to their posts, but included 
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those workers who absented themselves from work and did not return.231 The applicant 
acknowledged that the respondents cited in the application may have included those who did not 
engage in criminal acts. Thus, the applicant was not seeking final relief against the innocent 
parties who could be distinguished before the return day of the rule nisi.232 
The LC emphasised that the effect of a court order is tantamount to the enactment of legislation 
concerning the parties mentioned in an order of court.233 Nicholson J stated that the present 
application would place innocent non-strikers in danger of having committed the crime of 
contempt of court.234 The court reasoned that there were many employees who merely stayed at 
home and were not part of the picket. Therefore, to bring a class action, as proposed by the 
applicant, against all the employees without showing a cause of action would be incorrect. The 
only common action which all employees engaged in was that of not reporting for work. There is 
no justification for bringing a contempt of court application against an individual where no proof 
has been established.235 If this was allowed then the criminal court would appropriately assume 
that the order was correctly granted. Therefore, the onus would rest on the innocent non-strikers 
to prove that the interim order should not have been granted. This is a reversal of the onus of 
proof and is contrary to the essence of criminal justice which requires that he who alleges must 
prove.236 The applicant’s argument which was perceived by Nicholson J implied that where there 
were innocent non-participants of a strike as well as participants who did commit acts of 
violence, sabotage and intimidation then a different level of proof in orders should be applied.237 
In this regard, the court stated that this was a shocking proposal without any authority for such a 
suggestion.238 
The court described that intimidation of non-striking employees and blockading access to the 
business premises was an “evil” that should not be accepted. However, this evil should be 
weighed against another evil which is committed against non-participants when the court 
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authorises orders without evidence.239 The former evil, as held by Nicholson J, does not have 
such severe ramifications as the latter evil. The latter would cause the entire justice system to 
lose the trust and reverence of society if it enforces orders against individuals who have been 
identified as innocent non-participants. On this basis the LC could not discharge the rule nisi and 
hold the respondents in contempt of court.240 
The LC’s judgment indicates that in order for a contempt of court application to succeed there 
must be proper identification of the perpetrators that connects them to the acts of violence, 
intimidation and sabotage.241 The court is unwilling to construe an allegation of contempt lightly 
and discharges the onus on the applicant to show proof that the cited respondents in the 
application are in contempt of court.242 It is insufficient to merely prove that a crime or some 
form of misconduct has taken place. An applicant has to also prove the identity of the perpetrator 
of the crime.243 
The most significant point which can be extracted from Mondi Paper supra is that there must be 
an inextricable link between the identity of the strikers and the misconduct that they are alleged 
to have committed, as was further affirmed in Mondi Ltd (MondiKraft Division) v Chemical 
Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union & others.244 The evidence presented by 
Mondi in its application referred to a number of people who ran through the employer’s mill 
wearing civilian clothing, some of which were alleged to have turned off the emergency buttons 
on numerous machines.245 Only one individual from that group was identified, however, the only 
evidence against the individual is that he ran through the mill and did not stop when he heard his 
name being called. Apart from this evidence there was nothing to prove that he had switched off 
the emergency buttons. Thus, Francis J held that this was insufficient to ascertain that he or 
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anyone else was responsible. On this basis the final order confirming the rule nisi could not be 
made as there was a lack of evidence to identify the individual as the perpetrator.246 
The decision held by Francis J is further elaborated in Polyoak (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union & others,247 where the applicants applied for an interdict against all the strikers, 
even though the application alleged misconduct against only specific employees within the group 
of strikers.248 Brassey JA held that if there is no evidence to prove that an individual has 
committed acts of misconduct or is an accomplice to such acts, then an interdict cannot be 
brought against this individual.249 This is the correct position of our law even though that 
individual may be part of a group engaging in malefactors or even if his interests are advanced 
by the group of workers engaging in misconduct. Our law does not provide for collective guilt as 
it is unjust to convict one individual based on the actions of the group when no proof has been 
leveled against him.250 The LC further elaborated in Polyoak supra that if an interdict properly 
identifies a potential perpetrator and specifically places their actions under restraint then it would 
emphasise the purpose of an interdict and the authority of the court to exact the full force of the 
law for their non-compliance.251 However, an interdict would be discriminatory and a disregard 
to the principles of due process if it is granted without proper identification of the perpetrators 
that links the individual to the wrongful acts. This would lead to injustice and the devaluing of 
the justice system.252 
The court in Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union & 
others,253 confirmed the decision in Polyoak supra by deciding that to grant interdicts against 
individuals who have not been proven to be linked to the misconduct is simply wrong.254 The 
court has conveyed that they are sympathetic towards employers who experience violence during 
industrial action; however, this does not mean that interdicts will and should be granted on that 
basis alone. There must be due consideration to limitations that have to be in place which pertain 
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to when an interdict should be granted.255 The court is unwilling to grant ‘blanket’ interdicts that 
cover a whole group of people without exact identification of the individuals who are alleged to 
have committed the misconduct.256 
In Sappi Fine Papers (Pty) Ltd (Adams Mill) v Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union & 
others,257 Nepen J affirmed the judgment in Mondi Paper supra, regarding the fact that the LC 
possessed exclusive jurisdiction to provide relief to any strike that falls under s 68 (1) of the 
LRA.258 However, Nupen J was silent as to whether the jurisdiction of the LC extended to grant 
relief in circumstances where non-strikers are intimidated and harassed at their homes.259 This is 
highly pertinent as Nicholson J’s judgment Mondi Paper supra confirms that the onus of proving 
the respondents’ guilt rests with the employer. The judgment further indicates that the employer, 
especially considering the advancements in technology, ought to take steps to ensure that it can 
provide valid proof in the event of misconduct during a strike. This statement implies that the 
employer could have obtained the use of cameras as a means of recording the unlawful 
conduct.260 Although, Nicholson J makes no mention as to the relief that intimidated employees 
may resort to in the event that they encounter intimidation or harassment at their homes.261 This 
is regrettable as a majority of cases involving intimidation and attacks on non-strikers or their 
families occur outside the business premises and thus exceeds the boundaries where employers 
may take measures to prove the perpetrators wrongdoings.262 Whereas it may be within the 
ability of the employer to take measures to provide proof of misconduct in the workplace, the 
suggestion made by Nicholson J proffers no recourse or process for obtaining relief against the 
injustice suffered by non-strikers.263 
The next consequence which follows from an unprotected strike is that the employer may claim 
compensation against the union who is deemed to have initiated the unprotected strike.264 In 
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Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Mouthpiece Workers Union,265 the court illustrated how the 
LRA should be interpreted to provide a ‘just and equitable’ sum for compensating an employer 
where a union has initiated and furthered an unprotected strike. On 19 April 2000 the employer 
received a report indicating that its workforce intended to engage in a strike. There were various 
attempts made by the employer to communicate with the union regarding the employees’ 
disputes, although these attempts were in vain.266 The strike commenced on the 20th of April 
2000, however, the union only met with the employer during the latter part of 21st April.267 
During the course of the events, mass meetings were held by the union encouraging workers not 
to return to work until their demands were met.268 The employer accordingly obtained an 
interdict on the 21st of April and consequently NUM distanced itself from the strike.269 During a 
further meeting held by the employer with the union it was conveyed to the union that the 
employer believed that the union had instigated the strike. The union did not dispute this 
allegation.270 Subsequent to this meeting, the union called off the strike and instructed the 
workers to return to work.271 As a result of the strike the damages incurred by the employer due 
to a loss of production and profits amounted to R 15 370 000, although the employer limited its 
claim to R100 000.272 
 
Farber AJ considered the facts of the case in light of s 68 of the LRA which allows an employer 
to claim compensation for the damages incurred as a result of an unprotected strike under the 
authority of a union.273 The court analysed the first requirement which requires an investigation 
into whether there were any attempts that were made to comply with the provisions of chapter 
five of the LRA which outline the process for a protected strike.274 Farber AJ held that the union 
had instigated the strike as it had hosted a mass meeting with the employees’ encouraging them 
not to return to work until their demands were met.275 Furthermore, the union did not deny any 
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claim by the union that it had instigated the strike. Farber AJ reasoned that the fact that the union 
failed to make any vocal submission to oppose the allegation essentially deduced one to believe 
that the allegation was true.276 
In light of the second requirement which requires an investigation into whether the strike was 
premeditated,277 the LC held that it was indeed premeditated. Farber AJ acknowledged that it 
was highly improbable that there were two strikes which commenced at the same time 
considering that the mines were situated 26 kilometers apart.278 The third requirement questions 
whether there was any unjustified conduct on the part of the employer.279 In this regard, Farber 
AJ held that the employer had made every attempt to consider the demands of the union and to 
conduct meetings with the union. There was no evidence to prove that the employer had not 
taken the union’s demands seriously or that it was unwilling to negotiate to resolve the 
dispute.280 In fact it was the union who was unwilling to negotiate with the employer and deemed 
any communication with such as a waste of time.281 
The LRA also compels the employer to prove whether there was any compliance to the interdict 
granted by the court.282 In terms of this provision there are three aspects that the court has to 
consider. The first aspect pertains to the interests of collective bargaining.283 The court in this 
regard was of the view that the unprotected strike was of a serious nature as it had led to the loss 
of approximately R15 million.284 Farber AJ also reasoned that the behavior of the union was 
completely unacceptable in light of the interests of security within a workplace that necessitate 
stable and controlled actions in accordance to the law. When parties resort to their own strategies 
to resolve disputes such as the instigation and participation in illegal strikes it erodes the 
foundations of collective bargaining, it prejudices the innocent parties involved as well as 
impacts on the economy as a whole.285 The second aspect which has to be weighed by the court 
                                                          
276 Benoni Produce & Coal Co Ltd v Gundelfinger 1918 TPD 453, Benefit Cycle Works v Atmore 1927 TPD 524, 
East Asiatic Co (SA) Ltd v Midlands Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1954 (2) SA 387 (C).  
277 The LRA; s 68(1)(b)(bb). 
278 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Mouthpiece Workers Union supra note 265 at 2042H-I. 
279 The LRA; s 68(1)(b)(cc). 
280 Rustenburg Platinum Mines supra note 265 at 2044A-J. 
281 Rustenburg Platinum Mines supra note 265 at 2044G. 
282 The LRA; s 68(1)(b)(dd). 
283 The LRA; s 68(1)(b)(dd) (ii). 
284 Rustenburg Platinum Mines supra note 265 at 2045D-E. 
285 Rustenburg Platinum Mines supra note 262 at 2045D-E. 
162 
 
is that of the duration of the strike. In Rustenburg supra the union in this regard did instruct the 
employees to return to work which resulted in the short duration of the strike.286 The last aspect 
that the court is compelled to consider is the financial position of the parties. Farber AJ held that 
the union was in a very strong financial position as compared to the union who was barely 
solvent. However, this could be resolved by providing a structured payment schedule that would 
suit the financial position of the union without prejudicing the employer’s claim for 
compensation.287 
After an assessment regarding the facts of the case in light of the provisions of the LRA, the 
court awarded the employer R100 000 in compensation to be paid by the union in monthly 
installments of R5000.288 The case of Rustenburg supra clearly elucidates that the court is 
limited to the provisions of s 68 of the LRA and may not grant compensation for the entire 
amount suffered as was permitted under the common law, but is only constrained to 
compensation that is ‘just and equitable’ based on the factors that are enshrined by the LRA.289 
The decision of Farber AJ is an exemplary portrayal of how the LC should assess all the factors 
of the case in its entirety and then based on this assessment, the court should make a decision on 
which side the scale tilts. The award that is ‘just and equitable’ must reflect this balance.290 
However, in Mangaung Municipality v SA Municipality Workers Union,291 the court provided a 
further criterion in addition to those enshrined in s 68 of the LRA by holding that a union can be 
held liable not only for initiating an unlawful strike, but also for not taking any steps to end the 
strike.292 The court stated that as a result of the relationship that manifests itself during the course 
of collective bargaining, a union has the responsibility to prevent an illegal strike and where such 
does occur then the union is liable for any damages suffered by the employer.293 Furthermore, 
the union is also liable to compensate the employer if it commissions its representatives to end 
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illegal strike activity and such representatives fail to do so.294  The court reasoned that in light of 
the relationship that exists between the employer and the union as a consequence of collective 
bargaining, the union undertakes responsibility for the actions of its members and their 
compliance with the LRA especially when they engage in strike action.295 
The effect of a protected strike is that it gives way to the temporary suspension of an employee’s 
employment contract.296 If an employer dismisses an employee for engaging in a protected 
strike, this would amount to an automatically unfair dismissal.297 However, where an employee 
engages in illegal strike action an employer is entitled to effect disciplinary action against the 
employee which is a lesser sanction than actual dismissal.298 This may take the form of 
ultimatums to return to work, provided that such ultimatums are backed by the threat of final 
warnings.299 The court will not come to the assistance of dismissed strikers who engaged in 
illegal conduct during an unprotected strike and ignore ultimatums and warnings to return to 
work.300 In regard to final warnings, the case of National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others 
v Atlantis Forge (Pty) Ltd,301 provided an excellent understanding on how final warnings and 
consequent dismissals should be discharged. The employees of Atlantis Forge engaged in a strike 
as a result of a rumour regarding the late pay of annual bonuses. A strike ensued and employees 
were issued with a final warning on the basis that it was an unprotected strike.302 However, 
employees who had previously been given warnings for a strike in February 2002 underwent 
disciplinary proceedings for their participation in the present strike. Consequently, these 
employees were dismissed and approached the court for relief on the basis that their dismissals 
were procedurally and substantively unfair.303 
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The court in this instance mentioned that the final warnings given to employees for their strike in 
February 2002 had lapsed in terms of the disciplinary code. The employer was under a duty to 
destroy such warnings after a period of 6 months had lapsed. The court accordingly held that 
their dismissals were unfair.304 It was noted that the present strike did not in any way include acts 
of violence or any other criminal behavior; therefore, the employer was enforcing the 
disciplinary procedure based on their participation in the strike during February 2002. This was 
entirely incorrect as the employer was initiating disciplinary proceedings on a basis that had 
expired and could no longer be enforced.305 Accordingly, the court held that if the employer 
wanted to enforce disciplinary proceedings then it had to do so within the period specified by the 
Disciplinary Code that bound the employer and the employees. The dismissals of the employees 
were held to be unfair.306 
This case effectively illustrates that when employees engage in misconduct; their previous 
actions cannot be held against them. Furthermore, there was a prescribed period of time for 
which the employer could have initiated disciplinary proceeding, but failed to do so. The 
dismissed employees should not be prejudiced for the employer’s failure to adhere to the 
disciplinary code.307 It must be noted that dismissals preceding final warnings for unrelated 
issues to that of an unprotected strike will not be upheld by our courts.308 Furthermore, an 
employer must give the employees sufficient time to respond to the ultimatum before effecting 
the illegal strikers’ dismissal.309 It would be unfair to the employees if the employer issued an 
ultimatum that the employees could not comply with.310 
An employer is entitled to dismiss an employee provided that this action follows fair procedure 
in accordance to the Code of Good Practice (the Code).311 The employer must take all steps to 
ensure that the dismissal follows fair procedure and that it engages in dialogue with the union 
before effecting such dismissals or implementing any unilateral decision.312 The Code stipulates 
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the requirements which have to be met when regarding whether the dismissal was fair.313 The 
postulation for the enforcement of dismissal is a result of the employees’ failure to comply with 
the conciliatory framework provided for in the LRA.314 Essentially, this form of ‘punishment’ is 
to dissuade employees from engaging in illegal strikes as such employees had no cause to resort 
to illegal activity when there are proper channels to follow to resolve a dispute.315 The courts in 
this instance have required that strikers provide adequate reasons as to why they engaged in an 
illegal strike.316 It must be noted that this illegality of engaging in an unprotected strike must not 
merely be of a technical nature, but rather there must be a material breach in non-compliance 
with the conciliatory framework of the LRA.317 Where strikers engage in an unprotected strike as 
the union believed that the conciliatory framework would be too slow to resolve the matter, the 
employees bear the consequences of their unlawful actions.318 
Therefore, in terms of the requirement that there must be a material breach, the court must be 
satisfied that the illegal strike was not a mere short cessation of work319 as a result of misconduct 
or gross inequality on the part of the employer.320 In these circumstances the court may be 
willing to tilt the scale in the favour of the employees.321 However, there are various factors 
which the court takes into consideration. The most significant is whether the avenues to resolve 
the dispute were not appropriate to them and such alternatives were exhausted.322 The court will 
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also consider the financial loss incurred by the employer and his financial position.323 The court 
on the other hand will not be willing to assist employees who blatantly ignore the instructions of 
their unions and engage in violence, assault and intimidation during such unprotected strike 
activity.324 There are instances when the court will not at all be willing to assist employees. 
These instances would be when employees are interdicted from engaging in illegal strike action 
and nevertheless ignore such interdict.  The effect of the dismissal of strikers who engage in 
unprotected strikes is that such dismissal results in the termination of the employment 
relationship which takes effect immediately upon the strikers’ dismissal.325 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the above discussion that there are clear and precise procedures stipulated by 
the LRA in s 65 for engaging in lawful strikes. However, there have been instances where the 
legislature has been silent on specific issues, which has necessitated that the judiciary interprets 
such provisions in light of orderly collective bargaining.326 Furthermore, as was abundantly clear 
from the LRA’s prohibitions on how strikes must be conducted and that the court is unyielding 
towards employees who defy these prohibitions. The Judiciary in this regard as was conveyed is 
willing to award compensation for an employee’s lack of compliance.327 The reality of the 
situation however, is that even though these guidelines are endorsed in legislature, there is still 
great divergence from these provisions that govern an employee’s conduct during a strike.328 
These incidents will be discussed in the next chapter, Chapter six. 
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The transition from apartheid into a new South Africa was believed by many to mark the end of 
violence and bloodshed through the establishment of mediation and the institution of 
constitutional values.1 However, this has not been the reality as South Africa has been termed the 
‘strike capital of the world’, and this  is reasonably justified as in recent years the country has 
been overcome by a surge in service delivery and labour protests that have been accompanied by 
violence, intimidation, harassment and civil unrest.2 It has been noted that the majority of these 
strikes are unprotected and have inculcated an aura of fear, intimidation and catastrophic 
violence.3 It has become apparent that even though there is an excessive amount of chaos and 
disruption during such strikes, these strikes are not only protracted but also conclude with 
dissatisfactory compromises that often result in further strike action.4 Even after years of the 
implementation of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the LRA), the 
Department of Labour has recorded a steady increase in strikes with an account of 51 strikes in 
2009, 67 strikes in 2011, 99 in the year 2012 and a shocking 114 strike incidents in the year 
2013.5 In 2014, the Department of Labour recorded a total of 88 strikes. Even though the number 
of recorded strikes in 2014 decreased from the year 2013, the duration of the strikes in 2014 
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increased. The Department of Labour recorded that in 2013 there were 1.85 million work days 
lost as a result of strikes. In 2014, this figure soared to 10.3 million work days lost as a result of 
strikes.6    
 
6.2. A REPORT ON RECENT STRIKE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
It is imperative to note that the LRA has extensively promulgated legislature to control the 
enforcement of the right to strike, as was discussed at length in Chapter 5.7 However, there has 
been an overwhelming torrent of recent strike activity in South Africa that has been characterised 
by grievous criminal activity such as violence, intimidation, harassment, assault, death and 
contempt of court orders.8 An analysis of these strikes is thus essential to identify whether the 
provisions governing strike law are effective in controlling unlawful behavior by strikers.9 
Therefore, this section seeks to highlight the devastating and violent strikes that have brought the 
country to its knees.10 This discussion is focused on the time frame between the years 2005 and 
2015. The justification for focusing this report on this period is to analyse whether the LRA has 
been effective 10 years after coming into effect, as this would have provided an adequate phase 
for the implementation of the LRA within the new South Africa.  
 
The 2006 security guard strike was recorded at that time as being the most violent since the 
beginning of the new South Africa.11 The strike concerned the South African Transport and 
Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) over a wage increase of 11%. Government was only willing 
to offer 8%. The parties engaged in negotiations to no avail as the union was unwilling to accept 
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south-africa-r6-1-billion/, accessed on 28 December 2015. 
7 A Rycroft ‘Can a protected strike lose its status?’ (2012) 33 ILJ 821.  
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the offer of 8%.12 The violence escalated during mid-May when coaches of Metrorail were set 
alight and ticket offices petrol bombed. The damages to these coaches were nothing less than R4 
million. As a result of these appalling acts of violence, Metrorail was obliged to suspend their 
service to prevent threats to the lives of innocent commuters and further destruction of 
property.13 There had been reports of non-striking security guards being assaulted, intimidated 
and even murdered.14 The police were called upon on countless occasions to intervene when 
strikers began their attacks against fellow workers. It is imperative to note that these horrific acts 
of violence took place while an interim interdict was in force.15  
 
The largest strike after the beginning of the democratic era started on the 1st of June 2007 and 
lasted for 28 days.16 This strike involved over a million public sector employees after failed 
negotiations between Government and employees regarding wages, housing and medical 
benefits.17 The mass solidarity action resulted in a complete standstill of services as every sector 
of the country was paralysed by the disruptions that infiltrated taxi services, municipal services, 
electrical and cleaning services as well as administrators within the airports, border lines, vehicle 
licensing departments, labour offices and the deeds offices.18 The payment of social grants and 
pensions was also disrupted. Immigration officials engaged in the strike added pandemonium at 
international airports when flights had to be delayed or diverted.19 The strike was depicted as the 
most violent and inhumane strike since the end of apartheid.20  
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It was reported that nurses stormed wards and physically ripped patients’ drips from their arms. 
They intimidated and forced doctors and nurses to abandon their posts. These strikers were 
accordingly arrested.21 Although there are no exact reports concerning the extent of the 
disruption caused, it is evident that many patients were unable to collect their medication due to 
the closure of medical institutes.22 The striking workers would arm themselves with sjamboks, 
knobkerries and prevent fellow employees’ access to the workplace. In one hospital these armed 
strikers moved beyond the picket line and forced the entire hospital to hastily evacuate their 
workplace. The patients who were too sick had to be assisted out of the hospital and onto the 
street.23 It was former President Thabo Mbeki who echoed the sentiments of the country when he 
stated that the South Africa should question itself on the type of country and morals it seeks to 
establish when intimidation, violence and destruction to property become inherent to strike 
action.24 
 
In terms of the LRA,25 healthcare workers are not permitted to engage in protected strikes unless 
a minimum services agreement is concluded which would provide that only minimum services 
be regarded as essential.26 However, this strike did not merely deprive patients of healthcare 
services, but it also seeped into the education sector robbing children of their right to education.27 
Teachers were dominant participants of the strike. Schools were compelled to close their doors 
after teachers violently disrupted classrooms forcing fellow workers to join in the strike.28 This is 
extremely concerning as education is regarded as non-negotiable within advanced societies, but 
yet in South Africa the conduct of these strikers have diminished the value and time within 
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which learning takes place.29 These striking public sector employees were promised full pay and 
further benefits while engaged in the four week long strike, however, this promise was never 
materialised.30 The most far reaching consequence of the 2007 public sector strike was that it 
resulted in a loss of approximately R5.6 billion as a result of the 12 million work days lost.31 
 
In 2009 taxi drivers went on strike over the proposed implementation of the Bus Rapid Transit 
System. The strikers showed no mercy as innocent passengers were injured and killed when taxis 
and buses were petrol bombed.32 This was followed by more violence in 2010 as the taxi 
association engaged in further violent strikes. This strike was characterised by immense 
destruction to buses, shootings and the burning of tyres in and around the city.33  
 
Ironically, the longest devastating public sector strikes took place after South Africa’s hosting of 
the 2010 World Cup. In August 2010, public sector employees engaged in a ‘chaotic’ three week 
long strike over an increase in wages and housing allowance34 that was only suspended on the 6th 
of September 2010.35 Emphasis needs to be drawn to the fact that workers began strike action 
when they rejected Government’s offer of 7% increase in salary. It is indeed ironic that after a 
devastating three week strike Government only increased its offer by 0.5% of which was 
accepted after much negotiation, violence, intimidation and chaos.36 
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These striking workers included nurses, police officers, teachers, soldiers as well as other 
hospital employees.37 During the sixth day of the strike, the army had to be deployed to hospitals 
as striking workers began blocking the entrances to hospitals and physically assaulting fellow co-
workers who tried to enter. Strikers even went as far as to disrupt surgical theatres.38 It is quite 
evident that there is a grave problem, as court interdicts were granted preventing employees from 
essential services from engaging in strikes, yet strikers still continued. Moreover, employees 
were threatened with the weapon of dismissal. This as well did not have any affect in deterring 
the striking workers.39 It was reported that in the King Edward Hospital in Kwazulu-Natal, 
strikers prevented workers and patients from entering the hospital. The strikers only permitted 
patients who required antiretroviral medication to enter the hospital. This occurred even though 
there was an interdict in place prohibiting strikers from engaging in such conduct.40 Teachers not 
only disrupted classrooms, but matriculation students were behind in their preparation for trial 
examinations. Consequently, these examinations had to be postponed for a later date.41 
 
Union leaders “called for a complete shutdown of the public service”. Strikers used their chains 
and locks to lock out fellow workers who attempted to enter hospitals and other institutions. It 
was noted that not even during apartheid did the violent strikes prevent nurses, doctors and 
pharmacists from helping the sick.42 It is no doubt that the 2010 public sector strike caused 
insurmountable disruption and endangered the lives of many. However, more significantly to our 
third world country is that this strike is estimated to have cost the country R1 billion a day.43 
The most concerning issue regarding these strikes is not that they occur, but rather that they are 
characterised by violence and are a protracted battle. It was clearly highlighted that, 
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“[c]ivil servants have a right to strike in support of their wage demands. But striking teachers 
do not have the right to throttle school children, sjambok principles to disrupt schools, and 
health workers do not have the right to use threats of violence to keep hospitals closed”.44  
 
Another report on the public sector strike highlighted Government’s support and understanding 
for the plight of the striking employees, however, society and Government greatly condemned 
the violence and intimidation in which the strikers asserted their demands.45 The violence of the 
strikers was met with contempt by Government in the form of rubber bullets and water cannons 
on strikers by the second day of the strike.46 The 2010 public sector strike was yet again another 
illustration of non-compliance with the LRA that threatened to cripple our country. Violence and 
intimidation have become inherent to strikes. This strike, however, was merely a glimpse into 
South Africa’s worst strike in history.47 
In mid-February 2011, truck drivers embarked on a nationwide strike that sent shockwaves 
around the country as major retailers such as Pick n Pay and Checkers as well as many others 
were affected by not receiving their deliveries.48 The strike was marred by violent destruction to 
trucks and other property as well as grievous acts of murder and assault on innocent people. This 
violence was regarded by the spokesperson of the Road Freight Employers’ Association as being 
a tactic employed by strikers to force employers to agree to their demands.49   
 
The strike that has gone down in South African history as the most gruesome and bloodiest in 
South African history is that which has been branded the ‘Marikana Massacre’.50 The unrest 
began on the 9th of August 2012 as a wildcat strike at the Lonmin mines when miners downed 
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tools.51 The strike was initiated over a wage demand of R12 500 and a complaint over the 
hazardous working conditions. The strike was unprotected, which could have given way to the 
dismissal of these striking miners. Furthermore, the strike was not led by a union, but by a strike 
committee which was acting independently.52 There were numerous reports of violence and 
intimidation that had resulted in the loss of life. The violence continued for a week claiming the 
lives of at least nine people.53 This violence led to the bloodiest confrontation the country had 
experienced post-apartheid.54  
 
On 16 August 2012, police placed razor wire around the peaceful group of strikers and forced 
them out through an opening in the wire using stun grenades and tear gas as a weapon of force.55 
A special task team opened fire which resulted in the killing of 34 striking miners and fatal 
wounding 78 other miners.56 It is imperative to note that the shootings were initiated after 
strikers were ordered to disperse. Once shots were fired strikers began running away from 
policemen and started scattering. It is reported that many strikers were shot in their backs while 
trying to flee.57 The police brutality which robbed bereft families of their fathers, husbands and 
brothers left the international world aghast and South Africans mortified. It was abundantly clear 
that the use of force contradicted international and national standards.58  
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A highly significant point in terms of this dissertation is the consequent events which followed in 
Marikana’s wake. On the evening of 16 August, Lonmin miners on their own accord decided to 
continue the unprotected strike.59 This act of bravery or defiance, however one views it, was 
recorded as a momentous achievement for the unskilled workers of South Africa as it ultimately 
led Government to accede to the miners’ demands.60 The killings of Marikana provided the 
impetus which led to a series of unprotected wildcat strikes that lasted for six weeks and 
threatened to cripple the country’s economy.61 This resulted in the entire mining industry being 
engulfed by illegal strikes, all of which were characterised by violence and intimidation. The 
illegal strikes disrupted production at major mines such as Amplats, Goldfields KDC West mine, 
Anglo American and Gold One. A common factor amongst all strikers is that they demanded an 
exact salary hike and not simply an increased percentage.62  
 
These strikes not only caused major disruptions, but also a loss of production resulting in a 
serious knock on the economy. These illegal strikes raised an enormous question mark on the 
effectiveness of our dispute resolution system.63 The aftermath of Marikana, however, was not 
limited to only the mining industry. There were catastrophic strikes recorded in various other 
sectors of the country. There were reports of illegal sporadic work stoppages within the motor 
industry, the farming sector and even violent strikes by truckers.64 
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In November 2013, farm workers embarked on an unprotected strike demanding a minimum 
wage increase of R69 to R105 as well as that a programme regarding land reformation be 
implemented.65 Consequently, an interdict was granted by the Labour Court (LC) preventing the 
union, its officials and its members from causing damage to property, entering farms and 
intimidating non-strikers. Lastly, it ordered that strikers return to work.66 The strike was 
suspended pending negotiations between employers and workers, however, due to its  lack of 
success the strikers vowed that they would continue until their demands were met.67 The strikers 
continued unwaveringly in acts of violence such as setting tyres alight outside a police station 
and petrol bombing approximately 3000 wooden fruit bins, the farms and property of the farmers 
were destroyed.68 The towns worst affected by the strike were the biggest farming areas of 
Graubouw and De Doorns, whose business owners were compelled to close their doors after 
their shops were looted. The leaders of these towns admitted that they had lost complete control 
of the strike.69 The most horrific event of the farm workers strike was on the 9th of January when 
the N1 freeway outside De Doorns was blockaded by around 7000 strikers. The strikers began 
veld fires and destroyed buildings along that region and when they tried to move towards the 
town, the police tried to push back the strikers through the use of armored vehicles and rubber 
bullets. The strikers retaliated by throwing stones at the police.70 It is reported that this strike 
claimed the lives of four people, injured 68 police officials and 28 strikers. The expenses 
incurred as a result of damages to only police vehicles have been approximately R75 000. The 
strike also led to the arrest of 337 people from November 2013.71  
 
On 23 January 2014, platinum mine workers embarked on the largest platinum strike in the 
country which threatened to cripple mining giants Anglo American, Lonmin and Impala amongst 
other mining companies.72 The unions demanded a 15% wage increase, a one year contract, 
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R1000 housing benefit and the eradication of labour brokers.73 The strike that began in January 
2014 only ended in July that same year costing mine owners an estimated R 24 million loss and 
employees a R 10.6 million loss in wages.74 There were reports of strikers intimidating non-
strikers and barring them from reporting to work as well as the barricading of roads with rocks. 
The police were called in to intervene on numerous occasions and tried to disperse strikers with 
water cannons and rubber bullets.75  
 
In September 2015 violent protests by students wreaked havoc at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal (UKZN) campuses across the province over the allocation of financial aid, the intention to 
close the Registration Appeals Committee (RAC) and poor student accommodation.76 The strike 
was believed to have begun at the Westville campus but soon spread across all UKZN campuses. 
The South African Student Congress (SASCO) took full responsibility for initiating the strike 
and attempted to gather as many students as possible in support of the strike.77 After a week of 
violence, on the 8th of September 2015, an interdict preventing further protest action was granted 
by Judge Chetty in the Durban High Court. In terms of the order, students were prevented from 
intimidating, harassing, assaulting or causing harm to any person. They were also interdicted 
from removing and damaging UKZN property as well as preventing access to the university and 
instigating and organizing mass meetings on campus.78 However, this interdict did not deter 
strikers as there were reports of damage to buildings and the torching of UKZN vehicles at 
Westville campus. The roads around the campus were barricaded with stones preventing any 
access to the premises.79 There were also reports of damage to the buildings at residences on the 
Edgewood and Pietermaritzburg campus. A bus at the Pietermaritzburg campus was set alight 
along with campus vehicles leading to the arrest of two representatives of SASCO.80 The 
students at the Pietermaritzburg campus were asked to vacate residence as students went on a 
violent rampage throwing stones at cars in the vicinity of the campus and setting rubbish bins, 
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metal sheets and cars in the surrounding area of Allan Paton Avenue on fire. The roads in the 
vicinity of the campus were barricaded with concrete blocks. The police and ER24 had to be 
called in to contain the frenzy and attend to injuries as three security guards were taken hostage 
by students and assaulted.81 There were numerous arrests made in connection with these violent 
episodes.82 After a protracted battle, students and management reached consensus regarding 
some of their issues. However, the light at the end of the tunnel was soon dimmed when students 
embarked on a nationwide protest over a 10.5 % increase in fees for 2016 which has become 
famous as the ‘fees must fall’ campaign.83 This demand created a spate of riots throughout many 
universities in the country such as the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Wits University, 
University of Cape Town, Rhodes and Stellenbosch University, Fort Hare University and 
Pretoria University.84 There were reports of physical clashes between students and strikers which 
led to libraries being overtaken and their closure demanded by angry strikers. At the University 
of Pretoria campus, when the university’s vice chancellor did not arrive to address the students, 
strikers took to the street causing serious mayhem resulting in a standstill at Hatfield Road.85 The 
students demanded a national shutdown of all universities as they marched to the Union 
buildings and tried to enter the premises. The scenes reflected those of the apartheid era as police 
clashed with protesting students using pellet guns, grenades and tear gas to disperse the crowds.86 
   
After engaging in dialogue with vice chancellors of South African universities and student 
representative councils, President Jacob Zuma announced that fees will not increase for the 
academic year 2016.87 This, however, was a short lived victory as only one of the issues of 
protestors was resolved. The students then embarked on advancing their other demands such as 
free higher education and the end to outsourcing of workers at universities.88 There has been 
much analysis regarding this nationwide protest that has highlighted key defects within 
                                                          
81 A Umraw, K Pillay, C Pieterse & S Nsele ‘Students told to leave’ The Witness 18 September 2015 at 2. 
82 M Nxumalo ‘UKZN students spend holiday in jail’ Daily News 24 September 2015 at 3. 
83 C Peterson ‘UCT next target for ire raised by fees’ Cape Times 19 October 2015 at 1. 
84 Y Jadoo & S Tau ‘Fee protest boils over’ Citizen 22 October 2015 at 3. 
85 V Abreu ‘Hatfield campus chaos’ Citizen 22 October 2015 at 2. 
86 R Munusamy ‘Wake-up call’ Weekend Witness 24 October 2015 at 10. 
87 C Dodds ‘Fees fall… but it will cost you’ Sunday Tribune 25 October 2015 at 1. 
88 C Peterson ‘UCT defends outsourcing worker amid protests’ Cape Times 7 October 2015 at 3. 
179 
 
Government structures.89 However, Jacob Zuma has warned that these shortfalls are not an 
excuse for students’ use of violence and destruction of property in addressing their demands. It is 
evident from students’ conduct that this is a key element in obtaining resolutions to their 
demands.90  
 
6.3. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ILLEGAL STRIKES AND POSSIBLE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is abundantly evident from the report on strike activity that there are three prevalent features 
which are manifest in each of the strikes that have been discussed. The first characteristic is that 
the strikes included participants who are explicitly excluded from engaging in industrial action 
by the LRA.91 Secondly, there is an undeniable element of various forms of misconduct such as 
violence, intimidation, harassment, assault and death that has become synonymous with the 
enforcement of strikes.92 Lastly, there needs to be an analysis on how effective interdicts have 
been in controlling unlawful behaviour.93 It is also imperative to note that the report on recent 
strike activity included protests and wildcat strikes that exceeded the boundaries of the 
employment relationship and were strongly influenced by the strikers’ socio-economic 
challenges.94 However, this analysis centers only on the possible pitfalls and recommendations 
regarding the legal element of the LRA which may be a contributor to the increased level of 
violent strike activity.  
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6.3.1. ILLEGAL STRIKING BY EMPLOYEES WHO ARE PROHIBITED BY THE LRA 
 
In terms of the first issue, the LRA seeks to control strike action within essential services by 
explicitly prohibiting employees within essential and maintenance sectors from engaging in 
strike activity.95 Employees within these sectors are required to refer their disputes for arbitration 
and adjudication rather than having to resort to industrial action.96 In addition to the LRA 
prohibiting striking of workers in essential services, it indicates the possible punishment of 
illegal strikers which can be effected either through dismissal or a final warning.97 The LRA has 
also stipulated that such dismissal must follow a guideline on how it should be carried out.98 It 
does not, however, indicate that the employer is compelled to execute discipline against such 
behavior.99   
 
The LRA does not specifically stipulate any procedures for enforcing discipline on healthcare 
workers who engage in strikes as this is regulated by the respective regulations healthcare 
workers are required to adhere to. The National Council of Nurses compels all nurses to comply 
with a code of conduct and stipulates the punishment on nurses who do not comply.100 The code 
of conduct requires that nurses should at all times maintain an environment that is conducive to 
the health and welfare of their patients that is “free from neglect and malpractice and free of 
harassment and intimidation”.101 In light of the recent public sector strikes as discussed above, 
nurses were in severe breach of this ethical principle, as industrial action by nursing staff was a 
violation of their patients’ right to non-violent and uninterrupted treatment.102 The violence and 
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intimidation used by nurses during strike activity do not portray the values entrenched by the 
Nursing Council.103 
 
It must be noted that doctors are also obliged to adhere to an ethical guideline enshrined by the 
Ethical Rules of Conduct for Practitioners registered under the Health Professions Act 56 of 
1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Health Professions Act).104 The Health Professional Council 
of South Africa (HPCSA), which has been established under the Health Professions Act, acts as 
a watchdog within the professional field of doctors and is empowered to investigate matters of 
misconduct even if they have not been referred by the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Health 
Department.105 However, it is thus surprising that not one of the 16 ethical guidelines entrenched 
by the HPCSA indicates that strike action is deemed to be unethical.106 This alone indicates that 
there is a failure to reflect the prohibitions of the LRA in ethical guidelines that regulate the 
conduct of healthcare workers.107 The failure of the HPCSA to indicate that the participation in 
strike action is regarded as misconduct together with the withdrawal of charges against doctors 
by the KZN Health Department, conveys a latent attitude towards enforcing disciplinary 
proceedings against them.108 This could be a contributing factor as to why healthcare workers 
lack deterrence from participating in strikes, as if penalties are not enforced against healthcare 
workers for participating in strikes then there would be no discouragement from engaging in 
such conduct.109  
The problem with using dismissal as a weapon of deterrence against illegal strikes is that once a 
violent strike is over there is so much instability that the employer is afraid of contributing 
further to the volatile atmosphere that they do not sanction the unlawful conduct of the 
strikers.110 Moreover, this questions the practicality of the provision entrenched in the LRA as it 
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allows for the dismissal of hundreds of doctors, nurses and law enforcement officers who offer 
services that are vital and without these services our society would suffer irreparable harm.111 
 
6.3.2. THE INHERENT ATTRIBUTE OF VIOLENCE IN STRIKE ACTIVITY 
 
The second issue which can be extracted from the report on strike activity is that of the violence 
and criminal behavior which is inherent in strike action. The most gruesome and horrific acts of 
violence which have been equated with the Marikana strike have been the long winded case of 
Food & Allied Workers Union obo Kapesi & others v Premier Foods Limited t/a Blue Ribbon 
Salt River.112 The discussion of the pertinent issues that this case raises will be dealt with after an 
explanation of when the matter was heard in the LC under Basson J. Thereafter, the explanation 
of Kapesi supra will continue to when the matter was heard in the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) 
under Landman AJA and then to the LC under Steenkamp J where the matter was brought to the 
LC on a second occasion. In the initial proceedings in the LC, FAWU called for a protected 
strike as a result of failed negotiations. The protected strike, however, was flawed by heinous 
acts of violence and dreadful criminal conduct.113 It is alleged that non-strikers received death 
threats, their homes and cars were fire-bombed, witnesses of the violence were intimidated and 
one in particular was murdered after an identification of the perpetrators. There was also a 
conspiracy to have the director of the company assassinated. The employer obtained an interdict 
preventing such violence and after an agreement was reached, the strikers returned to work. 114 
Subsequently, strikers were suspended pending a disciplinary hearing regarding their conduct 
during the strike. On the day of the disciplinary hearing, the employer’s key witness did not 
arrive. The employer then decided on a basis of lack of evidence that it would proceed with the 
matter as a s 189 process.115 It is imperative to distinguish, at this point, that in terms of a 
disciplinary hearing, the employer is required to prove the guilt of the employees on the basis of 
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their misconduct. The process entrenched in s 189 does not require the employer to prove fault 
on the part of the employees. This was extremely important as without the key witness to testify 
at the disciplinary hearing the employer would not have been able to prove the fault of the 
strikers who engaged in misconduct.116 A notice was sent to the union informing it of the 
intention to effect the dismissal of the striking employees as contemplated by s 189 proceedings 
and due to the fact that it could not engage in disciplinary hearings for lack of oral evidence. 
There were meetings under the auspices of the CCMA which led to the dismissal of the 
suspended employees. The union then brought an unfair dismissal application against the 
employer.117 The union argued that this dismissal was procedurally and substantively unfair. The 
employer argued that it was compelled to resort to dismissal as the violence committed during 
the strike threatened the running of the business and necessitated the retrenchment of the 
employees. The case of the employer, however, did not succeed in the LC, as there was no case 
made regarding the link between the misconduct and the operational requirements.118 
 
The first issue which Basson J considered in the LC was whether hearsay evidence could be used 
in disciplinary proceedings.119 This issue is pertinent as it illustrates how the LRA could be 
interpreted to ensure effective control of strikes. The participation of employees in illegal strikes 
permits an employer to effect discipline in the form of dismissal. However, in order to do so the 
employer is required to prove fault on the part of the employee during a disciplinary hearing.120 
This may be problematic as witnesses who have already experienced threats and harassment are 
too scared to provide oral evidence for fear of further victimization as was evident in the case of 
Kapesi supra.121  This recommendation conveys how the LC could deal with practical issues of 
intimidation and harassment, as it is usually difficult during a violent strike to identify 
perpetrators through oral evidence.  
 
                                                          
116 A Rycroft ‘The legal regulation of strike misconduct: The Kapesi Decisions (2013) 34 ILJ 859 861. 
117 Food & Allied Workers Union obo Kapesi supra note 112 at 1656. 
118 Food & Allied Workers Union obo Kapesi supra note 112 at 1656. 
119 Food & Allied Workers Union obo Kapesi supra note 112 at 1672[40]. 
120 R I Abrams & D R Nolan ‘Toward a theory of ‘Just cause’ in employee discipline cases’ (1985) 3 Duke Law 
Journal 595. 
121 Food & Allied Workers Union obo Kapesi supra note 112 at 1666[6]. 
184 
 
Basson J referred the court to Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA & 
others,122 to illustrate an appropriate guideline for conducting a disciplinary hearing. It was 
stated that the previous LRA prescribed a process for such hearings that was akin to the 
requirements of a criminal trial.123 The new LRA does not confer such “onerous procedural 
requirements” as was indicated in the draft Bill that stated: 
“The draft Bill requires a fair, but brief, pre-dismissal procedure. . . . [It] opts for this more 
flexible, less onerous, approach to procedural fairness for various reasons: small employers, of 
whom there are a very large number, are often not able to follow elaborate pre-dismissal 
procedures; and not all procedural defects result in substantial prejudice to the employee.”124  
 
Therefore, the court stated that it was unnecessary to comply with all the requirements which are 
characteristic of the case of a criminal trial. This would effectively exclude the rules pertaining to 
the law of evidence.125 Consequently, a Commissioner is obliged to apply a standard that does 
not require that evidence be proved on any other standard other than on a balance of 
probability.126 This essentially allows one to deduce that pre-dismissal hearings are entitled to be 
flexible as was emphasised in Food & Allied Workers Union & others v C G Smit Sugar Ltd, 
Noodsberg.127 The learned Judge De Kock M stated that the reason for this was that fair hearings 
require that all evidence be presented.128 There are situations where the interests of the parties 
concerned and the interests of fair labour relations necessitate that procedure are flexibly 
complied with, such as when there is real fear of danger or intimidation then an employee should 
not be required to face his or her perpetrator. In such circumstances, it is permissible for 
witnesses to testify behind camera.129 There are numerous precedents which postulate that fear, 
intimidation, threats of danger and potential harassment are valid reasons for an employee to be 
exempted from providing oral evidence.130 The witnesses in Kapesi supra had provided written 
statements indicating the violent conduct of individuals but were unwilling to testify because 
                                                          
122 Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA & others (2006) 27 ILJ 1644 (LC). 
123 Avril Elizabeth Home supra note 122 at 1651J-1652A. 
124 Avril Elizabeth Home supra note 122 at 1652E-F. 
125 Avril Elizabeth Home supra note 122 at 1652G. 
126 Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA & others (1999) 20 ILJ 2679 (LC), Markhams (A Divion of Foshini Retail 
Group (Pty) Ltd) v Matji NO & others [2003] 11 BLLR 1145 (LC). 
127 Food & Allied Workers Union & others v C G Smith Sugar Ltd, Noodsberg (1989) 10 ILJ 907 (IC). 
128 Food & Allied Workers Union & others v C G Smith supra note 127 at 910D-E. 
129 Food & Allied Workers Union & others v C G Smith supra note 127 at 910D-E. 
130 Shishonga v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & another (2007) 28 ILJ 195 (LC), Hlongwane & 
others v Rector: St Francis College & others 1989 (3) SA 318 (D), Ngobo v Durban Transport Management Board 
(1991) 12 ILJ 1094 (IC), Marutha v Sember CC T/A Review Printers, Pitersburg (1990) 11 ILJ 804 (IC). 
185 
 
“they were afraid for their lives, or being assaulted or whatever the case may be”.131 This is 
highly significant as the foundation of the employer’s case in proceeding with the process 
prescribed by s 189 was due to the belief that the employer possessed insufficient oral evidence, 
without which he would be incapable of proving the guilt of the strikers.132  
 
However, in Southern Sun Hotels (Pty) Ltd v SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union 
& another,133 the LAC stated that there were two dire consequences that would follow if the 
court did not permit the admission of evidence where employees were unable to give oral 
evidence due to fear, intimidation and the threat to their lives.134 Firstly, an employer would not 
be able to prove the employee’s guilt even though the circumstances clearly indicate that they are 
guilty. Secondly, such failure would permit wrongdoers from engaging in an array of criminal 
activity with the security against liability if they can scare off witnesses from testifying or even 
prevent testimony by having witnesses murdered.135 The court further stressed that this was a 
type of evil, which if permitted within our society would “destroy the very foundations on which 
our society is built”.136  
 
The judgments discussed above are in line with the procedure that the LC has approved in 
National Union of Metalworkers & others v Deelkraal Gold Mining Co Ltd,137 which can be 
used in situations of fear of intimidation and harassment that compel evidence to be submitted in 
camera. The court provided a three stage approach that should be followed. The first stage is 
initiated before an open court or arbitration to determine whether the safety of the lives of such 
witnesses necessitate the matter to proceed to the next stage.138 The second stage is when the 
witnesses provide evidence in camera during which the witnesses will be cross-examined by the 
judge, adjudicator or union representative. This stage would not include any hearsay evidence 
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and if the witnesses have provided sufficient reason to believe that there is a valid fear of 
intimidation, then the matter will proceed to the next stage. The third stage is where the witness 
would provide evidence in camera subject to the cross-examination of the union’s 
representatives.139 Even though this would help assist the employer’s case in bringing criminals 
to book, it must be noted that there is a dire moral issue which arises from this case, which is that 
should employees be expected to give evidence at the cost of their own lives, as it is common 
knowledge that in camera proceedings do not provide complete certainty of anonymity.140 
 
In Kapesi supra, Basson J relied upon the judgments discussed above in concluding that the 
employer would have been able to proceed with a disciplinary hearing based on the reasoning 
that excluding hearsay evidence would give perpetrators impunity over heinous crimes.141 The 
primary reason for permitting hearsay evidence was that the interests of justice necessitate that 
society is not left to the evils of wrongdoers without an aid to the injustice committed against 
them as was the norm during apartheid.142 In the past “the majority of the population was 
subjected to the tyranny of the State, [therefore] we cannot now be subjected to the tyranny of 
the mob”.143 These sentiments were further echoed by Van Niekerk J in Ram Transport SA (Pty) 
Ltd v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others.144 This case centered on an unprotected 
strike that was also marred by acts of violence and destruction to the employer’s property as well 
as that of non-striking employees. The court in this regard provided a good illustration as to how 
the courts should deal with acrimonious conduct by strikers when it stated that if strikers engage 
in acts of grievous criminal misconduct then their actions cannot go unpunished but must be 
dealt with by exacting the severest penances that a court of law is permitted to enforce.145 
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The second issue that Basson J in Kapesi supra had to decide on was whether the employer 
could successfully proceed with the retrenchment of the employees via s 189. In this regard the 
court highlighted that this process will only succeed if it can be shown that the dismissal was due 
to the “continued economic viability” of the business. The conduct of the employees must have 
proven that it was impossible for the business to continue.146 A parallel was drawn between the 
present case and Tiger Food Brands Ltd t/a Albany Bakeries v Levy NO & others.147 The 
company was dealing with severe financial loss and appointed a new manager to address the 
issue. All proposals to improve production were obstinately opposed by the workforce. This 
opposition then became violent with death threats to managers as well as attempts to assassinate 
the new manager and one employee had shots fired at his home. As a result of the inability to 
individually identify the perpetrators, as was also the situation in Kapesi supra, the employer 
could not effect disciplinary proceedings against the employees.148 The LC stated that due to the 
threats on the managers’ lives they were unable to perform their tasks in a safe working 
condition. This effectively would mean that the company would be unable to turn the business 
around in order for it to be viable.149 The LC thus concluded that there was an economic reason 
for dismissal. This would satisfy the requirement of an operational reason. However, this does 
not mean that any conduct would give rise to the justification of proceeding with s 189 
proceedings.150 The facts of every case would determine whether this was possible. In Tiger 
Food Brands supra, the economic turnaround of the business was necessary as it was already 
making a loss and the proposals implemented by the managers were indispensable for this very 
purpose. If the managers could not implement the plans in a safe environment then the business 
could not be salvaged.151 The decision in Tiger Food Brands supra, indicate that s 189 may be 
used as a method for dismissing employees who engaged in misconduct during a strike such as 
threats to management, attempts of assignation and even fire shots at employees homes which is 
similar to the misconduct in Kapesi supra, but the ‘economic viability’ of a business as being a 
reason for dismissal as an operational requirement must be proven.152  
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The LC has mentioned that even if the misconduct causes the financial loss, this would not 
vitiate that the retrenchment was to rescue the business from the financial loss.153 In SA 
Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union & others v Pep Stores,154 there was an 
unexplained shrinkage of stock in two of its branches and the failure to protect the stock by 
employees under whose care the stock was placed in. This compelled the employer to close the 
branches pending facilitation on whether there was another way in which the business could be 
saved and if one could not be found then the employer would have to resort to retrenchment as a 
means of saving the business.155 The learned Judge in this regard stated that this was clearly an 
instance where the employer attempted to consider alternate methods of saving the business 
rather than resorting to retrenchment. The retrenchment in this instance would fall squarely on 
the employer’s attempt to ensure the economic viability of the business. Thus, the learned Judge 
concluded that this would satisfy operational requirements.156 The cases of both Pep Stores supra 
and Tiger Food Brands supra, illustrate that the misconduct of the employees must have been the 
basis for saving the “life of the enterprise”.157  
 
However, in Kapesi supra, the employer had based his entire case on the fact that misconduct 
had taken place in the workplace and it was impossible for disciplinary proceedings to succeed 
due to a lack of evidence against perpetrators.158 The court in its reasoning was not persuaded 
that the employer had thus proved that the misconduct was a reason for the economic viability of 
the business, as the applicant did not center its case on this justification. Hence the dismissals 
were held to be both substantively and procedurally unfair.159 The court did mention that the 
continuance of the employment relationship was highly unlikely based on all the violence that 
had occurred and declined to reinstate the employees, but nevertheless awarded compensation in 
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the form of 12 months salary.160 In Kapesi supra, Basson J highlighted two very significant 
issues that pertain to misconduct during strikes. The first is that disciplinary hearings can be 
successfully used even in the absence of oral evidence from victims who are too scared to testify. 
Secondly, that s 189 can be used as a method of dismissal where strikers engaged in violence but 
only if an economic rationale has been established.161 
 
The decision handed down by Basson J, however, was merely the beginning of a protracted legal 
process. As a result of this decision, the union took the matter on appeal. Landman AJA 
considered whether the employer had applied the selection criteria of the alleged offenders 
objectively and without bias.162 The LAC reasoned that the affidavits and statements did not 
indicate the link between the individual perpetrators to the acts of misconduct, but rather the 
identification was connected to operational requirements. There had to have been a personal 
identification of perpetrators so as to prove that the identification was made objectively.163 As a 
result of not being able to identify the perpetrators, Landman AJA could not reason that the 
employment relationship could not continue if these retrenched employees were not identified as 
the wrongdoers. The reasoning of Landman AJA was very different to the judgment of Basson 
J.164 The LC was compassionate towards the possibility that the employment relationship could 
be broken by horrific acts of misconduct, even if the identity of the perpetrators who committed 
the misconduct has not been identified. The LRA also envisages such a possibility which 
supports the decision of Basson J as s 193(2)(b) of the LRA permits the dismissal of employees 
where the employment relationship has become intolerable.165 Landman AJA however was not 
willing to consider s 193(2)(b) with regard to the grievous misconduct of the employees, but 
rather ordered the reinstatement of the employees retrospectively of five years.166 
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However, upon the reinstatement of the dismissed employees, the employer immediately 
suspended the employees and instituted disciplinary hearings. This was met with an application 
by the union interdicting the employer from the disciplinary proceedings. The urgent application 
was then heard at the LC with the intention to begin proceedings afresh.167 Steenkamp J stated 
that it was unfair to pursue proceedings on the basis that no new information had surfaced. 
Furthermore, it stated that it was unfair that since it had decided on a specific course of action 
and had failed to then embark on another course using the same evidence. Only if new evidence 
surfaced could there be a justification for starting the proceedings again.168 It must be noted that 
this was an application for an interdict and the element of ‘irreparable harm’ had to be proven, 
the LC clearly stated that this requirement had not been satisfied but nevertheless permitted the 
granting of the interdict.169 Steenkamp J stated that even though this judgment was in line with 
the legal principles, it had brought “a sense of disquiet” to the court as those who had engaged in 
grievous acts of violent misconduct have walked away from their wrongdoings without suffering 
any adverse consequences of the law.170 Although the court was of this view, it failed to provide 
any remedies that the employer could have followed to rectify the procedural and substantive 
defects in choosing the incorrect procedure.171 It is highly regrettable that the LC has made this 
judgment without providing recourse to the actual victim of the violent strike as there is authority 
that permits making an exceptional case to allow a second disciplinary hearing that would have 
ensured that the perpetrators of the violent misconduct did not go unpunished.172 The case of 
Kapesi supra illustrates that there is a deficiency in the interpretation of violent strikes as courts 
need to create a balance between the tyranny of the strikers and legal principles to provide an 
opportunity for victims of strike violence to correct procedures under the direction of the 
court.173   
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In order to exact the severest of penalties and provide a deterrence to misconduct during strikes, 
the court is also entitled to hold the union and their representatives financially responsible for 
gross misconduct during a strike, as was considered by the LC in Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Montecasino v Future of SA Worker Union & others.174 The case involved a protected picket 
following failed wage negotiations. Even though picketing rules had been formulated, the picket 
was tarnished by acts of criminal conduct. These included the emptying of dirt bins outside the 
employer’s property, burning tyres on the roads, blocking roads, and throwing bricks at police 
vehicles. There were also accounts of assault to patrons and non-striking employees, theft, 
malicious damage to the employer’s property and the property of patrons of Montecasino.175 It is 
imperative to note that the applicant notified the union and the employees that they were in 
material breach of the picketing rules although the union made no attempt to restrain its members 
and maintain order throughout the duration of the strike.176 An interim order was obtained by the 
applicant preventing the strikers from engaging in such unlawful conduct and before the return 
day of the final order, the applicants supplied supplementary affidavits asking that the union and 
its members be held liable for the costs incurred by their actions as there was no denial that they 
had engaged in such conduct. The respondents opposed the application on the basis that they 
were not liable.177 
 
The LC analysed the arguments presented by the respondent and stated that a costs order would 
not have an effect on the continued relationship between the employer and the employees for 
purposes of collective bargaining. The court went on to emphasise that by awarding such costs it 
would serve as a lesson to the respondents that collective bargaining is not authorisation to 
engage in collective brutality. It would also serve as a warning to the union and its officials who 
failed to intervene and that proactive measures are required to take responsibility of the 
irresponsible actions of its members.178 An important remark made by Van Niekerk J was that 
collective bargaining and dispute resolution extends beyond the workplace and into the public 
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sphere.179 It is for this reason that the courts need to address misconduct as this conduct also 
extends to the infringement of the rights of the general public when innocent members of society 
are assaulted, hurt or have their property damaged.180 The severity of the misconduct was further 
highlighted by Van Niekerk J who elucidated that the court will always step in to protect the 
right to strike and picket, however, the purpose of these rights are blackened when individuals 
further these rights through means of appalling acts of violence. In such instances, to protect the 
strike would be tantamount to the protection of violence.181 The valued judgment handed down 
by the court stressed that the court’s disapproval of such heinous acts of violence necessitates the 
severest punishment to deter individuals like the respondents who commit such acts and their 
union and its officials who fail to prevent and control the actions of their members.182 It is 
submitted that this judgment affirms the judgment held by the court in Chemical Energy Paper 
Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union & others v Metrofile (Pty) Ltd,183 where the learned 
judge described violence during strikes as “abhorrent and completely unacceptable”184 and stated 
that the “right to engage in a strike does not give employees the license to engage in 
misconduct”.185  
 
The CC made a landmark decision regarding the court’s stance against trade unions who initiate 
gatherings that turn violent in SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & another v Garvas & 
others.186 In Garvas supra SATAWU called for a protest march following the violent and 
prolonged security strike of 2006. This protest, however, turned violent and riotous. The protest 
caused extensive destruction to vehicles and property of shop owners to the value of 
approximately R 1.5 million.187 The respondents, namely two street traders, one shop owner and 
five vehicle owners whose cars had been vandalizsd as a result of the riot, instituted a claim for 
compensation in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (herein after referred to 
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as the RGA) which conferred liability on the organisers of the gathering if any damage 
occurred.188  
 
The union contended that s 11(1) of the RGA which held organiser’s liable for damage during a 
gathering was unconstitutional as it conflicted with the constitutional right to peacefully 
assemble, demonstrate, picket and make presentations as enshrined in s 17 of the Constitution.189 
It must be noted that the court analysed the term ‘reasonably foreseeable’ in terms of the RGA. 
However, for purposes of elucidating the Constitutional Court’s (CC) approach on violence, the 
discussion of this case will focus only on the argument that s 11(1) the RGA was 
unconstitutional.190 The CC in this regard held that the right to assemble is not an absolute right, 
but rather it is conditional on the basis that it takes place in a peaceful and unarmed manner. 
Where there is a riot it would mean that there was a prevalent feature of violence which excludes 
the application of s 17 of the Constitution.191  
 
The decision in Garvas supra was fundamentally based on the unwarranted use of violence 
during the gathering under the authority of the union. The CC noted that the implications of s 11 
would hold organisers liable for damages caused during a demonstration and would make 
organising gatherings costly. However, the court held that s 11 was justified. However, the CC 
reasoned that this was justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.192 In arriving at its decision 
the CC stated that s 11 served a significant purpose, namely that it was designed to safe guard 
members of our society who have been victims of riotous conduct and lack the means and ability 
to identify and take action against the perpetrators.193 Where a gathering causes danger to the 
health, life and livelihood of the defenseless then organisers of such gatherings must be held 
responsible for initiating the events that lead to the loss incurred.194 The CC held that the extent 
of the limitation on the right to assemble was justified even though it had a dampening effect on 
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s 17 of the Constitution.195 The limitation does not contradict s 17 of the Constitution but merely 
provided stricter guidelines for its enforcement in order to prevent injury or damage to property. 
This limitation also acts as deterrence to unions, as it holds unions accountable when damage 
occurs.196  
 
It must be highlighted that the judgment of Garvas supra elucidates the tradition of violence 
which has been inculcated into strikers by decades of confrontations with the apartheid 
government.197 Adequate cognisance needs to be given to the fact that South Africa has moved 
away from repressive laws198 and has unequivocally welcomed legislation that allows strikers 
and protestors to freely demonstrate their concerns in the public domain.199 However, emphasis 
must be placed on the fact that these entitlements are subject to their peaceful enforcement, as 
“rights and responsibilities go hand in hand”.200 The reason for this restriction is primarily to 
protect the health, safety and maintenance of public order.201  This submission is further enforced 
by international standards cited by the CC in Garvas supra, where the European Court of Human 
Rights expressed its view in Ziliberberg v Moldova202 by stating that: 
“An individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic 
violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if the 
individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behavior”.203 
 
It is abundantly clear that the right to engage in protests and strikes is conditional on the peaceful 
conduct of strikers as those who engage in criminal behavior will not be protected.204 However, 
this does not mean that if the protest or strike causes inconvenience that such conduct will render 
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a union liable.205 It will only be considered unlawful if it excessively infringes the rights of 
others.206 Where individuals are aware of what the law requires, then they are obliged to conform 
their conduct to adhere to such requirements, therefore there is no cause for engaging in 
violence.207  
 
As discussed in the judgments above, the attitude of the court towards misconduct is one of 
intolerance which is further enforced by awarding interdicts to prevent employers from suffering 
irreparable harm caused by the violent actions of employees and their representatives.208 
However, the value of a piece of paper enforced by a court of law must be analysed in light of 
blatant disregard towards interdicts that purport to prohibit the continuation of criminal 
behavior.209  
 
6.4. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTS WITH RESPECT TO 
ILLEGAL STRIKES 
 
One of the ways in which employers can seek to maintain order during a strike that is 
characterised by violence is by applying for an interdict.210 In respect of interdicts, there have 
been many incidents where employers have applied for and obtained urgent interdicts prohibiting 
strikers.211 However, more often than not, interdicts granted by the LC are completely 
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disregarded. The intervention of security officials from both the police and defense force have 
proven futile and businesses as well as society bear the brunt as violence continues.212  
 
The compliance to orders of court is essential to the maintenance of order and peace within 
society as was illustrated in Modise & others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath.213 The case centered on 
a failure to adhere to an urgent interdict which was granted by the SCA declaring the strike 
unprotected. The LAC, in its dissenting judgment handed down by Conradie J, made a 
significant remark as to the importance of obeying court orders when it stated that court orders 
are not afforded the respect which they ought to receive. This is evident in their blatant non-
compliance to interdicts. The court is called upon to ensure that it penalises those who do not 
comply with such orders.214 This view was further endorsed in North West Star (Pty) Ltd (under 
judicial management) v Serobatse & another,215 where the learned Judge Davis JA held that a 
society that disregards an order of court would soon be overcome by lawlessness and anarchy.216 
The judiciary has illustrated that where there is a willful failure to comply with an order of court 
there will be no leniency afforded to such wrongdoers.217 
 
The court’s lack of leniency towards individuals who are non-compliant with court orders was 
portrayed in Security Systems Employers’ Organization & others v SA Transport & Allied 
Workers Union & others.218 In Security Systems supra an urgent interdict was obtained following 
a protected strike in the security services sector that involved appalling acts of violence, 
including murder, countless injuries, vandalism, and damage to the employer’s property as well 
as private property.219 In terms of the interdict, the members of the union were interdicted from 
any violence, intimidation, harassment and assault of non-striking and replacement workers and 
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the union was instructed to affix copies of the interdict on all doors of the employers’ premises 
throughout the country in all languages. This was a clear and precise instruction which gave the 
union no room to misunderstand what was expected of it.220 The courts have been unrelenting 
towards applying a strict approach to what the interdict specifically requires the party to do or 
not to do.221 
  
The honorable Mokgouthlheng AJ considered that in terms of the rule nisi pertaining to the 
union members, it was pointless confirming the rule on the return date as the strike had ended, 
therefore, the purpose of the interdict which was to bring an end to the violence and other 
criminal acts had fallen away.222 However, in terms of the rule nisi pertaining to the union and its 
officials, the court analysed whether there was a mala fide and wilful intention not to adhere to 
the interdict. The argument presented by the respondents was merely to state that they were not 
in a position to put an end to the violence or to prevent the compliance of the order.223 The facts 
of the case revealed that the union had not affixed the order or the terms in numerous cities, nor 
had it communicated the order or the terms via radio when given the opportunity, furthermore 
the union did not communicate the order on the website of the company. There had been no steps 
taken by the respondents to comply with the rule nisi.224 Mokgouthlheng AJ took into account 
the evidence discussed above as well as the respondents’ argument in reaching the decision that 
the respondents had not proved that their failure to comply with the order was not wilful and 
mala fide. The court on this basis confirmed that they were in contempt of court.225 The first 
respondent was fined R500 000 with a five year suspension on condition that it is not found 
guilty of contempt on any further order made by the LC.226  
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The case of Security Services supra has highlighted the significant requirements to prove a 
contempt of court allegation, which is that those who disregard court orders will be severely 
penalised as a means of exerting the authority of the court.227 Even though there have been 
instances where employees and unions have been held accountable for contempt of court orders 
especially during unprotected strikes,228 these cases are too few to adequately portray the court’s 
uncompromising attitude towards such offenders.229 This is partly due to the requirement that the 
conduct which the applicant seeks to interdict has to be indicated precisely as is required in civil 
proceedings.230 In Security Services supra it was clearly stated in the interdict that the union was 
ordered to put up copies of the order to make the employees aware that such an order had been 
granted. Thus, having failed to comply with this clear order the court found the union to be 
contempt.231 
 
However, the problem arises when there is no clear instruction given to the interdicted party and 
the LAC is unwilling to broadly interpret terms as was the case in Food & Allied Workers Union 
v In2Food.232 This case was an appeal from the judgment of the LC.233 The initial proceeding 
was based on an interim order that had been granted against an unprotected strike that involved 
acts of violence, intimidation, assault and harassment. This was completely disregarded by the 
union and its members who continued to strike. The employer then applied and obtained another 
interim order to provide reason as to why they should not be held in contempt, thereby effecting 
the imprisonment of the employees and a claim of R500 000 against the union. On the return day 
the employer abandoned its proceedings against the employees.234   
 
The rule nisi was confirmed on the basis that the respondents’ answering affidavit merely 
provided denials to the allegations without any substantiation. The court took into account that 
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the interdict had been properly served on the respondents and declined to go any further into the 
evidence other than to say that on all the evidence before it there was sufficient evidence that the 
union was in contempt of the order.235 The court confirmed the rule and the union was held to be 
liable for the payment of R500 000. In its judgment the court highlighted a significant reason for 
its decision for imposing the penalty upon the union when it stated that: 
“[t]he time has come in our labour relations history that trade unions should be held 
accountable for the actions of their members. For too long trade unions have glibly washed 
their hands of the violent actions of their members. This in a context where the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995, which has now been in existence for some 17 years and of which 
trade unions, their office-bearers and their members are well aware, makes it extremely easy to 
go on a protected strike..”.236  
The court’s decision was based on the fact that there was no excuse for the extent of violence 
that the employees engaged in during the unprotected strike especially since the LRA has been 
enacted to provide a simple procedure that would render a strike protected. Furthermore, the 
court stated that these uncalled acts of violence diminish the effectiveness of orderly collective 
bargaining.237 It must be noted that strike action is a component of collective bargaining without 
which the structures of collective bargaining would have no foundation.238 When strikes are 
marred by acts of violence, intimidation, harassment, death threats and assassination attempts 
against managers, the effectiveness of collective bargaining is also tainted and undermined.239 In 
this way it is no longer the negotiation process with the threat of the strike that exerts pressure on 
the employer to give into the demands of the employees, but rather it is the end to the violence 
that coerces the employer.240 The union was aware that the actions of its members were 
unlawful, however, it did not take any measures to prevent or discourage the furtherance of the 
strike and attributed all cause for the strike as being solely due to the employer’s refusal to 
bargain and further absolved itself and its employees from all liability. Thus, on this basis the 
rule had to be confirmed.241 
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However, this was not the end of the matter as FAWU took the matter on appeal. The union 
contended on a single argument that there was no evidence to prove that they were in contempt 
of the order. The court considered that the interdict specifically stated that the union must cease 
to ‘continue’ the strike.242 In light of the first argument that was presented by the respondent that 
the union is liable for the actions of its members, the court stated that in an interdict there is a 
difference between a juristic person being liable for its members and a juristic person being 
liable as a separate legal entity. A contempt of court investigation is merely to determine whether 
the union specifically did what the interdict stated it should not do.243 The second argument made 
by the respondents asserted that it was implied that the union had to take steps to prevent the 
continuation of the strike. In terms of this argument the court stated that there could not be a 
generous interpretation to the word ‘continue’ that would infer that the union had to take steps to 
positively end the strike. The reason for this was that contempt of court proceedings could not be 
taken lightly due to the quasi-criminal implications. On this basis the court further elaborated 
that there was no evidence to show that the union had continued with the strike or blocked 
entrances after the date that the second interdict had been served. All that was required in terms 
of the interdict was for it, as a juristic person, to discontinue with the strike.244 The court thus 
concluded that the interdict was too vague and did not specifically state that the union had to take 
steps to end the strike by its members and on that basis the appeal was upheld.245  
 
This decision is to be criticized s in Tsogo sun supra the court clearly stated that the severest of 
punishment should be given where the union “fails or refuses to take all steps that are responsible 
to prevent its occurrence”.246 Even though the interdict did not specifically state that the union 
had to take steps to end the strike, Sutherland AJA should have given more consideration to the 
respondents’ arguments in light of the  pivotal case of Food & Allied Workers Union v Ngcobo 
NO & another.247 In Ngcobo supra, FAWU had failed to refer the dispute within the 90 day 
period. The union, after being approached by the employees regarding the matter, referred the 
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matter to another official who assured the employees that he would apply for condonation.248 
This was never pursued by the official, but instead he attempted to take the matter back to the 
CCMA to start the proceedings afresh. This was justifiably refused. The official then sought 
legal advice from its attorney who advised that the employees were unfairly dismissed and any 
award as to costs would be made adversely. On this basis, the union withdrew its representation 
of the employees and informed them that it would not proceed with their claims in the LC. The 
CC decided that a union can be held liable for failing to refer a matter on behalf of its members 
and if the union does commit such a failure then the members are entitled to compensation.249 
Cameron J considered the facts in light of the two arguments made by FAWU. The first being 
that there was an implied term that the union was entitled to withdraw its representation when it 
no longer served its interest to represent the members and secondly that the failure to refer the 
dispute was not in breach of the agreement with its employees.250 The first argument will be 
considered as it provides a good illustration on how unions become liable when they represent 
their members. Cameron J considered the premise of the union that s 23 of the Constitution 
allowed a union 'to determine its own administration, programs and activities', thus absolving it 
from liability. However, the court reasoned that this provision is merely to ensure that unions are 
afforded independence in the furtherance of the interests of its members. However, this provision 
does not state how the union should engage in such furtherance nor does it state that a union is 
provided immunity from damages claims.251  
 
The union also averred that s 200 of the LRA and s 23(4)(a) and the union’s constitutional clause 
5.11 which states that the aims and objectives allows it to provide legal assistance to officials and 
members where it is in the interests of the union, allowed the union to withdraw its assistance at 
any time when it was not in the union’s interest to do so.252 It must be noted that s 200 of the 
LRA allows a union to act in three capacities, firstly in its own interest, secondly on behalf of its 
members and thirdly, in the interests of its members.253 In light of In2Food supra, FAWU and its 
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members had been acting collectively in the unprotected strike, which is evident from the union 
organiser’s statement that it represents and acts on behalf of its members.254 Furthermore, by 
stating that the unprotected strike was a result of the employer’s actions and by extricating all 
liability of itself and its members, this conveys that firstly, FAWU was acting on behalf of its 
members and thirdly that it was aware of the misconduct and unlawfulness of its members’ 
actions and condoned it.255 This harmful attitude was highlighted in Garvas supra where the 
court stated that “unlawful behavior … threatens the fabric of civilized society and … 
undermines the rule of law”.256 In regard to the defense of FAWU in Ngcobo supra, Cameron J 
stated that the union had placed unwarranted weight on this provision as it is only promulated to 
provide unions legal standing to represent its members, it does not however provide immunity. 
Furthermore, clause 5.11 is merely to indicate the objectives of the union, it does not regulate the 
functions of the Union.257  
 
The learned judge noted that the union’s constitution contradicted its own case and conferred 
liability rather than immunity. In clause 32 it states that shop stewards, officials, committee 
members and office-bearers are indemnified of costs, incurred as a result of negligence provided 
their actions do not constitute misconduct.258 It must be noted that in In2Food supra, there was 
gross misconduct which included the participation of the union. The purpose of this clause is to 
ensure that those belonging to the union are held accountable when they engage in acts of 
misconduct.259 It must be emphasised that the LRA in s 200(1)(b) infers that unions represent the 
attitude and actions of their members. Therefore, the actions of unions and members are one and 
the same. It is common knowledge that juristic bodies cannot think or act, thus it is only by the 
actions of their members that they are rendered liable.260 However, the court in In2Food supra 
clearly stated that an interdict is to be taken seriously and must be clear and must make a 
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distinction between juristic persons acting in their own capacity and juristic persons acting on 
behalf of their members.261  
 
However, even though that may be the case, the role and function of the LC must be analysed in 
the light of violent strike activity that has plagued our country.262 It must be noted that the 
employees who had engaged in the violent misconduct were disciplined and consequently 
dismissed. It can be noted that justice had been served in this regard.263 However, the 
disallowance of a generous interpretation into the word ‘continue’ ultimately led Sutherland AJA 
to allow the union to escape any penalties for its involvement in the unprotected strike. The 
scales of justice in this case have clearly tilted towards the union, as the loss of R16 million has 
to be solely borne by the employer.264 The purpose of an interdict is to prevent irreparable harm 
to the victim; it is therefore ironic that the LAC has enforced harm to the employer through its 
judgement in In2Food supra.265 It is submitted that in light of the gross forms of misconduct that 
were permitted to take place under the powers of the union and the fact that the union condoned 
such atrocious conduct, the court in In2Foods supra should have been more compassionate 
towards the moral implications of not exacting punishment against the union as was illustrated in 
S v Mamabolo (E TV & others intervening).266 The CC as per the judgment handed down by 
Kreigler J in Mamabolo supra, held that the judiciary is required to depend on moral authority, 
without which it would be impossible to enforce its power as watchdog over the Bill of Rights.267 
The judiciary can only function properly if it obtains the trust and dependency of society by 
successfully protecting the ethical and moral values of citizens. Protecting ethical values would 
be protecting society from horrific acts of violence by unprotected strikers.268 Thus in response 
to the strict enforcement of the rule of law by Sutherland AJA in In2Foods supra, the CC in 
                                                          
261 Food & Allied Workers Union v In2Food supra note 232 at 2771G-H. 
262 Rycroft (note 165; 2505). 
263 Food & Allied Workers Union v In2Food supra note 232 at 2591F-G. 
264 Food & Allied Workers Union v In2Food supra note 232 at 2774[20]. 
265 A Rycroft ‘What can be done about strike-related violence?’ Labour Law Research Inaugural Conference, 
Barcelona 13-15 June 2013 7.  
266 S v Mamabolo (E TV & others intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC). 
267 S v Mamabolo (E TV & others intervening) supra note 266 at 16.  
268 S v Mamabolo (E TV & others intervening) supra note 266 at 18-19.  
204 
 
Mamabolo supra held that “where the Judiciary cannot function properly the rule of law must 
die”.269  
 
The judgment handed down in In2Food supra clearly indicates that there is a missing link 
between what the legal principles required for contempt of court and the moral obligations of the 
court.270 Furthermore, In2Food supra has highlighted an important point which is that the LC 
and LAC require a distinction between a trade union and the trade union’s members’ when 
drafting an interdict because the LAC requires that contempt be proven against the union in its 
own right. Thus it can be deduced that in terms of an interdict a trade union and its members are 
regarded to be two separate bodies.271 This is highly concerning as s 68 of the LRA does not 
infer that there has to be a separation made between a trade union and its members when drafting 
an interdict.272 The case of In2Food supra illustrates that a contempt of court penalty can never 
substitute for a reactive stance from legislature nor will it be a shield against society’s growing 
discontent of violent and criminal behavior during strikes.273 The effectiveness of the LC and the 
LAC came under scrutiny during a SASLAW address by Van Niekerk J who reasoned that the 
viewpoint and role of the court is undermined when strikers advance their interests by exceeding 
the barriers of the law. One of the ways in which the courts could reaffirm their authority is by 
providing a narrow interpretation of the provisions of the LRA.274 
 
The analysis of cases which illustrate misconduct during strikes and the lack of adherence 
towards interdicts shows that violence, intimidation, harassment and destruction to property has 
become inculcated in strike action to the extent that it has “been established as a tradition”.275 A 
possible contributor to such violence could be the liberal interpretation of the procedural 
                                                          
269 S v Mamabolo (E TV & others intervening) supra note 266 at 18-19. 
270 Food & Allied Workers Union v In2Food supra note 232 at 2774[19]. 
271 M Ling ‘Draft the terms you mean’ 2014 Without Prejudice 38. 
272 The LRA; s 68. 
273 Rycroft (note 166; 6). 
274 Myburgh (note 168; 71).  
275 P Benjamin ‘Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)’ 
Working Paper No. 47 (2013) 35. 
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requirements of the right to strike.276 An excessive interpretation of legislation can be detrimental 
as it often causes the scales of power to tilt either in the favour of employers or employees, 
which impedes the purpose of orderly dispute resolution.277 The liberal interpretation of s 65(2) 
of the LRA by the CC can cause an acrimonious and volatile atmosphere as a result of the 
principle enunciated in SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto No & 
another.278 If employers are unaware of the extent of the strike, they cannot prepare for it. 
Consequently, when there is uncertainty it leads to an unstable arena that forms the breeding 
ground for violence. A strike that is constructed upon instability is bound to become violent and 
chaotic.279 The interpretation of the LRA should not focus solely on the implications of the right 
to strike on employees, but rather it should extend its scope towards an external effect an 
interpretation would have on society as a whole,280 as strikes extend outside of the employment 
relationship and their consequences are experienced by all citizens especially those who are 
victims of violent strike action.281  
 
It must be considered that when strikers engage in violence and intimidation this ultimately 
negates individuals’ freedom to decide whether they would want to participate in the strike. This 
violence and harassment adversely affects the lives of non-strikers and endangers their health 
and safety.282 It has been proposed by government that the introduction of compulsory ballots 
prior to a protected strike would largely decrease violence and intimidation against non-striking 
employees.283 The lack of mandatory secret ballots can be viewed as a contributor towards the 
instability of initiating strikes.284 An additional proposal was made by government for extending 
the 30 day “cooling off” period enshrined in s 65(1) to 60 days and an extension to 30 days for 
                                                          
276 The LRA; s 65 (2). 
277 J Romeyn ‘Striking a balance: the need for further reform of the law relating to industrial action’, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library, accessed on 15 June 2015. 
278 SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto No & another (2012) 33 ILJ 2549 (CC). 
279 M A Chicktay ‘Employment, the economy & growth: The implications for labour law’ paper presented at 
Sandton Convention Centre  30 July-1 August 2013 17. 
280 C Thompson ‘Essential services and the unfair labour practice remedy’ (1992) 13 ILJ 500 at 500. 
281 S Mottier & P Bond ‘Social protest in South Africa’, available at http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/default.asp?2.27.3.1858, 
accessed on 15 June 2015. 
282 D Horsten & C le Grange ‘The limitation of the educator’s right to strike by the child’s right to basic education’ 
(2012) 27(1) SAPL 514. 
283 M Malefane ‘Proposals ‘an attack on unions’’ Sowetan 8 December 2011 at 4. 
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establishing picketing rules.285 Even though these proposals have been vehemently rejected by 
unions, it draws cognisance to the necessary balance that needs to be struck between the right to 
strike and the rights of everyday citizens, the protection of private, municipal and state property, 
street traders, non-striking employees and health, safety and environmental considerations.286  
 
There has also been a recommendation to implement compulsory arbitration in the public sector 
that would effectively ensure that public sector employees were treated the same as employees 
within essential services.287 However, this recommendation must be considered in the light of the 
democratic values of society as well as the fact that compulsory arbitration is currently not as 
successful as the legislature would have hoped it would be as employees within essential services 
still embark on strikes. Furthermore, it would add to the growing frustration of the dissatisfied 
public sector employees.288  It is submitted that there needs to be more attention given to strikes 
especially with regard to the misconduct that is anticipated with industrial action.289 This urgent 
need had been responded to by the National Economic, Development and Labour Council 
committee (Nedlac) who agreed on a code of good practice specifically centered on collective 
bargaining and industrial action. The code is intended to address the entire phase of dispute 
resolution which would include regulations on pre-negotiation, the negotiation process, post-
negotiation proceedings, dispute, and the implementation of industrial action and lockouts as 




                                                          
285 ibid 11. 
286 W Khuzwayo ‘Cosatu sees red over proposed changes to LRA’ STAR 7 November 2011 at 15. 
287 W R Maclaurin ‘Recent experience with compulsory arbitration in Australia’ (1938) 28(1) The American 
Economic Review 67. 
288 D S Grant & M Wallace ‘Why dos trikes turn violent?’ (1991) 96(5) American Journal of Sociology 1125. 
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The LRA has effectively enshrined provisions that deter and prevent unruly behaviour during 
strikes such as dismissal, interdicts, the awarding of compensation to victims of strike 
violence.291 However, the situation becomes tricky when unions are not involved in calling 
strikes and employees embark on rampant strikes to secure their demands.292 It must be noted 
that in instances of wildcat strikes, union involvement is excluded and includes an undeniable 
characteristic of violence embedded in asserting demands as was evident in the Marikana 
strike.293 It must be further highlighted that incidents such as the Marikana strike are by no 
means unique as it has become the norm for poverty stricken individuals as they fight for 
survival.294 The essence of strikes and protest action exceeds the ordinary boundaries of the 
employment relationship and focuses on far greater social and political deficiencies of the 
country.295 There is a culture of violence that has become integrated in the battle for housing, 
water, electricity and a decent wage which has now evolved into a class struggle.296 These events 
have created an avalanche of terror as protestors and strikers burn tyres and vehicles, loot shops, 
destroy buildings, block roads and violently confront police.297 These unprecedented torrents of 
strike violence reveal an inherent flaw within the social dynamics of society which have been 
inherited from colonial times.298 It is far beyond the scope and capabilities of a single piece of 
legislation, namely, the LRA to address the plight of society’s underdogs and their growing 
frustration about a living wage,299 nor can it be expected that the LRA should provide a cure for 
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the ineffective structures within our socio-economic structures.300 This requires aggressive 
intervention from our political leaders who possess greater power to address this inadequacy.301  
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The right to strike has become recognized as a fundamental right within the national and 
international community. This right has earned its pertinence for the pivotal role it has played in 
shaping labour laws and seeking to instill equality within the workplace as well as society as a 
whole.1The significance of strike action is evident in South Africa as the former part of the 20th 
century experienced a rise in strike action as a response to the inequalities relating to job 
opportunities and wages between black and white workers.2However, it was these inequalities 
that provided black workers with the impetus to revolt against discriminatory laws within the 
industrial and political sphere.3Strike action thus contributed to the development of labour 
legislation that sought to bring impartiality within the labour industry through the promulgation 
of labour legislation.4 
TheLabour Relations Act of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the LRA) has been government’s 
reactive response to the deficiencies within the industrial and social field but it has also been the 
first legislation to endorse the right to strike across all races without any repercussions provided 
thatthestrike has followed the procedure stipulated by the LRA.5The main aim of the LRA has 
been to rewrite the injustices of the past.6 In light of the recent violent strikes, the effectiveness 
                                                          
1 LJ Matee ‘Limitation on Freedom of Association: The case of Public Officers in Lesotho’ (unpublished LLM 
thesis, University of Kwazulu-Natal, 2013) 9. 
2S van der Velden& W Visser ‘Strikes in the Netherlands and South Africa, 1900-1998: a comparison’ (2006) 30(1) 
SAJLR 52. 
3M Beittal ‘Labor Unrest in South Africa 1870-1970’ (1995) 18(1) Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 90. 
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of controlling the unruly conduct of strikers has come under spotlight.7  It is quite evident from 
the chapters discussed within this dissertation that the LRA has promulgated procedures for 
ensuring the protection of strikes. The LRA has also entrenched a number of methods for 
controlling and preventing illegal strike action as discussed in chapter six. Furthermore, the 
Judiciaryhas clamped down on strikers and unions who engage in misconduct during strikes. 
However, these violent strikes are indicative of the fact that South Africans have inherited a 
pervasive culture of strife from the apartheid era which is still used today to satisfy their 
demands.8 Many of the social and economic frustrations that South Africans have experienced 
have seeped into the workplace.9 The similarities of these strikes to those during apartheid range 
beyond mere violence, but rather include the weakened relationship between government and 
workers which ultimately leads to such violent conduct.10 
There are many contributors to the violence and unwarranted illegal conduct of strikers such as 
inequality, poverty, union rivalry, unemployment to name a few,11 however, this dissertation has 
merely considered the legal perspective on possible pitfalls and the likely recommendations that 
could decrease strike violence. These, however, must be analyzed in light of the democratic 
values of our country, as no amount of laws will eliminate the violence entrenched in strikes, 
although it may be probable that government could positively contribute to reducing the 
unlawful conduct of strikers if it intervened to shape strike activity.12 A further consideration 
which must be acknowledged is that even though the Legislature may propose amendments to 
improve themanagement and supervision of strike activity, it ultimately depends on how these 
laws are implemented through the court system that would bring about success.13 
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